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T r a d i t i o n a l ly  r a t i o n a l i t y  h as  b een  a n a ly sed  in  r a t h e r
p u r i s t i c  te rm s ; th u s  r a t i o n a l  a c c e p tan ce  has been
p re se n te d  as  u n s u l l i e d  by th e  demands o f  com peting c la im s -  th e
o n ly  demand a d m itted  g e n e r a l ly  b - in g  t r u t h  ( *Do n o t have f a l s e
b e l i e f s * ) .  Such a view  le a d s  us to  th e  s tra ig h tfo rr-T ard
r^ - je c tio n  o f  th e  t h e s i s  t h a t  a  r u le  o f  detachm ent f o r
p r o b a b i l i t y  s ta te m e n ts  i s  s u f f i c i e n t  to  e x p l ic a te  r a t io n a l
a c c e p ta n c e ; s in c e  such  a r u le  l e a d s ,  a p p a re n t ly  u n a v o id a b ly ,
to  th e  l o t t  ry  p a ra d o x . (b o ttk -ry  Paradox* A ccept o n ly
th o s r  p r o p o s i t io n s  uhos p r o b a b i l i t y  i s  shovm to  be  g r e a te r
th an  H p eo p le  e n te r  a  l o t t e r y ,  th a r r  'o re  th e
îf~l yp r o b a b i l i t y  o f  an in d iv id u a l  lo s in g  i s  /ÏÏ; t h i s  goes f o r  
each  s e p a r a t e ly  and so  w may a c c e p t t h a t  each  w i l l  lo s  , and so
t h a t  a l l  w i l l  l o s e .  B ut we know th a t  t h i s  i s  f a l s e . ) .
The a p p e a l o f  th i s  r a t h e r  contem ptuous tre a tm e n t 'd im in ishes 
in  th e  fa c e  o f  th e  P re fa c e  P arad o x . (p re fa c e  P aradox; A 
man w r i te s  th e  fo l lo w in g ,  em in e n tly  r e a s o n a b le ,  l i n e s ;  Bach 
o f  th e  p r o p o s i t io n s  I  a s s e r t  in  t h i s  book I  b - l i e v o  to  be t r u e ;
b u t  I  am a l s o  s u re  t h a t  some w i l l  b e  p rov  d f a l s e . ) .  I f  we
re a so n  as  b e fo re  we have to a c c e p t th e  im p o s s ib i l i ty  o f  r a t i o n a l  
b e l i e f .
The two paradoxes a r e  exam ined in  d e t a i l  and t h e i r  
consequences s p e l t  ou t in  C h ap te r One; g iv in g  us t  o 
a l t e r n a t i v e s ;
( l )  To show , d e s p i te  ap p ear a r c o s , t h a t  n e i th e r  
s e t  o f  b e l i e f s  i s  i n c o n s i s t e n t ,  
o r  ( 2 ) To show some d i f f e r c n c ' betw een th e  t^ o  paradoxes 
t h a t  e n a b le s  th^* t r a d i t i o n a l  view  o f  r a t i o n a l i t y  
to  s e p a ra te  them .
( 1 ) i s  r e j e c t e d , and ( 2 ) in  th e  co u rse  o f th e  same 
a rg u m en t, in  C h ap te rs  Two and T h re e , where we fo rm u la te  a
c o n tin u e d    ...............
pa ge 2 .
c r i t e r i o n  f o r  th e  c o n s is te n c y  o f  s e t s  o f  b e l i e f s  , defend  
i t  a g a in s t  a p p a re n t c o u n te r -e x a m p le s , (v e rs io n s  o f  Moore’s 
Paradox) and d e m o n s tra te  t h a t  b o th  s e t s  o f  b e l i e f s  a re  
i n c o n s i s t e n t .  T h is  d e s p i t e  a tte m p ts  by some, n o ta b ly  
K yburg, to  show th e  o p p o s i te .
I f  we a re  bo avo id  c o n c lu d in g  r a t i o n a l i t y  
b a n k r u p t , and y e t  m a in ta in  o u r o r ig in a l  r e a c t io n  to  th e  
r u le  o f  de tachm en t we must do t-- o th in g s ;
( a )  r e j e c t  th e  r u le  o f  de tachm ent on grounds_ 
o th e r  th a n  th e  L o t te r y  p a rad o x .
(b )  g iv e  an acco u n t o f  r a t i o n a l i t y  th a t  w i l l  
accommodate th e  P re fa c e  p a rad o x .
In  C h ap te r Four we j u s t i f y  ( a )  by  c o n s id e r in g  
th e  asym m etries th a t  con be shown to  e x i s t  b tw een th e  
syntax: o f  th e  c l a s s i c a l  p r o b a b i l i t y  c a lc u lu s  and th e  s y n ta x  
o f c o n f irm a tio n  in  o rd in a ry  la n g u a g e , and by  p o in t in g  to  
th e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  en co u n te re d  in  g iv in g  an ad eq u a te  se m a n tic s  
to  such  a c a lc u lu s  when c a s t in n th e  r o le  o f  e c a lc u lu s  o f  
c o n f irm a tio n .
F i n a l l y ,  in  C h ap te r F iv e ,  w? p r e s e n t  a  more 
complex acco u n t o f  r a t i o n a l i t y ,  c a p ab le  o f  accommodating 
th e  P re fa c r  P a rad o x , one w hich ta k e s  s r i  u s ly  th e  d iv e r s e  
needs o f  human b e in g s .
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C h ap ter One
An I n t r o d u c t io n  to  th e  L o t te r y  and P re fa c e  P a rad o x es ,
I t  h a s  been  a t r a d i t i o n a l  to p ic  o f  d is c u s s io n  among ep is te ra o -  
l o g i s t s  w h e th e r , o r  n o t ,  ou r b e l i e f s ,  o r  some o f  them , co u ld  be 
r a t i o n a l ;  a n d , i f  th e y  c o u ld , u n d e r  what c o n d i t io n s .  A ttem pts 
have been  m ade,by p r e s e n t in g  v a r io u s  s c e p t i c a l  argumentSy to  
8_how t h a t  some, o r  in d e e d , m ost o f  o u r b e l i e f s  a re  i r r a t i o n a l ,  
and cou ld  n o t be o th e rw is e .  Such argum ents as  a re  o f fe re d  run  
som eth ing  a lo n g  th e  fo llo w in g  l i n e s ;  most o f  our b e l i e f s  ^ re  
o b ta in e d  by  n o n -d e d u c tiv e  in f e r e n c e ,  n o n -d e d u c tiv e  in fe re n c e s  a re  
u n j u s t i f i a b l e  -  f o r  re a so n s  A ,B ,C ,, ,  -  hence i r r a t i o n a l ,  th e r e fo r e  
m ost o f  o u r  b e l i e f s  a re  i r r a t i o n a l .  We may c o u n te r  argum ents 
o f  t h i s  ty p e  by a t te m p tin g  to  show th a t  in  each  ca se  th e  second 
p rem iss  i s  f a l s e ,  o r  we may r e j e c t  t h i s  p iecem eal a t t a c k  in  
fa v o u r  o f  s^ome more g e n e ra l  c r i t i c i s m  t h a t  may be  l e v e l l e d  a t  
any argum ent o f  th e  above ty p e  -  t h a t  i s  no m a t te r  how A ,B ,C ,, ,  
a r e  f i l l e d  i n .  I t  i s  t h i s  second approach  t h a t  i s  ta k e n  by 
P .P .  S traw son  in  h is  book I n t r o d u c t io n  to  L o g ic a l Theory where he 
s^ay s  th e  fo llO T d.ng i-
We have a lr e a d y  see n  t h a t  th e  r a t i o n a l i t y  o f  in d u c t io n ,  
u n l ik e  i t s  ’s u c c e s s f u ln e s s *, i s  n o t a  f a c t  abou t th e  
c o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  th e  w o rld . I t  i s  a  m a t te r  o f  what we 
mean by th e  word • r a t io n a l*  in  i t s  a p p l i c a t io n  to  any 
p ro ce d u re  f o r  fo rm in g  o p in io n s  abou t what l i e s  o u ts id e  
o u r o b s e rv a t io n s  o r  t h a t  o f  a v a i la b le  w i tn e s s e s ,
B ut by  s t a t i n g ,  as  he d o e s ,  t h a t  i t  i s  p a r t  o f  th e  m eaning 
o f  th e  word • r a t io n a l*  t h a t  th e  p ro c e sse s  by  which wo c h a r a c t e r i s t i ­
c a l l y  a c q u ire  o u r b e l i e f s  a re  r a t i o n a l  $ StraTison s c a r c e ly  ta k e s  
th e  argum ent beyond c o u n te r—a s s e r t i o n ;  and i n  an. a tte m p t to  ta k e  
th e  argum ent f u r t h e r  th e r e  h as grovm up a  v a s t  l i t e r a t u r e  on th e  
n a tu r e  o f  r a t i o n a l  inq^^u iry . On th e  a ssu m p tio n , o f  c o u r s e ,  t h a t
( a )  p p ,260-61
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r a t i o n a l  in q u i r y  te rm in a te s  in  r a t i o n a l  b e l i e f  and hence th a ^ t  a 
c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n  o f  th e  n a tu r e  o f  r a t i o n a l  in q u i r y  v z i l l , a t  
" ‘ l e a s t ,  p ro v id e  a  b a s i s  f o r  an answ er to  th e  q u e s t io n  •Can human
b e in g s  have r a t i o n a l  b e l i e f s ? *
I n  th e  c o u rse  o f  t h i s  d e b a te  th e r e  have b een  d is c o v e re d  two 
p a ra d o x e s , w hich th r e a t e n  e i t h e r  to  d e c id e  th e  d e b a te  on th e  
s ^ id e  o f  th e  s c e p t i c ,  o r  to  r e v e a l  some u n ex p ec ted  c o m p le x it ie s  
i n  o u r  c o n c ep t o f  r a t i o n a l i t y .  I t  i s  to  th e s e  two p a rad o x es  
and t h e i r  consequences t h a t  we a d d re s s  o u rse lv e s *  B ut b e f o re  
we do so  we m ust f i r s t  co n d u c t a  few  p r e l im in a r ie s  i n  o rd e r  th e  
more p r e c i s e l y  t o  d e l i n e a t e  th e  scope  o f  o u r i n v e s t i g a t i o n s .
The p r e d ic a te  * - i s  r a t io n a l*  can  be  a p p l ie d  to  a  b e w ild e r in g  
v a r i e t y  o f  th in g s*  a c t s ,  b e l i e f s ,  b e t s ,  commands, d e c i s io n s ,  
an im a ls  and so  on* From t h i s  f a c t  and from  th e  c e n t r a l  p la c e  
th e  c o n c ep t o f  r a t i o n a l i t y  h a s ,  i t  would seem re a s o n a b le  to
/
Ac s j ip p o s e  t h a t  an a c c o u n t o f  t h a t  n a tu r e  o f  r a t i o n a l  b e l i e f  i s
n o t  t o  b e  had b y  f i r s t  f in d in g  an acco u n t o f  r a t i o n a l i t y  and 
th e n  a p p ly in g  i t  to  th e  p a r t i c u l a r  c a se  o f  b e l i e f .  B u t ,  r a t h e r ,  
t h a t  i n v e s t i g a t i o n s  m ust ta k e  p la c e  i n  th e  r e v e r s e  o r d e r .  Thus 
i t  i s  % a t  an a n a l y s e s  o f  th e  n a tu r e  o f  r a t i o n a l  b e l i e f  t r i l l  
shed  l i g h t  on th e  problem  o f  p ro d u c in g  a  g e n e ra l  u n i t a r y  acco u n t 
o f  r a t i o n a l i t y .
We w i l l  g e t  an id e a  o f  what i s  in v o lv e d  in  t h i s  n a rro w in g  
dotjn by  c o n s id e r in g  what happens when an in d iv id u a l  comes to  
b e l i e v e  a  p r o p o s i t io n .  I n  some e t i o l a t e d  s e n se  o f  th e  word 
•d e c is io n *  when an in d iv id u a l  comes to  b e l ie v e  a  p r o p o s i t io n ,
 ^ ^  sa y  p ,  he may be s a id  to  have p ro v id e d  h im s e lf  w ith  an answ er to
1 ; [ th e  q u e s t io n  *May I ,  o r  may I  n o t ,  b e l i e v e  p ? * T here  a r e  some
, in  m aking t h i s  d e c i s io n ,  
f - q u i t e  o b v io u s  f a c t o r s  in v o lv e d  f o r  exam p le , th e  n a tu r e  o f
e v i d e n t i a l  s u p p o r t .  H ow ever, i t  i s  a t  l e a s t  c o n c e iv a b le  t h a t
■» 8 —
th e r e  a re  o t h e r ,  l e s s  o b v io u s , f a c t o r s  in v o lv ed *  C o n s id e r  
th e  p r o p o s i t io n  'H eg ro es  have in n a t e l y  i n f e r i o r  i n t e l l e c t u a l  
c a p a c i t i e s  to  C a u c a s ia n s* , now i t  m ight bo th e  c a se  t h a t  w ith  
r e s p e c t  to  some g e n e ra l  u n i t a r y  acco u n t o f  r a t i o n a l i t y  th e  
d e c is io n  to  b e l i e v e  su ch  a p r o p o s i t io n  would in v c lv o  m oral 
c o n s id e r a t i o n s , o v e r and above c o n s id e ra t io n s  ab o u t th e  
adonuacy o f  th e  a v a i l a b l e  e v i d e n t i a l  su p p o rt*  O r, what 
p ro b a b ly  p ro v id e s  a more p la u s ib le  exam ple , th e  d e c is io n  to  
b e l ie v e  some p r o p o s i t i o n ,  p ,  m igh t in v o lv e  some r e l i g i o u s  
c o n s id e r a t io n s  in d e p e n d e n t from th e  e v id e n t i a l  s u p p o r t  
a v a i l a b l e  f o r  p* I t  i s  c o n s id e ra t io n s  l i k e  th e s e  t h a t  
we a re  n o t concerned  w ith ;  we a r e  concerned  w ith  r a t i o n a l i t y  
n o t  os i t  deems j u s t i f i e d ,  o r  n o t ,  th e  a c c e p ta n c e  o f  a  
p roposition"), b u t  o n ly  in  so  f a r  a s  i t  deems j u s t i f i e d  
a c c e p t in g  a p r o p o s i t io n  to  be tru e *  L e t us c a l l  a  b e l i e f  
th a t  i s  r a t i o n a l  on th e s e  g rounds an e p is to ro ic a l ly  r a t i o n a l  
b e l i e f  * Even g iv e n  su ch  a  n a rro w in g  as  t h i s  th e  n a tu r e  o f  
r a t i o n a l  b e l i e f  i s  a  l a r g e  t o p i c ,  so  i t  i s  b y  no means o u r 
co n cern  to  p r e s e n t  an e x h a u s t iv e  acco u n t o f  i t *  B a th e r  \ie 
t d . l l  c o n c e n tr a te  on th o s e  a s p e c ts  im p o rta n t  to  th e  two 
p a ra d o x e s ; one w hich c a s t s  d o u b t on a p a r t i c u l a r  p a r t i a l  
d e s c r ip t i o n  o f  e p i s te m io a l ly  r a t i o n a l  b e l i e f ,  th e  o th e r  w hich 
c a s t s  d o u b t u p o ^ s u c c e s s  o f  any a tte m p t to  g iv e  an £  p r i o r i  
d e s c r ip t i o n  o f  e p is to m ic  r a t i o n a l i t y *
Suppose we c o n s id e r  some i n d i v i d u a l 's  b e l i e f  in  a  
p a r t i c u l a r  p ro p o s i t io n *  I t  would s e e n  r e a s o n a b le  to  suppose  
t h a t  i t s  e p is to m ic  r a t i o n a l i t y  w i l l  depend upon two f e a tu r e s *  
One, itife r e l a t i o n s h i p  to  th e  o th e r  b e l i e f s  t h a t  th e  
in d iv id u a l  h as andj  ^t i r o , th e  n a tu r e  o f th e  s u p p o r t  t h a t  th e  
in d iv id u a l  h as f o r  t h a t  b e l i e f *  G iven th o se  t  o a s p e c ts  to  
th e  r a t i o n a l i t y ^ ^ ^  o f  a  b e l i e f  we can s e e ,  i n  a g e n e ra l  way,
(a)F rom  now on b y  r a t i o n a l i t y  I  s h a l l  mean e p is te m ic  r a t i o n a l i t y
u n le s s  s t a t e d  otherw ls© *
« »  4M
the sort o f to which two parrytoxco civ-'' rise#
In each oar;- m  m p ^ - ^ y  •■ -.hat the rtrtioneJLlty of m s oofwact 
la  do kemln- 4  In m e aort of w y  # and im = noh i t  i n  f .p p w n tly  
oho^m that thlB loR&m to e l  t im e  in  whio)i th ■ h 'lle v e r  
ACqulrr-.? that are %&rrift-nbly im sntlofrotoiy in tW
other aopoot# But b% fom  taking th le ajiy further l e t  u@
givn pn «ooount o f the t#c pp,roAo%ae#
f i r r t  the pr-'f&oe p^^rn'im: j ^ ià t ï  rune w; fo il cm# # 
wrltoe o hock mmd alnwT/.ly hmll#vw every proposition h &  
lemeerW In i t ,  on vhot he oom ldcm  to hr good gpcRmdo#
Po::TeV'^ ;r, he aleo oeagl.iero that hia hook io  no 0%ooption to  
the general *ral,e* that long hookc contain oomA faleohooda, 
r ^ j ^ n i n  on what he teke» to he g o #  groundga* Ho, therefore, 
wri tea modemt préfaça in vhlfA he thet alth^mgh W
minC')T l y  b a i i o v t h a t  each propo»! tion he ae@*rta in  the hook
ie  tru e, ho ie  pleo eitre that eo#D are f^alne# Howovor, i t  
tfould appear fn m th lo  th a t the w rite r  la  commit ted to  h e llin g  
lo g ic a lly  co n flic tin g  h e lio fe . #o in com&itted to believ ing  
thrt a l l  th?> proxooi ti.onc he mg^^rto in  th@ book are true and 
to b eliev in g  that not a l l  the pronm ltione h ®  ©naor-té in the 
book o f ' truc»
W t  d e e o r ib e  th e  ctOTe le W ln g  up  to  t h i s  s i t u a t i o n  l a
detmtl; , being th e  prorooitton» A Acnorts in  h to
book#
(1) A bellev^m p^, becauao###
A bolievoB p j, beomrm*#*
A b e l ie v e  V ^ l  bconuee.##
How (1) ce^mn to leed  to  (#)#
( 8 )  A b c l lc v e a  boeaue^s, i n  th e  o n m  o f  P j_^##.ctc#
H fw vsr, a lec  (3)*
(3 )  A b e l ie v o o  th e r e  i s  a  p,p^ , smch t h a t  n o t — , becaw m ##!
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and ( 3) seems to  lo ad  to  (4 ) ,
( 4 ) A ‘b o lie v o s  nofc a l l  Px*«*Pn 8.re t r u e , bficause . . .
And from (2 )  and ( 4 ) we ge ,
(5 )  A b e l i e  vos P i,* * *  jPn sire a l l  fcrue, and n o t a l l  
P i , • • *Pji a re  t r u e  b ecau se  • #.
I t  im to  be p o in te d  o u t thr t  s te p s  from ( l )  to  ( 2 ) ,
from ( 3 ) to  ( 4 ) and from ( 2 ) and ( 4 ) to  ( 5 ) a re  n o t be 
c o n s tru e d  as on b a ilm e n ts^ fo r  th ey  e re  no t#  I t  i s  n o t th e  
casv th a t  i f  P. b o lio v e s  p an- A b e l ie v e s  q th en  n e c e s s a r i ly  A 
b e l ie v e s  p and e* The e x a c t r e l a t io n s h ip  betw een connected  
O J  _ 8_t©p8 in  th e  d e r iv a t io n  i s ;  th e  b e l i e f  d e sc r ib  d in  ( ) commits
D ’ -
’ A to  th e  b e l i e f  d e s c r ib e d  in  ( )•  We w i l l  d is c u s s  th e  r e l a t i o n
' f  '
 ^ -  commits A to  b e l ie v e  -  l a t e r  o n , in  C hap ter Two#
, W heiein then  l i e s  th e  paradox? The m odest p re fa c e
-  • ' " - r i t e r  h as sim p ly  u n w it t in g ly  com m itted h ira e e lf  to  h o ld in g
\ ' c o n t r a d ic to ry  b e l i e f s , and on t h i s  b e in g  p o in te d  o u t to  him
' he ; f i l l  acknowledge t h a t  t h i s  i s  bhe case  and r e c t i f y  h is
m istake*  The p ro b lem , how ever, l i e s  in  the  f a c t  th a t  n o th in g , 
op thr: f a c e  o f  i t ,  would ap p ear mor r a t io n a l  th a n  to  w r i te  
such  a p re fa c e *  F u r th e r ,  th e re  i s  no c l e a r  a l t e r n a t iv e  
t h a t  th e  a u th o r  can take# How does he r e c t i f y  h is  m is ta k e , 
i f  mis ùpke i t  be?
I t  m ight seem , a t  f i r s t  g la n c e ,  th a t  A cou ld  n e v e r  be 
in  th e  p o s i t io n  d e s c r ib e d  in  ( 3 ) u n le s s  he a l s o  d is b e l ie v e s  on© 
o f  th  ' p r o p o s i t io n s  a s s e r te d  in  h is  book* I n  o th e r  words h is  
on ly  grounds fo r  thr, b e l i e f  d e s c r ib e d  in  ( 3 ) mirut be d o u b t, 
o r  d i s b e l  l e t , i n  on© o r  o th e r  o f p^j***>Pn* But t h i s  i s  
c l e a r l y  n o t th e  case*  For h is  grounds cou ld  sim p ly  b e ,  th e  
le n g th  o f  th e  bo o k , th e  d i f f i c u l t y  o f  th e  t o p i c ,  th e  number o f  
u n tru th s  he has a l r e M y  d isc o v e re d  and c o r r e c te d ,  g e n e ra l 
human f a l l i b i l i t y ,  th e  ra p  i d i t y  w ith  which d is c o v e r ie s  a re
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made in  t h a t  t o p i c ,  and so  on. E q u a lly  w e ll we do n o t 
w ant to  sa y  th a t  A can  o n ly  havn a r a t i o n a l  b e l i e f  i n  
. and in  P j , » . . i f  i t  i s  a l s o  th e  c a se  t h a t  A can n o t 
hav-^ a r a t i o n a l  b e l i e f  t h a t  one o f  them i s  w rong.
L e t u s  le a v e  th e  p re fa c e  p arad o x  f o r  th e  moment, and 
tu r n  o u r a t t e n t i o n  to  th e  l o t t e r y  paradox# I n  th e  
p r e fa c e  p aradox  w© s im p ly  c h a r a c te r is e d  A*s b e l i  >f i n  
p as  e v i d e n t i a l l y  w e ll- s u p p o r te d  i f  he had good grounds 
f o r  p# I n  th e  l o t t e r y  p aradox  we w i l l  be more s p e c i f i c  
and s u g g e s t  t h a t  / ' s  b e l i e f  in  p i s  e v i d e n t i a l l y  w o l l-  
c j^ P P o rte d  i f  th e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  p on A*s e v id e n c e , q ,  
i s  g r e a t e r  th an  some f i g u r e ,  sa y  w# The l o t t e r y  p aradox  
ru n s  a s  follovTS: a man, A, ta k e s  p a r t  in  a  lo tfc e ry  in
which H—1 p e o p le ,  o th e r  th a n  A, a l s o  ta k e  p a r t#  So 
t h a t  A*s chances o f  l o s in g  a r e  N -l/fT , a m i^ lo t u s  suppose, 
t h a t  H -l/H  i s  g r e a t e r  th an  w# I t  w i l l  fo llo w  from  t h i s  
t h a t  A may b e l ie v e  t h a t  ho w i l l  lo se #  But b y  th e  s^aae 
to k en  s in c e  th e  chances o f  l o s in g  a r c  th e  same f o r  each 
c o m p e ti to r  A m i l  b e  com m itted bo b e l ie v in g  o f  each  
c o m p e ti to r  th r  t  he w i l l  lo se #  H ow ever, A m a ^  a ls o  b e l ie v e  
t h a t  someone i l l  w in , s in c e  th e s e  a re  th e  r u le s  o f  th e  
l o tb e r y .  A,  t h e r e f o r n , seems to  be  com m itted to  h o ld in g  
l o g i c a l l y  c o n f l i c t i n g  b e l i e f s , th e  b e l i e f  ^hc t  everyone 
w i l l  l o s r , and a l s o ,  th e  b e l i e f  t h a t  n 6 ^o ve i" jo n c  i d . l l  lo se #  
S e t t in g  th e  parad o x  up i n  f u l l ;  where q ^ ,# # |q n  ? d l l
l o s e ,  B w i l l  l o s e , . . .  e t c .  we h av e ;
( I J ’ fh e  p r o b a b i l i t y  t h a t  q^^ l a  ÎJ-1/îî ( g r e a t e r  th a n  W.) 
th u s  A may b e l ie v e  q j .
( 2 )*The p r o b a b i l i t y  t h a t  q ^ , i s  W—1/N (e n u a l to  the 
p r o b a b i l i t y  t h a t  q ^ .)
Thus A i s  com m itted to  b e l i e v in g  q^#
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The p r o b a b i l i t y  t h a t  q , i s  H -I/H  (e q u a l t o  th e  p r o b a b i l i t y
t h a t  q.,)
Thus A i s  com m itted to  b e l ie v in g  q^«
From ( ! ) •  (2 )*  we a r e  le d  to  (3 )* *
( 3 )* A b e l ie v e s  g^^*##,q^$
Hovrover,
( 4 )* A b e l ie v e s  t h a t  th e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  ( q ^ ,# # ,q ^ )  
e q u a ls  n o u g h t.
and A b e l ie v e s  t h a t  th e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  n o t - ( q ^ 5###fq^) 
e q u a ls  o ne .
T h e r e f o r e ,
(5 )*  A im y b e l ie v e  n o t - (q ^ ,$ * *  ,q ^ )
But from (3 )*  and ($ )*  A i s  le d  to  ( 0 '
( 6 )* A b e l ie v e s  and n o t - (q ^
I n  th e  l o t t e i y  ca se  we have a  s i t u a t i o n  i n  which wo hoped 
to  c o n fe r  r a t i o n a l i t y  upon some o f  o u r b e l i e f s  by  a d o p tin g  a 
r u l e  o f  a c c e p ta n c e , in  t h i s  c a se  a r u le  o f  de tach m en t f o r  
p r o b a b i l i t y  a ta t^ 'tio n ts*  Nam ely, a c c e p t o n ly  th o se  
p r o p o s i t io n s  whose p r o b a b i l i t y  i s  co rrcn c tly  b o l ie v e d  to  
b e  g r e a t e r  th a n  «• H ow ever, as  wo have soon, i t s  a p p l ic a t io n  
i n  c e r t ,  in  s i t u a t i o n s  seems to  le a d  u s  in e x o ra b ly  to  accu m u la tin g  
m a n if e s t ly  u n s a t i s f a c t o r y  s e t s  o f  b e l i e f s *
I t  m ight seem , from  th o  exam ple , t h a t  th e  s i t u a t i o n  
i s  e n t i r e l y  a r t i f i c i a l  and th a t  a  r u le  o f  dotaoliraent i s  v e ry  
im '^ la u s ib lo , b u t we s h a l l  le a v e  u n t i l  C h ap te r F our th e  d is c u s s io n  
as to  why i t  cam© i n t o  th e  d eb a te#
We p o in te d  o u t e a r l i e r  on th a t  th e  r a t i o n a l i t y  o f  a  
b e l i e f  h e ld  b y  an in d iv id u a l  depended u p o n , a t  l e a s t ,  
two th in g s ;  th e  e v id e n t i a l  su p p o rt th a t\  he p ro v id ed  f o r  i t ,
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a .n â  i t s  r e l a t i o n  t o  th o  o th e r  b e l i e f s  t h a t  th o  p e rso n  h o ld s#  
 ^ % Now i t  i s  com pJL etely  a r t i f i c i a l  to  a u g g ee t t h a t  th e s o  two 
o o n s id o ra t io n s  a r e  e n t i r e l y  in d e p o n d e n tj^ ^  b u t  i f  t h i s  were
th e  CG0© n e i t h e r  parad o x  would p ros, n t  d i f f i c u l t i e s #  F o r h
we would havn two s e t s  o f  r u le s  > one c o n fo rm ity  w ith  # i i c h  
ppoiuced  s u f f i c i e n t l y  grounded b e l i e f s ,  th e  o th e r  o o n fo rm ity  
w ith  w hich e n su re d  t h a t  su ch  b e l i e f s  accum ulated  were c o m p a tib le .
Thus g iv e n  a  s i t u a t i o n  in  w hich th e  r u l e  o f  r a t i o n a l  eooeptonc©
8 ay s  we may a c c e p t two in o o m p titib le  p r o p o s i t i o n s ,  we would
às im p ly  tu r n  to  o u r  second  s e t  o f  r u le s  t o  s e e  w hich ^
p ro ï)o s it io n  to  a c c e p t .  H ow ever, u n le s s  we a r e  p re p a re d  t o  
a c c e p t  a  p o s i t i o n  i n  w hich t h i s  seco n d  o p e r a t io n  i s  q u i t e  
a ^ r b i t r a r y ,  i t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  c o n s id e ra t io n s  a p p ro p r ia n te  to  
th e  f i r s t  p ro c e s s  a r e  e q u a l ly  a p p r o p r ia te  to  th e  s e c o n d # I t  
would seem , t h e r e f o r e ,  t h a t  b o th  o p e r a t io n s  m ust b e  a d e q u a te ly  
co v ered  w ith in  a  th e o ry  o f  i n f e r e n c e ,  n o t  one w ith in  end one 
w ith c u t#
I t  i s  p r e c i s e ly  t h i s  î>oint t h a t  Fem pol, a  p h ilo o o p  h e r  
l i i t h  h ig h  hopes as  r e g a rd s  feh© d e tach m en t r u le  a s  a  r u l e  o f  
r a ^ t io n a l  accoptgm oo, acknow ledges i n  g iv in g  h i s  foarm ulation  
o f  th e  c o n d i t io n s  w hich need to  b e  s a t i s f i e d  by  any ad eq u a te  
e a jn d id a te  r u l e  o f  acco p tan ce#  T hese a r c  as  fo llo w s#
C .H .li  Any l o g i c a l  oonse^uonce o f  a  s e t  o f  a cc e p te d
s ta te m e n ts  i s  i t s e l f  an a c c e p te d  s ta te m e n t ;  o r  
K c o n ta in s  a l l  l o g i c a l  consequences o f  any o f  
i t s  s u b -c la s e e s #
C#R.2$ The s e t  o f  a c c e p te d  o to to m e n ts  (K) i s  l o g i c a l l y  
c o n s i s t e n t •
C .R .B t The i n f e r e n t i a l  ao o ep tan ce  o f  any s ta te m e n t ,  
h ,  i n t o  (k ) i s  d e c id e d  upon by r e f e r e n c e  to
( a  ) T hese p o in t s  w i l l  be e lab o ra t(3 d  f u r t h e r  in  C h ap te rs  
Two and Four#
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th e  t o t a l  sy stem  
Qnco w© have a c c e p te d  t h a t  th e r e  e x i s t  c lo s e  l i n k s  
b e tw een  th e s e  two a s p e c ts  o f  th e  r a t i o n a l i t y  o f  a  b e l i e f ,  a s  
Hompol h as  done h e re  in  C .B .2 , th e n  wo a r e  open t o  th e  f u l l  
f o r c e  o f  th e  t w  p a rad o x es  ♦ Thus th e  l o t t e r y  p arad o x  would 
seem to  s u g g e s t  t h a t  a r u l e  o f  d e tach m en t f o r  p r o b a b i l i t y  
s ta te m e n ts  m ust b e  rA je o te d  a s  a  r u l e  o f  r a t i o n a l  a c ce p ta n c e#
And, more d i s a s t r o u s l y ,  th e  p r e fa c e  p a rad o x  would seem to  
s u g g e s t  th a t  n o th in g  th a t  co u ld  b e  s u b s t i t u t e d  f o r  t h i s  r u l e  
would f a r e  any  b e t t e r #  I n  o th e r  w o rd s , th e  c o n c lu s io n  we a r e  
a p p a r e n t ly  fo rc e d  t o ,  u n le s s  wo can  f in d  some s a t i s f a c t o r y  way 
o u t o f  th e  two p o riu lo x ee , i s  t h a t  th e r e  can  be  no  n  p r i o r i  th e o ry  
o f  r a t i c m a l i t y ,  no  a  p r i o r i  g u a ra n te e  t h a t  some o f  o u r 
b e l i e f s  a r e  r a t io n a l#  T h is  may n o t  seem , a t  f i r s t  s i g h t ,  
an  obv io u s consequ  noe o f  th e  p rn fe c  paradox# B ut i f  we 
e x t r a c t  i t s  e s s e n t i e l s  from  th e  s l i g h t l y  a r t i f i c i a l  su rro u n d in g s  
i f i tb in  w hich i t  h a s  b een  p la c e d ,  i t  w i l l  c e r t a i n l y  beccmio 
ob v io u s#  I f  we l e t  U bo th e  t o t a l  s e t  o f  an  i n d iv id u a l s  
b e l i e f s  th e n  i t  would seem  ro ascm ab le  t h a t  f o r  some s u b - s e t s  
>of u  th o  in d iv id u f i l  may have  th e  f u r t h e r  b e l i e f  t h a t  su ch  
sub—s o t s  oooritain some f a l s e  b e l i e f s  ( C le a r ly  t h i s  c a n n o t 
h o ld  f o r  a l l  s u b - s e t s  o f  C , f o r  th e n  lb  would be  p o s s ib le  f o r  
th e  in d iv id u a l  t o  h o ld  o f  each  b e l i e f  t h a t  i t  was f a l s e |  but^ 
eq u a lly ^  i t  i s  c l e a r  th a t  t h i s  i s  p o s s ib le  f o r  some s u b -s o ts # )
F o r  ex am p le , i t  would seem to  b e  r a t i o n a l , in d eed  o f  th e  v e ry  
e s se n c e  o f  r a t i o n a l i t y ,  t h a t  one s h o u ld  h o ld  t h a t  some o f  
o n e 's  b e l i e f s  wore m is ta k e n , su ch  a  b e l i e f  o u ld  bn  tan tam o u n t 
to  d e n y in g  th e  t r u t h  o f  th e  c o n ju n o tiw i o f  o i l  th e  p ro f> o sitio n s  
one b e l i e v e s .  T h is  w ou ld  b th e  c a s e  w h a tev er th e  o r ig in  o f
o u r  b e l i e f s ;  t h a t  i s  w h a tev e r r u l  o f  in d u o t iv  a c c e p ta n c e
(a  ) Given in  Hempol • Deductive-Eomologicol v*s S ta t i s t ic a l  Bxplana-
tio n  in  Minnesota S tudies in  the philosophy of Science I I I  (ed .
Feigl and Maxwell y 3inncai)olis 19^2# ' '
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W0 em ployed. Thus i t  would seem t h a t  w h a tev er th e  r u le  o f
r a t i o n a l  a c c e p ta n c e  we ad o p ted  we co u ld  n o t  h e lp  av o id
a  d r iv in g  a t  some su ch  s i m i l a r  p o s i t io n  to  t h a t  d e s c r ib e d  
in  ( 5 ) ;  Hence we c an n o t h e lp  c o n f l i c t i n g  w ith  c r i t e r i o n  
C .R .2  o f  H om pel's  re q u ire m e n ts  f o r  a  r u le  o f  r a t i o n a l  a c c e p ta n c e .
When Herapel gave h i s  th r e e  re q u ire m e n ts  f o r  a s a t i s f a c t o r y  
r u l e  o f  a c c e p ta n c e  he a l s o  t e n t a t i v e l y  s u g g e s te d  th e  fo llo w in g  
r u le  f o r  c o n s id e ra t io n s
(D^) A c c e p t, o r  r e j e c t ,  h g iv e n  K a c c o rd in g  a s  to  C (h ,k )
i s  g r e a t e r  tha^_,n ^  o r  C (h ,k )  i s  l e s s  th a n  -^| when
C (h ,k )  e q u a ls  ^  h  may b e  a c c e p te d ,  r e j e c t e d  o r  l e f t  
i n  s u sp e n s e .
H i s t o r i c a ^ l l y  th e  l o t t e r y  p a rad o x  was fo rm u la te d  by  Kyburg n o t  
a s  an a t t a c k  on (D ^ ), o r  s im i l a r l y  in s p i r e d  r u le s  o f  a c c e p ta n c e , 
b u t  a s  an a tte m p t to  show th e  d e f i c i e n c i e s  o f  C . R . I . ,  C .H .2 . ,  
and C .R.3* The argum ent g iv e n  b e in g  so m eth in g  a lo n g  th e  
fo llo w in g  l in e s #  e i t h e r  we a c c e p t th e  c o n d i t io n s  C .R . l ,  C .R .2  
and C .R .3 , o r  we a c c e p t (D ^ ) , o r  so m eth in g  s i m i l a r ,  b u t  n o t  
b o th ;  ( p ^ ) ,  o r  som eth in g  s i m i l a r ,  i s  c l e a r l y  th e  b e s t  we ciîXï 
d o ,  so  we m ust r e j e c t  C .R . l ,  C .R .2  and C .R .3  as  c o n d i t io n s  t h a t  
each  have to  bn s a t i s f i e d .  A co m p le te  e v a lu a t io n  o f  t h i s  
argum ent w o u ld , o f  c o u r s e ,  have to  in c lu d e  an e v a lu a t io n  o f  
auoh s te p s  as  were th o u g h t to  le a d  up to  i t ,  and t h i s  we m ust 
le a v e  u n t i l  l a t e r ,  when in  c h a p te r  ( 4 ) we g iv e  some d is c u s s io n  
o f  th o  n a tu r e  o f  e p is te m ic  r e a s o n in g .  B ut a t  th e  v e ry  l e a s t ,  we 
can  s u g g e s t  t h a t  such  an argum ent m isses  on© o r  two p o in t s .  F o r 
i t  i s  n o t  a t  a l l  c l e a r  t h a t  th e  c o n d i t io n s  Hempel d e s c r ib e s  a r e  
a d e q u a te  ^on g rounds in d e p e n d e n t frbm  th e  l o t t e r y  p a ra d o x . A ll  
th e  c o n d i t io n s  seem to  demand i s  th o  c o n s is t e n t  c lo s u r e  u n d e r  
d e d u c tio n  o f  th e  s e t  o f  p r o p o s i t io n s  an in d iv id u a l  b e l i e v e s ,  when 
accu m u la ted  in  acco rd an ce  w ith ^  c a n d id a te  r u le  o f  a c c e p ta n c e .
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îTcn-rever, i t  i s  q u i te  c l e a r  th a t  as a  c h a r a c te r i s a t io n  o f
th e  n eo o asa ry  and s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d itio n s  f o r  th e  s a t i s f a c t o r i n e s s
in
o f  some r u le  o f  eco ep tan ce  i t  i s  q u i t e ^ad eq u a te . At th e  v e ry
le a s e  we would want to  sa y  th a t  u n le s s  op ist'^m ic re a so n in g  can
he shown to  have some b ia s  tow?irds accu m u la tin g  tru e  p ro p o s i t io n s
r a t h e r  th an  false ones th e n  wo can have no grounds f o r  th in k in g
( a )i t  e i t h e r  i s  o r  can bo r a t i o n a l . '   ^ I n  o th e r  words as a g a in s t  
th e  s c e p t ic  who arguos t h a t  a l l  n o n -d e d u c tiv e ly  grounded 
b e l i e f s  a re  i r r a t i o n a l ,  t h a t  no m a tte r  what in d u c t iv e  p o l i c i e s  
a re  im ploraentod we a re  no more r a t i o n a l  in  b e l ie v in g  th a t  we 
have g o t to  th e  t r u t h ,  h av in g  im plem ented them , th an  i f  we had ; 
n o t ;  wo want to  argue t h a t  i f  we im plem ent some p a r t i c u l a r  
in d u e tlV 'j p o l ic y  th en  we a re  quit©  j u s t i f i e d  in  b e l ie v in g   ^ ^
t h a t  we hav  come to  a  t r u e  b e l i e f .
In  o rd e r  f o r  C .R . l ,  C .R .2 , and C .R .3 to  be co n s id e red  
B^s a  s u f f i c i e n t  c h a r a c te r i s a t io n  o f  th e  c o n d it io n s  to  be met 
b y  any r u le  o f  r a t io n a l  accop tanc© , i t  would have to  be shown 
th a t  th e re  i s  some c o r r e l a t i o n  betw een h o ld in g  c o n s is te n t  b e l i e f s  
and h o ld in g  t r u e  o n e s . A c o r r e l a t io n  we a re  q u i te  j u s t i f i e d  in  
th in k in g  does n o t  e x i s t .  I n  f a c t  g iv en  Hempel’s  r u le  and C .R . l ,  
C .R .2 , and C .R .3 , as  we s h a l l  see  in  C hap ter F o u r , th e re  i s  good 
re a so n  f o r  th in k in g  th a t  q u i te  th e  o p p o s ite  i s  th e  c a s e .  But 
u n t i l  we g o t on a c c o u n t, o r  pai’t i a l  acco u n t, o f  th e  g o a ls  and 
norms o f  r a t i o n a l  in q u iry  we a re  n o t in  a p o s i t io n  to  se e  how 
C .R . l ,  C .R .2 , C .R .3  a re  to  be  a l t e r e d ,  i f  in d eed  th e y  a re  to  
be a l t e r e d  ra th e : th an  s im p ly  added t o .
So f a r  we have s im p ly  d e s c r ib e d  th e  t  o p a ra d o x e s , and 
in d ic a te d  th o se  p o in ts  in  tho  s t r u c t u r e  o f  e p is to m ic  r a t i o n a l i t y  
th a t  th e  t t  o paradoxes show to  be  l e s s  w ell u n d e rs to o d  th an
(a  ) We w i l l  e la b o ra te  t h i s  p o in t  to  some e x te n t  in  th e  n e x t
c h a p te r .
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m ig h t otherr-yise h e  th o u g h t .  How can  we c a r r y  on from  h e re ?  
I t  w ould seem to  me t h a t  d e sp it©  th e  o b v io u s  s i m i l a r i t y  
b e tw een  th e  two p a ra d o x e s ,  t h e r e  i s  an o b v io u s  d i f f e r e n c e  
b e tw een  them . The d i f f e r e n c e  i s  t h a t  th e  l o t t e r y  p a rad o x  
v i t i a t e s  th e  r u l e  o f  d e tach m en t w hereas th e  p r e f a c e  p a rad o x  
d o es  n o t  v i t i a t e  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  r a t i o n a l  b e l i e f .
G ran ted  t h i s  i n t u i t i v e  r e s p o n s e ,  w hat we have  to  do i s  to  
d i s c o v e r  w hat i t  i s  t h a t  i s  wrong i n  th e  l o t t e r y  c a s e ,  and 
th e n  show t h a t  i t  i s  n o t  a l s o  wrong i n  th e  p r e f a c e  c a s e ;  and 
th e n  to  show why, o r  how , th e  b e l i e f s  i n  th e  p re fa c o  c a se  may 
b e  shovm to  b e  r a t i o n a l .
B ecause  th e  tvro p a ra d o x e s  l i e  a t  th e  h o t  bom o f  th e  
d e b a t?  on r a t i o n a l  b e l i e f  th e y  a r e  th e re b y  c o n n e c ted  to  a 
l a r g e  num ber o f  to p ic s ^ c o n s is te n o y  i n  b e l i e f ,  in d u c t iv e  
a c c e p ta n c e ,  b e l i e f ,  r a t i o n a l i t y ,  th e  s t a t u s  o f  l o g i c a l  law s 
in  r e a s o n in g ,  th e  e t h i c s  o f  b e l i e f ,  d e c i s io n  th e o r y ,  and so  
o n . T h is  means t h a t  i t  i s  n o t  p o s s ib l e  to  e f f e c t  a  s im p le  
l i n e a r  dev elo p m en t o f  th e  p l o t  w hich l e a d s ,  I  h o p e , t o  th e  
s o l u t i o n ,  in s t 'm d  we w i l l  f in d  i t  n e c e s s a r y  to  ta k e  a num ber 
o f  d iv e r s io n s  from  tim e  to  t im e . I  say  ch is  i n  o rd e r  to  
j u s t i f y  i n  advance th e  d e v io u s  dev e lo p m en t o f  th e  d i s c u s s io n .
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dhapber Two
C o n s is ten cy  and B e l i e f .
P a r t  ( i )  C o n s is te n c y .
I n  d e s c r ib in g  th e  g e n e s is  o f  th e  two paradoxes we showed 
t h a t  an in d iv id u a l  who s ta r tn d  o f f  w ith  a c e r t a in  c o l l e c t io n  o f  
b e l i e f s  was th e re b y  l e d ,  a p p a re n tly  in e x o ra b ly ,  to  h o ld in g  
f u r th e r  b e l i e f s ,  th e  r e s u l t a n t  s e t  o f  b e l i e f s  b ^ in g  f a u l t y ,  o r  
o b je c t io n a b le ,  in  some way. We sh o u ld  th e r e fo r e  make an 
a tte m p t to  d e s c r ib e  p r e c i s e ly  what t h i s  f a u l t  i s .  In  o th e r  
w ords, to  e x p l ic a te  th e  n o tio n  o f  c o n s is te n c y  as i t  a p p l ie s  to  
s e t s  o f  b e l i e f s .  At th e  end o f th e  in v e s t ig a t io n  we t i l l  n o t 
be  a b le  to  draw  any v e ry  s t a r t l i n g  c o n c lu s io n s ;  f o r  example we 
w i l l  n e i t h e r  be  a b le  to  say  th a t  th e  two paradoxes a re  
d i s t in g u is h a b le  in  term s o f c o n s is te n c y ,  n o r  w i l l  we be a b le
to  sa y  th a t  n e i th e r  o f  th o  two s e t s  o f  b e l i e f s  i s  i n c o n s i s t e n t .
B ut a lth o u g h  a l l  we w i l l  be a b le  to  say  i s  t h a t  th e  two s o t s
o f  b e l i e f s  a r e  i n c o n s i s t e n t , which we knew a l r e a d y ,  th e  d is c u s s io n
w i l l  c l a r i f y  th  r o le  w hich b e in g  c o n s is te n t  p la y s  in  r a t i o n a l  
b e l i e f .
L e t us adopt th e  fo llo w in g  n o ta tio n *
•B (a)p* f o r  *A b e l ie v e s  t h a t  p * .
*C(a)B(a)p* f o r  ’A i s  com m itted to  b e l ie v in g  p.*
T here i s  some s l i g h t  am b ig u ity  abou t 'A  i s  com m itted to  b e­
l i e v in g  p * , so  in  o rd e r  to  avo id  any co n fu s io n  i t  i s  to  be  read
1 ) cpc. -, -, as *6 i s  commit tod  t o ,  th e  f a c t  t h a t  A b e l  io  vos p* .
f 'r ■ F u r th e r ,  l e t  u s  u se  th e  fo llow ing*
* B (a) ' f o r  ' t h e  s e t  o f  A*s b e l i e f s * ♦
*FB(a)* f o r  *the sr-t o f  p ro p o s i t io n s  A b e l ie v e s * .
VL..+ S ' a n d , *POB(a)* f o r  "tho s o t  o f  p ro p o s i t io n s  A i s  com m itted to * .
 ^  ^ The gen r a l  n o tio n  o f  c o n s is te n c y  i s  as fo llow s*  a s e t  o f
p r o p o s i t io n s  i s  c o n s is te n t  i f  and o n ly  i f  th ey  can a l l  be t r u e .
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But th i s  w i l l  n o t do f o r  b e l i e f s , f o r  th e  most b iz a r r e  s e ta  
/ o f  b e l i e f s  can e x i s t  u n d er th e se  c o n d i t io n s , f o r  example
p  ( 3 ( a ) p ,B ( a ) n o t - p , .♦*)♦ Tho f a c t  t h a t  p i s  in co m p a tib le
' " w ith  n o t - p ,  does n o t a to p  i+  b e in g  p o s s ib le  f o r  A to  b e l ie v e
p and b e l ie v e  no t-p *  T hat i s  to  s a y , a  c o n s is te n t  s e t  o f  
b e l i  f -^ ic c r ip t io n s  i s  n o t a  s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d it io n  f o r  a 
c o n s is te n i. s e t  o f  b e l i e f s *  However, t h i s  c h a r a c te r i s a t io n  
o f  c o n s is te n c y  len d s  i t s e l f  to  an obvious e x te n s io n  f o r  s e t s  
o f  b e l i e f s .  Namely, a  s e t  o f  b e l i e f s  i s  c o n s is te n t  i f  and 
on ly  i f  th e  s e t  o f  p ro p o s i t io n s  b e l ie v e d  can be h o ld  to  be 
t r u e , a t  th e  same tim e , by th e  samo p e rso n . T h is  i s  a l l  
v e ry  w e l l , b u t what u s g  can wo make o f th is ?  P e rh a p s , i r i th  
a g ro a t  d e a l  o f  p r a c t ic e  i t  i s  p o s s ib le  bo g e t  o n e s e lf  in  a 
s t a t e  o f mind in  which one b e l ie v e s  e v e ry th in g . I t  would 
seem th a t  t h i s  e x te n s io n  p resupposes a c h a r a c te r i s a t io n  o f 
c o n s is te n c y  r a th e r  then  c o n s t i tu t e s  one . So l e t  us sim p ly  
adop t th e  fo llo w in g  as a c r i t e r i o n  o f  c o n s is te n c y  f o r  b e l i e f s  
and see  what can be mad© o f i t*
(g )  a  s e t  o f  b e l i e f s ,  B ( a ) ,  i s  c o n s is t  nb  i f  and p 
\ I J . (  o n ly  i f  th e  s e t  PCB(a) i s  such  th a t  i f  p i s  an
I / / I- ) e lem ent o f POB(a), thon  p i s  c o n s is te n t*  ’ ,
x i  : ^  A
T his fo rm u la tio n  o f  c o n s is te n c y  i s  to  be p r e fe r r e d  to  
 ^ th e  i n t u i t i v e l y  more p la u s ib le  fo rm u la tio n s  A s o t  o f  b e l i e f s ,
B (a ) ,  i s  c o n s is te n t  and on ly  i f ,  th e  s e t  PCB(a) i s  such th a t
any o u b -se t o f  i t  i s  c o n s is t e n t .  (c)  i s  to  be p re fe r re d  in
should
o rd e r  th a t  w e n o t  beg any q u e s tio n s  about th e  com position  
o f PCB(a).
Ib  i s  q u i te  c l e a r  t h a t  th e  s t r e n g th ,  o r  s c o p e , o f  (C ) , 
in  term s o f  what r-n g e  o f  ty p es o f s e t s  o f  b e l i e f s  i t  
c h a r a c te r is e s  as i n c o n s i s t e n t ,  depends on what p j r i n c ip l e s  o f
V.
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commitment we a d o p t, and so  f a r  wo have s a id  v e ry  l i t t l e  
about th e s e .  Two p la u s ib le  p r in c ip le s  are*
(O onj) ( i )  I f  B (a )p  a^nd B (a )q , th e n  C{a)B(aXp q)
( i i )  I f  C (a)B (a)p  and C (a )B (a )q , th e n  C (a )B (a )(p  and q ) .
(im p) ( i )  I f  B (a)p  and p e n t a i l s  q ,  then  C (a )B (a )q ,
( i i )  I f  C (a)B (a)p  and p e n t a i l s  q ,  th en  C (a)B (a)q#
He Trill argue in  su p p o rt o f  th o se  ond a number o f  o th e r
p r in c ip le s  o f  commitment in  C hap ter T h ree , b u t  f o r  bhe moment
l e t  i t  be bom© in  mind th a t  th e se  a re  p r in c ip le s  we a re  
assum ing, N© m?iy a ls o  n o t io  t h a t  (C) in  c o n ju n c tio n  w ith  
(C onj) i s  e q u iv a le n t to  th e  i n t u i t i v e  n o tio n  o f  c o n s is te n c y  
g iv en  above.
At t h i s  p o in t  i t  m ight bo argued  th a t  we have been a 
l i t t l e  p rec ip itou fd  and th a t  th e re  are c o n s id e ra b le  d i f f i c u l t i e s  
ra ised , by th© n o tio n  o f b e l ie v in g  a c o n t r a d ic t io n , o r  even 
s im p ly  b e l ie v in g  p and b e l ie v in g  n o t-p  a t  th e  seme tim e . For 
example P ap , in  h is  book Seman t i c s and N ecessa ry  T ru th , 
a rg u es  t h a t  i t  i s  n o t l o g i c a l l y  p o s s ib le  f o r  someone to  b e l ie v e  
p and to  b e l ie v e  th a t  n o t—p . He s a y s ;
" «•« i f  someone r e p o r ts  th a t  he b^^lieves th a t  n o t—p , 
we a l l  deduce a n a ly t i c a l l y  from th>~ r e p o r t  t h a t  he 
does n o t b o l ie v  thrfc p; no p sy c h o lo g ic a l assum ptions 
about the,, w orking o f  h is  mind i s  needed to  j u s t i f y  th e  
in fe re n c e
So a cc o rd in g  to  P ap , to  say  o f  someone th a t  th ey  b e l ie v e  p and 
th a t  they  b e l ie v e  n o t-p  i s  to  say  t h a t  th e y  b o th  do and do n o t 
b l ie v q  p# I t  m igjit even be su g g e s t d  th a t  th e  above argum ent 
p ro v id es  us w ith  a v e ry  s im p le  s o lu t io n  to  th e  two paradoxes we 
a r e  c o n s id e r in g ,  th a t  i s  t h a t  n e i th e r  c o n s t i tu te s  a  l o g i c a l ly  
p o s s ib le  s t a t e  o f a f f a i r s , However, l e t  us be r u i t e  c l e a r  
abou t tho scope o f  th e  above argum en t, c o n s id e r  th e  fo llo w in g
( a )  P .172
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fo u r  c a s e s t
( a )  B (a ) (p  and n o t - p ) .
(b  ) B ( a j p and B( a ) » o t- p .
(o )  B (a)(pand  n o t-q )*  (w here p *io e n u iv r lm t  to  q . )
(d )  B (a )p  and L (a )n o t-q .  (Where p i s  e q u iv a l \n t  to  q , ) .
Bow P a u l’ s argum ent i s  a g a in s t  tli p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  h o ld in g
e x p l i c i t l y  c o n tr a d ic to ry  r e p o s i t io n s ;  a g r in a t  ( a )  and (b )
b ^ in g  pOQslble o a se s^ n o t (o )  and (d )*  However, i t  i s  by no
me CDS c l e a r  th a t  Pap i s  o o r re o t  and Q îiino, f o r  o n e , has
advocated  the possibility o f  (b )#^^  Khat io  c l e a r  i s  t h a t
th e re  i s  c e r t a in ly  som eth ing  Y ery odd abou t b o th  ( a )  and ( b ) .
But i f  we c o n s id e r  c e r t a i n  s i t u a t i o n s ,  perhaiie i t  I s  n o t so
obvious th a t  we would want to  say  th a t  bor.h ( a )  and (b )  d e s c r ib e
im p o ss ib le  s i tu a t io n s *  Thus i f  a man b ^ l i  ^vea ^  and
P
u n o o n eo io u sly  b e l ie v e s  a s  ono n ig h t  want to  say  i f
someono u n c o n sc io u s ly  remembered th a t  p an - b e lie v e d  th a t  n o t-p #  
F u r th e r  d is  ru se  ion  o f  th i s  p o in t  ie  i r r e l o v n t  f o r  ou r purposes 
f o r  i t  i s  n o t  c r u c ia l  th a t  w d e c id e  e i t h e r  way on th r m atte r*  
A ll th a t  i s  n e c e s sa ry  f o r  o u r p u r p o c 's ,  t h a t  i s  f o r  ( c )?  if?0L fcrt'poüHo'vv
th a t  C (a)B {a)(p  and n o t—p) be c o n s is t  n t*  I f  i t  i s  th o u g h t
/ j
t h a t  th i s  i s  io u b ta i l  bccouo o f  th e  in c o n s is te n c y  o f ( a )  o r
( b ) ,  o r  b o th ,  then  so  much th e  worse fo r  such nrpum cnts ms 
a tte m p ts  tq^how the in o o n c is t  noy o f  (e )  o r  ( b ) ,  E q u a lly  w ell 
th e  name p o in ts  go to  show th a t  a  r e j e c t i o n  o f  ( a )  o r  (b )  os 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s  does n o t show th a t  th e  s i t u a t i o n  d e sc rib e d  in  
i t h e r  the  l o t t e r y  paradox  o r the  p re fa c e  paradox i s  im possib le*
P a r t  (1 1 ) Moore’s  P aradox*
L ot us r e tu rn  then to  c o n s id e r in g  (C) as a oh&r- e th e r isa tio n  
o f  c o u s is t-moy* The o n ly  t e s t  wn can hav f o r  th e  sort* c tn e s s  
o f  (C) iB to  ee w hether o r  n o t i t  can cope i t h ,  o r  accoun t 
f o r ,  examples o f  s e t s  o f  b e l i e f s  which we would c o n s id e r  could
( a )  p #14B, Mori and d b je c t  (M .I.T# P r e s s ,  19M )
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n o t  be  h e ld  to  be t r u e  by  one p e r s o n ,  a t  one t im e , w ith o u t 
r a i s i n g  cons id : r a b l  d i f f i c u l  tim e * And, un f o r  :una t e l y , th e r e  
i s  an exam ple to  hand w hich problem s f o r  (C) n am ely ,
M oore*3 P arad o x . I n  t h i s  exam ple somoono sa y s  som etin g  to  
th e  e f f e c t  *p, b u t  I  do n o t b e l ie v e  i t . *  low  th e r e  a re  tw o , 
non-G: u iv a le n  t , ways in  ..h i oh t h i s  u t te r a n c e  may b e  symbol i s  
as B { a)(p  and B (a )n o t-p )  o r ,  cm B (a ) (p  and n o t-B (a )p } ,  each  
poses a oepara .to  p ro b le m . B eforr wo go on to  i n v e s t i g a t e  
p o s s ib le  s o lu t io n s  i t  i s  as w*-!! s h a t  wr sh o u ld  bo c l e a r  abou t 
what i s  g o in g  on h e ro .  By *may bo o^/mboliscd* we mean t h a t  
th e  oondi'.ionr* u n d e r w hich u t t e r  n ee  i s  a  problem  a re  th e  same 
as th e  c o n d it io n s  u n d e r w hich x-ro a r g je n t i t lc n  to  a s c r ib e  th e  
cbov b e l i e f s .  v iu 'th o r  i t  n ig h t  seem th a t  th e re  e r e  some 
b e l i e f s  o f  th e  f o r m B (a ) (p  and B (a )n o t—p ) and o f  th© form 
j3 (a )(p  and n o t B (a )p )  t h a t  were q u i te  r e a s o n a b le .  F o r  exam ple , 
s i t u a t i o n s  whero *a* was e d e s c r ip t io n  wiiich th e  in d iv id u a l  w ith  
th e  b e l i e f  d i i  not; know a p p lie d  to  h im . Howev - r , xfi a r e  o n ly  
Gone m o d  :d t |^ h o s e  o ases  in  which bhe i n i i v i  i u a l , A , has such  
a  b e l i e f  su ch  as  che above and *a* i s  a d e s c r ip t i o n  which A 
r e c o g n is e s  as a p p ly in g  to  him .
L e t u s  ta k e  tlio f i r s t  v e r s io n  o f  th e  p a rad o x  B (a )^  and B (a) 
n o t - p ) .  How s in c e ,  a s  we p o in te d  o u t e a r l i e r , th e  s t r e n g th  o f
(c)  depends upon what p r in c ip l e s  o f  commitmeni; wo a r e  p rep a re d  
to  a d o p t ,  i t  would noom t h a t  wo have oil e a sy  s o lu t io n  by  
a d o p tin g  th e  following:,*
( a ) B (a )p  e n t a i l s  C (a )B (a )p . 
a n d , (B) B (a)B (ci)p e n t a i l s  C (a )B (a )p .
G iv in g  us th e  fo llo w in g  s o lu t io n :
( 1 ) B (a ) (p  ann B (a )  n o t -p )  
e n t a i l s
(2 )  B {a)p and B (a )B (a )  n o t-p  
e n t a i l s
(3 ) C (a)B (a)p  by  (a )
and
(4 ) C (a)B (a) n o t-p  by (b ) 
e n t a i l s
jl/ 0 (a )  (B (a )p  and B (a) n o t-p )  by (C o n j) .
T h is  i s  in c o n s i s te n t  by (C) b ecau se  (B (a)p  and B (a ) n o t-p )  
i s  in c o n s i s te n t  5 p a r a d ig m a t ic a l ly ,  and occu rs  as an elem ent 
o f  PCB(a).
However, as a means o f  p re s e rv in g  (c) t h i s  i s  
c h im e r ic a l .  C o n sid er th e  l a s t  l in e s  C (a) (B (a )p  and B (a) 
n o t-p )  i s  in c o n s i s te n t  b cause (B (a )p  and B (a) n o t-p )  i s
as an elem ent o f  PCB(a )• T h is  s im p ly  i s  note t r u e ,  th e  s te p  
i s  q u i te  f a l l a c i o u s .  (B (a)p  and B (a ) n o t-p )  a re  in c o n s i s te n t  
b e l i e f s  b ecau se  th ey  commit A to  *p and n o t-p *  as an elem ent 
o f  PCB(a) and th a t  i s  an exarapl'"' o f  an u n p ro b le m a tic a lly  
in c o n s i s te n t  p r o p o s i t io n .  I t  does n o t fo llo x f from t h i s  
t h a t  i f  (B (a)p  and B (a )n o t-p )  i s  an elem ent o f  PCB(a ) th en  
B (a) i s  an in c o n s i s t  n t  s e t  o f  b e l i e f s .  To say  th a t  (5 )  
shows ( 1 ) to  bo an in c o n s i s te n t  b e l i e f  i s  to  make th e  
assu m p tio n , as y e t  c o m p l-te ly  unfounded , t h a t  th e  r e l a t io n s h ip  
betw een C (a) (B (a )p 'a n d  B (a) n o t -p )  and *p and no t-p*  i s  th e  
same as  th e  r e l a t io n s h ip  betw  en (B (a) p and B (a ) n o t-p )  and 
*p and n o t-p * .
' B efo re  g o in g  on to  d is c u s s  how we m ight a l t e r  (C) to  
g iv e  a s o lu t io n  to  Moore’s P a ra d o x , l e t  us d is c u s s  a more 
g -n o ra l  p rob lem , naraoly, w hether Moore’s Paradox i s  a p roblem  
f o r  us a t  a l l ?  I t  would so m re a so n a b l e, th a  b w shou ld  
abtnm pt to  ground our i n t u i t i o n  th a t  Moore’s Paradox i s  
r  la t f 'd  to  in c o n s is te n t  sr t s
(c o n tin u e s  on n e x t page)
A .- J./) A
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o f  b e l  l o f a , b e fo re  v r ta k e  any s te p s  to  produce a  s o lu t i o n .
F i r s t  o f  a l l  we laust a c c e p t t h a t  b o th  fo rm u la tio n s  o f  
Moore’s  Paradox a re  p o s s ib le ,  t h a t  i e  n o t s e l f —c o n tr rd ic to ry ^  
u n le s s  ve a rc  p r^perod  to  a c c e p t th e  fo llo w in g  en ta ilm c n ts#
(1 )  B (a) n o t-B (e )p  e n t a i l s  not-B (ei)p*
( 2 ) B (a )B (a )p  e n t s i l n  B (a )p . 
and (3 )  B (a )n o t-p  e n t a i l s  n o t—B(a)p*
Those*, to g e th e r  w ith  th e  ^ n ta l lm e n t ,  B (a){p  and q )  e n t a i l s  
B (a )p  which w have a lr e a d y  accepted^ would show
t h a t  b o th  foryriuladicjns o f  M oore’s  Paradox wore c o n tr a d ic to ry  
p r o p o s i t io n s .  '*h?tnilment (1 )  s u f f ic n s  to  ge t  r i l  o f  
B (a ) (p  and !?o t-B (a )p ). And e n t a i Iment s  (2 )  and (3 )  s u f f i c e  
to  g n t r i i  o f  B (a )(p  and B (a) n o t—p ) .  However, n e i t h e r  
( 1 ) n o r  (2 )  con r e a l l y  b^ oono idered  as a t  n i l  p la u s ib le *
So i f  an i n d iv id u a l ,  A, has as e lem en ts  o f  PCB(a) th e  
i)ro jx » sitlo n e  p ,  and B (a )p , id ia t th e n  i s  th e  problem ? I t  i s  
p ro b ab ly  a  u n iv e r s a l  o ccu rren ce  t h a t  p eo p le  b e l ie v e  one 
th in g  and b r  lioVG th e y  b e l  le v  a n o th e r ;  t h i s  i s  th e  caao 
b o o n u e w e  a re  n o t  b le s s e d  w ith  ran sp a re n c y  o f  co n sc io u sn ess*  
However, so  what? What i s  so  s p e c ia l  abou t b e l i e f s  as  
o b je c ts  o f  b e l i e f ,  o r  know ledge, t h a t  d i f f e r e n t i a t e s  them 
from a n y th in g  e ls e ?  In  o th  r  w ords, we do n o t f in d  i t  
I>rbblcPiatic th a t  p  sh o u ld  bo th e  ea se  w h ile  B (a )n o t-p ;  s o  
why sh o u ld  we f in d  i t  p ro b l :m atio  th a t  B (a)p  b u t  B (a )B (e )n o t-p ?  
Even raor^ s u c c i '^ n t ly ,  i f  B (a )p  i s  an  ©lament o f  B (a ) and B (a)B (a) 
n o t—p i s  an e lem en t o f  B (a) why may' ) h a t  B(.a) B (a )n o t—p 
sim p ly  b e  a  f a l s e  b e l i e f ?
A gain c o n s id e r  th e  s ta te m e n t *p, b u t  I  d is b e l ie v e  i t , *  
c o n s tru e d  as  B (a )(p  and n o t-B (a )p ) ;  we srom to  hav© s im i l a r  
problem s w ith  t h i s , b u t  why? Suppose p and n o t-B (a )p  a re  
e le m e n ts  o f  PCB{a)| th e n  onoo a g a in  th la  would seem to  be
(a ) ’May' h e re  r a th e r  than  ' i s ' , s i n c e  we have n o t accep ted  
th a t  B (a) n o t-p  e n t a i l s  n o t-B { a ]p .
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a p o s f ï ib i l i t y  t h a t  we muot a llo w  once g r a n t in g  th e  non- 
, ^  y/ y . tra n n p F m n cy  o f  o o n ac io u en ese . The p o in t i s  th a t  whereas
^  ^ ^  )n o t-p )a M  B (a ) (p  and n o t-B (a )p )  b o th
 ^ seem p ro b le m a tic  in  th e  ex trem e  ^ i t  does n o t seem so
p ro b le m a tic  t h a t  p be  an elem ent o f  PCB(a) and n o t-B (a )p  
be an elem ent o f  PCB(a); b o th  a re  ca se s  o f  la c k  o f  s e l f -  
loTOwleclgG#^'''^
L et Us c o n s id e r  th e  s i t u a t i o n  in  th e  fo llo w in g  way. I f  
I  become aware o f  th e  f a c t  th a t  I  am ig n o ra n t abou t m y se lf  
in  a p a r t i c u l a r  way ; t h a t  i s  I  become aware t h a t  I  b e l ie v e  
p and th a t  I  b r l i e v e  t h a t  I  do nob b e l ie v e  p ,  th e it  a t  t h a t  
moment I  cease  to  be ig n o ra n t o f m y se lf in  th a t  p a r t i c u l a r  
way* Or r a t h e r ,  I  ought to  c e ase  to  be s e l f - i^ m o r a n t . I t  
i s  im p o rta n t to  n o t ic e  t h a t  my b e in g  open to  c e n se u re i f  
I  f a i l  to  a p p r o p r ia te ly  a d ju s t  my b l i e f s  i s  a p o in t  o f  
lo g ic a l  S ig n if ic a n c e . F or i f  I  am a b le  to  b - s e l f - ig n o r a n t  
in  t h i s  way, w ith o u t my b s in g  opon to  any p a r t i c u l a r  
c e n s u re , o th e r  than th a t  o f  b e in g  ig n o r a n t ,  bh m " b e lie f#  
ce a se s  to  h a v e , o r  r a t h e r ,  c ea se s  to  be  a b le  to  have a 
number o f  fu n c tio n s  q u i te  c e n t r a l  to  our co n cep t o f  b e l i e f .
I f  I  b e l ie v e  p ,  then  in  some way I  a c c e p t t h a t  p i s  t r u e ;  
t h i s  t r i v i a l  tn ji th  abou t b e l i e f  and w hatever fo llo w s  from 
i t  i s  u i t e  c r u c ia l  to  our concep t o f  b e l i e f .  But i t  i s  
t h i s  t h a t  i s  b in g d en ied  i f  we deny th a t  aw -r ^ness o f  
s e l f - ig n o r j in c s  in  th e  manner d e s c r ib e d  above demands some
L~
a c t io n  -  in  the way o f  r e o rg a n is in g  h is  s e t  o f  b e l i e f s  -  
on th e  p a r t  o f  the b e l i e v e r .  % a t  o b scu res t h i s  f a c t  
i s  th e  i n t e n t i o n a l i t y  o f  b e l i e f ;  I f  T can b l ie v o  p when 
p i s  f a l s e ,  thenrwby canno t I  b e l ie v e  th a t  I  b o l ie v e  p 
when I  do n o t?  %’e a re  handicapped  a t  t h i s  p o in t  s in c e  i#
^^^Lack o f se lf-k n o w led g e  r a t h e r  th a n  s e lf - d e c e p t io n  s in c e
th e  l a t t e r  im p lie s  a  s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d  la c k  o f  s e lf -k n o w le d g e .
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la c k  a n y th in g  th a t  m ight re a so n a b ly  ha c a l le d  an a n a ly o is  
o f b e l i e f ,  so l e t  us ta k e  i t  t h a t  i f  I  b e l ie v e  p th en  I 
aooep t p to  b t r u e ;  t h i s  i s  n o t supposed to  b - an m .a ly s is  
b u t  i t  s u f f ic e s  f o r  our p u rp o se s . Bhat w hav to  show i s  
th a t  i f  I  b l i e v  t .h r t I  b e l ie v e  j  than  J  a cc e p t p t- be 
t r u e ,  in  o th e r  words th a t  th e re  s h o ir i  be a  com. itrae n t to  
p .  Thus i f  I  b e l ie v e  p , T accep t th a t  p b" t r u e  and i f  
I  b ^ l l  ve t h a t  I  b e l ie v e  p then I  accep t th a t  I  a c ce p t th a t  
p b: trrH '. I n  do ing  ao I  ecoopt two th in g s ,  I  ac c ep t th a t  
I  acf '-'pt P to  b t r u  , and I  a c ce p t th a t  I  a c c e p t p to  be 
trt,i6 . The coiTiadtment i s  r- ta in e d  d e s p i te  th e  i n t m b i o n a l i t y  
of bf l i c f g  a n i thi'-' mus t s u re ly  b som ething  an eccom it o f  
i n t e n t i o n a l i t y  must accommodate. I f  we deny t h i s  then
Moor-a*a Paradox a p a r t  we g e t  o u r s - lv e s  in to  se v e re  
d i f f i c u l t i e n • C onsider ; man who Says *I b e l ie v e  p# | 
i f  \;é deny th -1 th e  b o l i o f  th a t  ona b a l le v a s  p c o n s t i tu te s  
a commitment to  p , th e n  we canno t co n s tru e  th is  rem ark , 
sym bolised  as B ( t ) 3 ( i ) p ,  as c o n s t i tu t in g  an a f f i rm a t io n  
o f and t h i s  i s  s u re ly  v e ry  odd indood .
I t  fo llo w s , th e re  Core, from what hav.., s id  th a t  
1 V) \   ^ B (a)(p  ■ nd B( - )n o t-p ) i s  inde d in c o n s is te n t  and must be
shown to  b- such by any a n a ly s is  of co n sis ten cy  in  s e ts  o f 
b l i e f o ._ /  f - 'f
■ a , J /„' / From whr; b we have s a id  we havm th e se  two s o lu t io n s  to
th e  two vr s io n 3 o f  Moore"s P aradox .
(1 )  fB (a )(p  and B{a) n o t-p )  
g iv e s  us
(2 )  B (a)p  and B (a)B (a) n o t - p .
(2 ) g iv  ?8 us
k / L  C(a)P
and
(/;)  C (a )B (a )n o t-p
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(4 )  glTnn UB
(5 )  C(a )C (a )n o t-p
(5 )  g iven  us
( 6) C(a )n o t-p  
( 3 ) and ( 6 ) g i v - us
Q (e )(p  and n o t - p ) .
And f o r  tiie cth- r  vc h a v e .
(1 )*  B (a ) (p  and nok~B(&)p)
( l ) *  g iv e s  us
(2)»  B (a )p  and B(e ) n o t - 3 ( a ) p .
( ? ) "  g iv ? s  us
(3)*  C (a )B (a )p
and
(4 )*  C (a )n o t-B (a )p .
( 3 )* and (/;)"  giv.^ u s
( 5 )' 0 ( a )  (B (a )p  end n o t.-B (a )p ) .
The p r in c ip l e s  o f  ooimltmcnt: i n  a d d i t io n  to  ( a )  and (b )  
t h a t  need  to  g u a ra n te e  th-_ d e d u c tio n s  f r o r  ( 1 ) to  ( 6 ) 
and from ( l ) ‘ to  ( 5)* a r e : -
(G) B (a )p  e n t a i l s  C (a )p .
(B) C (a )C (a )p  e n t a i l s  0 ( e ) p ,
and
(S ) C(a )B (a )p  e n t a i l s  C (a )C (a )p .
Bach o f ( . ) ;  (b )  a rd  (E ) has been arg u ed  f o r  ab o v e .
T h is  th e n  d e a ls  w ith  b o th  v e r s io n s  o f M oore 's  P aradox  
w hich we may now ta k e  as  n o t  b e in g  c o u n te r  exam ples to  ( c ) ,  
s in e  b o th  ( 6 ) and ( 5 )* a re  in c o n s i s t  n t  by ( c ) .
P a r t  ( i i i )  C o n s is te n c y  and R a t io n a l i t y .
So f a r  we have d ev e lo p ed  th e  n o t io n  o f  a  o o n s is t 'm t
s e t  o f  belie"$[9. We m ust now answ er th e  q u e s tio n s  IThat
i s  th e  r e l a t i o n  betw  en r a t i o n a l i t y  and c o n s is te n c y ?  I t  
i s  q u i t e  c l e a r  th a t  we do n o t h o ld  someone open to  c r i t i c i s m
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as  i r r a t i o n a l  s im p ly  b ecau se  he h as  a few in c o n s i s te n t  
b e l i e f s  t h a t  he has n o t n o tic e d  a re  in c o n s i s t e n t ;  on th e  
o th e r  hand we would n o t want to  sa y  th a t  he was beyond 
c r i t ic is m #  T h is  i s ,  p e rh a p s , a  p o in t  w orth  d is c u s s in g  
a l i t t l e #  We a re  engaged in  an a ttem p t to  u n d e rs^ ten d  
why one s e t  o f  b ' l i e f s ,  th o se  in  th e  l o t t e r y  p a rad o x , a re  
i r r a t i o n a l ,  w h i ls t  a n o th e r  s e t  o f  b e l i e f s  i s  r a t i o n a l ,  
th o se  in  th e  p re fa c e  parad o x ; th a t  i s ,  d e s p i te  th e  
f a c t  t h a t  in  b o th  c a se s  the b e l i e f s  a r e ,  o r  a p p a re n tly  
a r e ,  i n c o n s i s t e n t ♦ And th e  su g g e s tio n  i s  th a t  i f  we wore 
to  f a i l  to  f in d  any d i f f e r  nce betw een  them th en  we would 
be  fo rc e d  t  say  t h a t  b - l i e f s  h e ld  by huaaii b e in g s  a re  
g I ■ rv ' G p is to m ic a lly  i r r a t i o n a l #  Yot th , f a c t  i s  th a t  we do
i M  4^ .  ' n o t h o ld  someone who has a f  ^éw in o o n o ia to n c  b e l i e f s  and a
few i l l - s u p p o r te d  b e l i e f s  i r r a t i o n a l ,  we do a llo w  
c o n s id e ra b le  co n fu s io n  in  a m an 's b e l i e f s  b e fo re  we c a l l  
him i r r a t i o n a l #  So we m ight w e ll wonder wliy i t  was th a t  
th e  b e l i e f s  d e s c r ib e d  in  th e  two paradoxes wore so im portan t#  
The answ er to  th is  l i e s  in  th e  f a c t  t h a t  i f  we f a i l  
to  s e p a ra te  th e  two paradoxes th eh  we canno t d e s c r ib e  a 
s i t u a t i o n  in  which a man may be s a id  to  be beyond c r i t ic is m #  
T hat i s  to  s a y ,  no m a tte r  what he does , he canno t p la c e  
h itn so lf  beyond c r i t ic is m #  S o , i f  t h i s  i s  th e  c a s e ,  th en  
we a re  e n t i t l e d  to  c a s t  some do u b ts  on th e  means whereby 
he comes to  such b e l ie f s #  Wliereas in  th e  ca se  which we 
^ re  c o n s id e r in g ,  the man whose b e l i e f s  e x h ib i t  no more th an  
a c e r t a in  amount o f c o n fu a io n , th e  assum ption  i s  th a t  he 
can do som eth ing  abou t i t #  T hat i s ,  th e re  a re  no s t r u c t u r a l  
d e f e c t s  v i t i a t i n g  h is  re a so n in g . The 'c a n ' h e re  i s  a 
lo g i c a l  'c a n ' ,  and th e  p o in t  we a re  making has n o th in g  to  
do TTith th e  d is p u te  abou t th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f e v a lu a t io n  and 
'o u g h t*  im p ly in g  'c a n * .
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So , I f  ( p r r s o n 's  b e l i e f s  a r r  beyond c r i t i c i s m  then
ho i s  i d e a l l y  r a t i o n a l , i f  th ey  a r e  c r i t i c i s e b l m  to  a  o e r tn in
d eg re e  th en  he i s  r a t io n a l#  end i f  b yond th le  then  he i s
i r t r a t i o n a l , and i f  b y  end t h i s  ven f u r t h e r ,  th e n  i t  would
b d i f f i c u l t  to  d e s c r ib e  su ch  a  x>ei»QOn as  h av in g  b e l i e f s  a t
e l l *  I t  Tfould seem to  fo llo w  from  t h i s  th a t  th^? c o n t r ib u t io n
p la y e d  b y  b r in g  c o n s i s t e n t  in  b e in g  r a t i o n a l ,  i s  th e  c o n t r ib u t io n
i t  makes tow ards p la c in g  an in d iv id u a l  beyond c r ib ic is m *  Thus
one o f  th e  g e n e ra l  n o rm a tiv e  p r in o ip le s  o f  TauiomüL  b e l i e f ,  i s
th e  i n ju n c t io n  'Do nob hav f n ls f  b e l i e f s ' ,  o r  O 'o n o t  make
c ic ro rs ' ,  o r  *Do n o t  make m i s t a k e s ', o r  any one o f  a number
o f  f ornas ouch a p r in c ip l e  m ight ta k e *  And c l e a r l y  one who
o rg a n is e s  h ie  b e l i e f s  i n  acco rd an ce  w ith  th ^  jr r i i io iy le  'Be
c o n s is v a n t*  w i l l  have gone some o f  th -  x»;ay tow ards o r g a n is in g
them in  oocorionc©  w ith  th e  p r in c ip l e  *i)o n o t h av  f a l s e
b e l i e f s * .  Some o f  th e  way, bub n o t a l l ,  s in c e  a  s o t  o f
co n m istm rt b ' l i e f s  co u ld  a l l  b r  f a l s e *  r t h e l e s s , i t  i s
c l e a r  t h a t  th e  n o t have f a l s e  b e l ie io*^  demands th e
o th e r^ 'B e  ccm m lstm n t'*
Be for- wa go on th e r e  a r  two p o in ts  whi >h need to  b©
made au o u t th e  p r in c ip l e  'Bo n o t  h&v% f a l s e  b e l i e f s ' .  The
f i r e t  r < l a t a s  to  th e  a p p a re n t ly  e q u iv a le n t  p r in c ip l e  'H ave
t r u e  b e l i e f ^ ' .  i s . - q u i te  c l e a r  t h a t  a lth o ijg h  we a re
b u i l 'l i n g  up a p ic tu r e  o f  r a t i o n a l i t y  from  th e  i n s i d e ,  m
o b v io u s ly  do n o t  a n t  t o  in c lu d e  f e a tu r - o  chat a r e
in c o m p a tib le  w ith  any g e n e ra l  f e a t u r  s  we deem to  be
c o n s t i t u a t i v ^  o f  ou r n o tio n  o f  r a t i o n a l i t y .  Kow, i f  we
adop ted  th e  second p r in c ip l e  i t  would seem t h a t  we a re
e n d o rs in g  th e  c l? im  th a t  r a t i o r m l i t y  alm s a s  oom xdetenesg .
T h a t iSy th e  r a t i o n a l  b e l i e v e r  elm s a t  b e l i e v in g  a l l  t r u e
p ro i^ o s iv io n s . How, s ln c ^  i t  i s  no b a s i s  f o r  c r i t i c i s m  o f  
an individual that there are some t r u e  p r o p o s i t io n s  t h a t  he
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does n o t b e l i e v e , i t  seems e m in e n tly  re a s o n a b le  t h a t  we 
sh o u ld  r . '- je o t  any p r in c ip l e  t h a t  seems to  make such  a 
claim * I n  o th e r  w o rd s , hhe r a t i o n a l  b e l i e v e r  aim s a t  
p u r i t y  o f  b e l i e f  r a t h e r  th a n  c o m p le te n e ss • S o , d e s p i te  
th e  f a c t  t h a t  w? s h a l l  show in  C h ap te r F ive  t h a t  th e r e  i s  
no d i f f e r o n c  betw een thes* tv o  form s o f  th e  p r i n c i p l e ,  we 
S v h e ll  r  t a i n  th o  fo rm er v e r s io n  so  as to  e l im in a te  any 
s u g g e s t io n  t h a t  we a re  e n d o r s i n g  a co m p le ten ess  e lem en t 
in  r a t i o n a l  in q u i r y .
The second  p o in t  r o l a t - s  to  why we have 'Do n o t  have 
f a l s a  b e l i e f s ’ r a t h e r  th a n  'Do n o t havo b e l i e f s  you know 
to  br> f a l s e ' as a p r i n c i p l e .  Bow h e r e ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  th e  
p o in t  i s  th e  St.uae as  we made e a r l i e r  o n , we a r e  d e s c r ib in g  
id e  1 r a t i o n a l i t y .  ( Q u ite  a p a r t  from  th e  o b v ious 
c i r c u l a r i t i e s  InvolvedZ  Thus i f  'A knows p ’ e n t a i l s  
'A  r a t i o n a l l y  b e l ie v e s  p '  th e n  we can n o t in c lu d e  'know ' 
in  our s t a t  .mont o f  th e  p r in c ip le s  by which we o v o lu a te  
sjom e b e l i e f  as a  r a t i o n a l  o n e .)
We can  sa y  a  l i t t l e  more ab o u t th e  ro le  o f  c o n s in to n c y  
in  r a t i o n a l  b e l i e f  th a n  we have* The demand th a t  one be 
c o n s i s t a n t ,  in  th e  m anner d e s c r ib e d ,  i s  th e  demand f o r  a  
c e r t a i n  hom ogeneity  o f  a t t i t u d e #  U n less  a c e r t a i n  
hom ogeneity  o f  a t t i t u d e  i s  m a n ife s t  d th e n  an i n d i v i d u a l 's  
b e l i e f  c an n o t b e  s a id  to  be  d i s c r im in a to r y .  Thus th e  
ch arg e  o f in c o n s is te n c y  w i l l  amount to  th e  c h a rg e , i f  you 
can  b e l ie v e  t h i s  as w e ll  as t h a t  th e n  you can  b e l ie v e  
a n y th in g . T h a t i s , u n le s s  wo demand a  c e r t a i n  hom ogeneity  
o f  b e l i e f ,  re a so n in g  c e a s e s  t o t e  a  d is c r im in a to r y  o r  g o a l -  
d i r e c t e d  p ro c e ss*  B ut t h i s  demand does n o t e n t a i l  t h a t  
th e  hom ogeneity  to  be e x h ib i te d  should, be c o n s is te n c y  as
we have d e s c r ib e d  i t *  I n  o rd e r  t o ^ t  t h i s  we have to  ta k e
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s e r io u s ly  th e  f a c t  t h a t  when we b e l ie v e  a p r o p o s i t io n  we
b n l i ’vr> i t  to  be t r u e ,  From t h i s  wo can a rg u e  t h a t  th e
s o r t  o f  hom oganeity  we a sk  f o r  i s  c o n s is te n c y  in  th e  fa sh io n
d e s c r ib e d  5 n r tio ly  a c o n s is te n c y  c lo s e ly  r e l a t e d  to  th e
c o n s is te n c y  o f  p r o p o s i t i o n s •
So much th en  f o r  th e  p r in c ip le  'h e  c o n s is te n t*  , b u t
i t  i s  n o t obvious how such a p r in c ip l e  would work o u t in
p r a c t i c e .  C o n sid e r s m an, A, lûio has a  s e t  o f  b e l i e f s ,  B ( a ) ,
he n o t ic e s  th q ^ t  B(&) i s  i n c o n s i s t e n t :  f o r  th e  sak e  o f
argum ent he b e l ie v e s  p and he b e l ie v e s  no t-} ;: what sh o u ld  he
do? C le a r ly  th e r e  a re  th r e e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s ;  he can r o j e c t
(a )p ,  o r  r e j e c t  n o t - p ,  o r  r e j e c t  them b o th ,   ^ I t  i s  h o rd ly  
a s a t i c f a c t o r y  s o lu t io n  to  s u g g -s t  t h a t  3 sh o u ld  a r b i t r a r i l y  
d ro p  h is  b e l i e f  in  p , o r  h is  b e l i e f  in  n o t - p ,  o r  b o th ,  l i k e  
à h o t p o ta to ,  30 how sh o u ld  B change h is  mind? The 
p rob lrm s in v o lv e d  in  d e s c r ib i  n r a t i o n a l  changes o f  mind 
o r ;  n o t fu n d a m e n ta lly  d i f f e r e n t  from  th o se  in v o lv -d  in  
d e s c r ib in g  wha^t happens when we r a t i o n a l l y  make up o u r mind; 
when we make up ou r mind we have to  d e c id e  whn th e r  to  a c c e p t 
I> o r  n o t -p  o r  n e i t h e r .  T h is  would su g g e s t t h a t  th e  answ er 
t o  th e  problem  o f how wo a r e  to  be c o n s is te n t  i s  to  be g iv en  
by  a g e n e ra l  th e o ry  o f  in f e r e n c e .  Thus j u s t  as a g e n e ra l  
th e o ry  o f  in fe re n c e  m ust show how o u r a c c e p ta n c e  o f  p a r t i c u l a r  
p r o p o s i t io n s  i s  n o t a r b i t r e r y ,  so  must i t  a l s o  show how our 
r e j e c t i o n  o f p a r t i c u l a r  p r o p o s i t io n s  i s  n o t  a r b i t r a r y .  From 
t h i s  wc can sec  t h a t  i t  i s  a  n e c e s s a ry  c o n d it io n  o f  th e  
s a t i s f a o t o r i n e s e  o f  a  g e n e ra l  th e o ry  o f  in f a r e n c  th a t  i t  
sh o u ld  e n a b le  us to  be n o n - a r b i t r a r i l y  c o n s i s t e n t .  We s h a l l  
leave- fu r 'u h e r  d is c u s s io n  o f  th i s  u n t i l  C h ap te r F our when wo 
d is c u s s  I n f e r e n c e ,
((•a)
Æo. r e j é c t  b o th  % n o t-p -d o e s  n o t dëmhnd b e l i e v in g  n o t - ( p  o r  'n l t - p )  
b u t s im p ly  n e i t h e r  b e l i e v in g  p n o r  b e l i e v in g  n o t-p j  su ch  a p o s i t io n
i s  o b v io u s ly  co m p a tib le  w ith  b e lie v in g ^ ( .p  o r n o t - p )  s in c e  B (a ) (p  o r  n o t-p )  does n o t e n t a i l  -G ^ )p  o r Ci-ad- not*-p. \
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At t h i s  p o in t  l e t  us le a v e  th e  d is c u s s io n  o f  c o n s is ­
te n c y  and r e l a t  ' what have s a id  to  th e  o r ig in a l  t o p i c .
To he a b le  to  say  a f t e r  so much e f f o r t  what we a lr e a d y  know 
to  be th e  c a s e ,  nam-^^ly th a t  th e  b e l i e f s  a r r iv e d  a ^  i n  b o th  
p arad o x es  a r e  in d eed  i n c o n s i s t e n t , would seem to jh e  a  sm all 
re w a rd .  But we h a v e , I  th in k  g le a n e d  a  l i t t l e  more th a n  
t h i s ;  h a v in g  sh o rn  th e  fu n c t io n  o f  c o n s is te n c y  w ith in  
r a t i o n a l  b e l i e f ,  we a r e  a b le  to  se e  more c l e a r l y  th e  n a tu re  
o f  th e  p rob lem s r a i s e d  by th e  two p a ra d o x e s . I n  th e  
l o t t e r y  c a se  h a v in g  a r r iv e d  a t  i n c o n s i s t e n t  b e l i e f s  ^d.th 
no way shoi?m to  e x t r a c t  o u r s e lv e s , we a re  e n t i t l e d  to  be  
s u s p ic io u s  o f  th e  r o u te  by which we cam e, ab th^^ v e ry  l e a s t  
to  s a y  t h a t  p r o b a b i l i t y  i n f e r e n c ' can n o t c o n s t i t u t e  a 
g e n e ra l  th e o ry  o f  i n f e r e n c e .  H ow ever, i f  t h i s  i s  c o r r e c t  
how a re  we to  accommoda :,e th e  p rob lem s r a i s e d  by th e  p re  ace  
paradox?  F o r t h e r e ,  by s u p p o s i t io n ,  we a r r iv e d  a t  th e  
in c o n s is te n c y  by  emjploying re a s o n in g  j u s t i f i e d  b y ,  s im p ly , 
a g e n e ra l  th e o ry  o f  in f e r e n c e .  I t  would, a p p e a r  th en  th a t  
th e  r a t i o n a l  man who o rg a n is e s  h i s  b e l i e f s  in  accord ;m ce w ith  
th e  p r in c ip l e  *Be c o n s i s t e n t ' sh o u ld  n o t have any b e l i e f s  
a t  a l l .
B ut b e f o r ' we draw  t h i s  d ism a l c o n c lu s io n ,  we sh o u ld  
e x p l o r s u c h  a l t e r n a t i v e s  as a re  p re s e n te d  to  u s .  T h is  we 
vn .ll do in e th e  n e x t c h a p te r ,  where we w i l l  c o n s id e r  th e  s o lu t io n  
o f fe r e d  us by F yburg .
A ppendix to  C h ap te r Two.
R a th e r  by an o v e r s ig h t  I  h a v e , i n  f a c t ,  f a i l e d  to  do 
what I  s a id  I  had done a t  the end o f  p a r t  ( i i )  o f  C h ap te r 
Two. T h a t i s ,  to  j u s t i f y  each  o f  th e  p r in c ip l e s  o f  
commitment employed to  red u ce  tho» t  o v e r s io n s  o f  M oore 's  
p a ra d o x ic a l  b e l i e f  to  o ases  o f  i n c o n s i s t e n t  b l i e f s .  The
p r in c ip l e s  I  employed w e re , a p a r t  from (Conj)?.
( a ) B (a )p  e n t a i l s  C (a )B (a )p .
(B) B (a )B (a )p  e n t a i l s  C (a )B (a )p . 
th e  r a t h e r  unfortunat*-^ly  named (c)  (n o t  to  ba Confused w ith  
th e  c r i t e r i o n  o f  c o n s is t e n c y ) .
(c)  B (a )p  e n t a i l s  C (a )p .
(p )  C (a )c (a )p  e n t a i l s  C (a )p . 
a n d , ( e ) C (a )B (a )p  e n t a i l s  C (a )C (a )p .
Of th e s e  f iv e  p r in c ip l e s  f o u r ,  (B) to  ( b ) were j u s t i f i e d
in  th e  d is-'^ussion  in  which I  showed th a t  M oore 's  p a ra d o x ic a l
b e l i e f s  wore to  be c o n s id e re d  as  i n c o n s i s t e n t  b e l i e f s .
H ow ever, ( a ) ,  n e c e s s a ry  in  d e a l in g  w ith  B (a ) (p  and n o t-B (a )p )  
c a s e ,  I  have n o t j u s t i f i e d .
( a ) i s ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  th e  m ost d i f f i c u l t  to  j u s t i f y  f o r ,  
u z ilik e  a l l  th e  o th e r  p r in c ip l e s  , i t  la c k s  any g r e a t  
im m ediate a p p e a l .  I t  i s  a p a r t i c u l a r  ca se  o f  a n o th e r ,  q u i te  
f a l l a c i o u s ,  p r i n c i p i e % 
p e n t a i l s  C (a )p .
B ut c l e a r l y  we w i l l  f in d  no grounds f o r  the j u s t i : i c a t i o n  o f
( a )  h e r e .  The p r in c ip l e  ( a ) does h a v e , a t  l e a s t ,  two p o in ts  
in  i t s  f a v o u r .  The f i r s t  i s  t h a t  i t  does g e t  r i d  o f  th e  
B (a )p and n o tf.B (a )p )  c a s e ,  and h e lp  p re s e rv e  th e  c r i t e r i o n  
o f c o n s is te n c y  p roposed  in  th e  c h a p te r .  The second  i s  t h a t  
th e  e x is te n c e  o f su ch  a princi% )lo would e x p la in ,  b u t n o t 
j u s t i f y ,  why some p h ilo so p h e rs  have a n te d  to  argue  f o r ;  B (a )p  
e n t a i l s  B (a )B (a )p .
To j u s t i f y  th e  se c o n d , th e  more im p o r ta n t ,  o f  
th e  above two c la im s  would be o u t o f  p la c e  h e re  b u t  we 
can a t  l e a s t  s k e tc h  a l i n o  o f  argum ent# Suppose an 
i n d i v i d u a l , A, u t t e r s  th e  p r o p o s i t io n  p and does so  
u n d e r  c irc u m sta n c e s  in  w hich i t  would be a p p r o p r ia te  to  
a s c r ib e  to  him th e  b e l i e f  t h a t  ps i . e .  B (a)p#  Now we 
would s u r e ly  want to  a rg u e  th a t  i f  t h i s  were th e  ca se  
th en  B (a )B (a )p  i s  a l s o  tru e #  The problem  i s  how 
do we g u a ra n te e  t h i s  i f  we deny t h a t  B (a )p  e n t a i l s
B (a )B (a )p ?  W ell, we can b e g in  to  see  how to  g e t  an
answ er to  t h i s  i f  we a c c e p t t h a t  B(a.)p e n t a i l s  C (a )B (a )p . 
And a l s o  show , as we have no tim e to  d o , th a t  th e  
{ Jj. c o n d it io n s  which tu r n  mere u t t e r a n c e s  i n to  b e l i e f s  a l s o
/ _ tu rn  commitments in to  b e l i e f s .
s: j
;
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C h ap te r T h re e #
g y b u rg 's  U olubion  to  th e  L o t te r y  P aradox .
The l o t t e r y  p aradox  b e g in s  w ith  an a p p l i c a t io n  o f  th e  r u le  
o f  d e ta c h m e n t.
(Dg) A ccept o r  r e j e c t  h ,  g iv e n  K, a c c o rd in g  as to  c (h ,K ) i s  
g r e a t e r  th a^ n  o r  c ( h ,K ) is  l e s s  th an  -J; when c (h ,K ) 
e q u a ls  % , h may be a c c e p t ' d ,  r e j e c te d  o r  l e f t  in  suspense, 
T h i s , o f  c o u r s e , i s  n o t a p r in c ip l e  o f  commitment b u t  a  
c a n d id a te  r u le  o f  a c c e p ta n c e . I t  g iv e s  us th e  f i r s t  s t e p :
(l)* ^ ^ ^ T h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  th a t  q i s  ïï-l/îT  ( g r e a t e r  th a n  -J) 
th u s  A may a c c e p t o r  come to  b e l ie v e  q •
The move from th e  f i r s t  s t e p  to  th e  Sf^c.ond, in  w hich A 
i s  com m itted to  b o l ie v e  o f  each  p a r t i c ip a n t  t h a t  he w i l l  lo s e  
i s  demanded by th e  fo llo w in g  p r in c ip l e  o f  com m itm ent.
(N eut)*  I f  c(p,K) is  g r e a t e r  than and A a c c e p ts  o r  
comes to  b e l ie v e  ^  th e n  A is  commAed to  
believing q.
We may c a l l  t h i s  the p r in c ip l e ,  o f  n e u t r a l i t y #  A ll w e  
need now, to  com plete  th e  l i s t  o f  p r i n c i p l e s ,  i s  th e  p r in c ip le  
th a t  demands th e  mov: from A i s  com m itted to  b e l ie v in g  o f  each  
t h a t  th e y  w i l l  lo s e  to  A i s  com m itted to  b e l i e v in g  th a t  ev e ry ­
one w i l l  l o s e , and t h i s  i s  as fo llo w s
(C o n j) I f  B (a )p  and B (a )q ,  th e n  B (a ) (p  and q ) .
I f  C (a )3 (a )p  and C (a)B (.a)q , th en  c ( a ) E ( a ) ( p  and q ) .
The p re fa c e  paradox  r e l i e s  on e x a c t ly  th e  same p r in c ip le  
(C o n j) ,  b u t  o b v io u s ly  n o t ( h a u t ) * ,  as s u c h , s in c e  we have h e re  
s ta te d  i t  i n  t-^rms o f th "  r u le s  o f a c c e p ta n c e  (Dh )« The more
( a )  We w i l l  number th e  s te p s  in  th e  t  o parad o x es  as in  th e  
f i r s t  c h a p te r .
(b )  I n  f a c t ;  o f  c o u r s e ,  th e r e  i s  an im p l i c i t  u se  o f  (im p) h e re  
as w a l l .  B ut s in c e  no-one has y e t  su g g e s te d  th a t  t h i s  
p r in c ip le  be r e j e c te d  I  have n o t b ro u g h t i t  in to  th e  
d is c u s s io n #
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g e n e ra l  p r in c ip le  o f  n e u t r a l i t y  s t a t e d  s im p ly  in  term s o f  a  
g e n e ra l  r u le  o f  a c c e p ta n c e  i l l  b e ;
(N eu t) I f  on th e  s e t  o f  p r o p o s i t io n s  A b o lie v o s  , P B (s ) ,
i t  i s  shovm by  som r u le  o f  r a t i o n a l  a c c e p ta n c e , R, 
t h a t  A may a c c e p t p ,  th o n  A i s  com m itted to  
b e l ie v in g  p*
So now we have in  f r o n t  o f  u s  a com plete  d e s o r ii^ t io n  o f 
each  o f  th e  t  o p a ra d o x e s , each  s t e p  and th e  p r in c ip le s  and 
r u le s  w hich demand each  s to p ,  B o fo r tu rn in g  ou r a t t e n t i o n  
to  s o lu t io n s  t h a t  hav been  o f fe r e d  to  th e  par*doxes which h in g e  
on one o r  o th e r  p r in c ip l e  o f  com m itm ent, l e t  us s a y  som eth ing  
ab o u t p r in c ip le s  o f  commitment. The most im p o rta n t p o in t  to  
be  made ab o u t commitment i s  t h a t  i t  i s  n o t o b l ig a t io n . T ha t 
i s  to  sa y  i f  »A' i s  com m itted to  b e l i e v in g  p* th e n  i t  does n o t 
fo llo w  t h a t  *A ought to  b e l ie v e  p * . Thorn a re  a  number o f  
p o in ts  t h a t  make t h i s  c l e a r ,  b u t  th e  most c o g m t i s  a p o in t  
th a t  f o l l o >73 from c o n s id e r in g  a man, A, who has in c o n s i s t e n t  
b e l i e f s .  I t  i s  n o t  th e  ca se  t h a t  i f  A b e l ie v e s  b o th  t h a t  p and 
th a t  n o t-p  th e n  A ought to  b e l ie v e  e v e ry th in g .  And t h i s  i s  j u s t  
a  s p e c ia l  ca se  o f  th e  more g e n e ra l  one; i f  A b e l ie v e s  p and p 
e n t a i l s  q ,  th en  i t  does n o t  fo llo w  t h a t  A ought to  b e l ie v e  q , 
F o r th e  p e r f e c t l y  s im p le  re a so n  t h a t  i t  m ight b e  th e  case  t h a t  
A ought n o t to  b e l ie v e  p .  I t  i s  n o t  even th e  ca se  t h a t  i f  A 
' ought to  b e l i e v e  p th en  A ought to  b e l ie v e  q ,  i f  p e n t a i l s  q .
F o r ,  i f  an in d iv id u a l  b e l ie v e s  o n ly  what he ought to  b e l i e v e ,  
th en  ho ough t to  b o l ie v e  a l l  th e  consequences o f  what he 
b e l i  VGs* t h i s  would b e  a b su rd . A lthough  wo h av sh o T -m  th a t  
A i s  com m itted to  b e l ie v in g  p does n o t e n t a i l  t h a t  A ought to  
b e l ie v e  p t h i s  does n o t  mean th a t  th e r e  i s  no r  ^ la t io n s h ip  
betw een them a t  a l l .  T here  i s  a r o la b io n s h ip  b u t i t  i s  more 
com plex. T ha t th e r  i s ,  i s  shown by th e  f a c t  t h a t  i f  th e r e  was
] ' '  ,  X  -- '  - ^  a  f  ■
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n o t vre oou ld  n e v e r  f o rc e  someone to  a  c o n c lu s io n .
L e t us now tu rn  to  c o n s id e r in g  th e  th re e  p o s s ib le  
s o lu t io n s  which a re  p re se n  ted to  u s ;  k eep in g  o u r a t t e n t i o n  
f ix e d  s o l e l y  on th e  l o t t e r y  p a ra d o x . The th r e e  
a I t e m a t i v e s  a r e s -W'
( a )  We can r e j e c t  ( % )  a s  e r u le  o f  r a t i o n a l  accep tan ce*
(b )  We c?.m r e j e c t  (N e u t) ' as  a  p r in c ip le  o f  commitment.
( c )  We can r e j e c t  (C on j) as  a p r in c ip le  o f  commitment.
The c a n d id a te  s o lu t io n  ( a )  would s o lv e  th e  problem  by
d en y in g  th a t  A co u ld  a c c e p t ,  o r  r a t i o n a l l y  come to  b e l ie v e  q ,
s im p ly  b ec au se  th e  p r o b a b i l i t y  t h a t  q was g r e a t e r  th an  some 
' f ig u r e ;  in  th e  ca se  o f  (% j) t h i s  w i l l  be
The c a n d id a te  s o lu t io n  (b )  would s o lv e  th e  problem  in
th e  fo llo w in g  way. Suppose t h a t  th e r e  a re  to n  p eo p le  %jho
ta k e  p a r t  in  th e  l o t t e r y  A ,B ,C , I t  fo llo w s  ,ha t th e
chances o f  B lo s in g  w i l l  be 9 /1 0 ; s im i l a r l y  f o r  A ; , . . . , J  
when t h e i r  p r o b a b i l i t y  i s  e s tim a te d  on B ( a ) .  Now A n o t ic e s  
t h a t  th o  chances t h a t  B m i l  lo s e  a re  9 / I O 9 so  he a c c e p ts  
g  1  t h a t  4  w i l l  l o s e .  Now t h i s  g iv e s  A a s e t  o f  b e l i e f s  d i f f e r e n t
from  B ( a ) , s in c e  i t  w i l l  in c lu d e  th e  b e l i e f  t h a t  A w i l l  l o s ^ .
So A now e s tim a te s  th e  chances o f  anyone lo s in g  on a 
d i f f e r e n t  s e t  o f  p r o p o s i t io n s .  F o r exam ple th e  chances th a t  
C w i l l  lo s e  have b come 8 /9 ;  b u t  th i s  a g a in  i s  g r e a t e r  than %
so  A a c c e p ts  i t .  And so on down the  l i n e  u n t i l  th e r e  a re
j u s t  two p eo p le  l e f t *  By t h i s  t im e , c a l c u l a t i n g  on th e  
b e l i e f s  t h a t  A has a c n u ir e d ,  \re have th e  chances t h a t  A w i l l  
lo s e  a re  and th e  chances t h a t  J  w i l l  lo s e  a re  '^* A b e in g  
m a l ic io u s ,  o r  o p t i m i s t i c ,  a c c e p ts ,  r i g i d l y  a d h e r in g  to  (B it) , 
t h a t  J  w i l l  l o s e ,  and d is c o v e r s  t h a t  he v r ill  \7±nl I n  t h i s
t
way th e  s e t  o f  b e l i e f s  t h a t  B acq u ir- 'S  w i l l  n o t  bo in c o n s i s t e n t
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_ ^  ' s in c e  th e y  id .l l  be th a t  B w i l l  l o s e ,  C i d l l  l o s e ,  . . . ,  J  w i l l
l o s e ,  t h a t  someone w i l l  win and th a t  th a t  someone w i l l  be 
hims I f .
The c a n d id a te  s o lu t io n  (9 ) w i l l  so lv e  th e  problem .
F or a c c e p tin g  (G ), as a  c r i t e r i o n  o f  c o n s is te n c y ,  i t  "frill 
s im p ly  p o in t  ou t th a t  the move from *A b e lio v e s  p and A 
b e l ie v e s  n o t—p* to  'A i s  com m itted to  b e l ie v in g  p and n o t—p* 
i s  n o t j u s t i f i e d ;  and hence A does n o t have in c o n s i s te n t  
b e l i e f s .  Perhaps n e i th e r  o f th e  s o lu t io n s  loo lts  i n v i t i n g ,  
b u t o b v io u s ly  we sh o u ld  i n v i s t l g a t r  them . In  t h i s  c h a p te r  
we i r i l l  examine c a n d id a te  s o lu t io n  (b )  and ( c ) ,  and in  th e  
n e x t c h a p te r  wo w i l l  examine ( a ) .  None lias y e t  s e r io u s ly  
proposed (b )  as a s o lu t io n  to  th e  l o t t e r y  p a rad o x , b u t (c)  
has re c e iv e d  some s u p p o r t ,  most n o ta b ly  from K yburg, who 
c o n s tru c te d  th e  paradox  in  th e  f i r s t  p la c e .
L e t us c o n s id e r  th e  (b )  s o lu t io n ,  i t  i s  p ro b ab ly  c l e a r  
th a t  as a  s o lu t io n  i t  la c k s  any i n t e r e s t  a t  a l l .  However, 
i t  does r a i s e  a number o f  im p o rta n t p o in t s .  C onsider the 
s i t u a t i o n  where te n  p eo p le  ta k e  p a r t  in  a  l o t t e r y .  L eaving  
a s id e  c o m p lic a tio n s  ab o u t th e  f a i r n e s s  o f  the  l o t t e r y  o r  
o f  th e  te c h n ic a l  h i tc h e s  th a t  m ight a r i s e , th e r e  a re  te n  
m u tu a lly  e x c lu s iv e  and e x h a u s tiv e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s .  They a re  
t h a t  A i f i l l  w in , B w i l l  l o s e ,  G w i l l  l o s a ,  . . .  e t c . ;  A w i l l  
l o s e ,  B xd.ll Tfin, C w i l l  l o s e ,  . . . ,  e t c . ;  and so on . The 
p o s i t io n  we a r r i v  a t  by r e j e c t i n g  (N eut) and d o in g  no more 
abou t i t ,  i s  t h a t  i t  i s  e q u a lly  r a t i o n a l  to  a c c e p t any one 
o f  them; and th a t  i t  i s  e q u a lly  r a t io n a l  to  a c c e p t any one 
o f  them a lth o u g h  we h a v  : no re a s o n  to  p r e f e r  one r a th e r  
th a n  a n o th e r , and we know th a t  o n ly  one a l t e r n a t iv e  i s . t h o  
c o r r e c t  o n e . I t  i s  t h i s  extrem e a r b i t r a r i n e s s  t h a t  makes
(b )  such  a bad s o lu t io n .
There i s  a ls o  ano h e r  p o in t .  A lthough by a d o p tin g  (b )
i & ' \
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we do av o id  coming to  c o n t r a d ic to r y  b e l i e f s ;  we come to  
haV"; b e l i e f s  such  t h a t  th e  a n te c e d e n t p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  th e  
c o n ju n c tio n  o f p ro p o s i t io n s  b e l ie v e d  i s  lo w er th a n  o u r 
i n i t i a l  s t i p u l a t i o n  f o r  r a t i o n a l  a c c e p ta n c e . Now a lth o u g h  
t h i s  i s  n o t c o n tr a d ic to r y  i t  d o es r a t h e r  ta k e  away th e  
i n t u i t i v e  p l a u s i b i l i t y  t h a t  h ig h  p r o b a b i l i t y  has as  
s u f f i c i n g  f o r  r a t i o n a l  a c c e p ta n c e . V
From th e se  p o in ts  wc can see  t h a t  th e  r e j e c t i o n  o f 
(N eut)*  am ounts to  th e  fo llo w in g . The r u le  o f  
a cc e p ta n c e  ( % )  i s  sup  osed to  be such  th a t  g iv en  an 
argum ent *p hence q * , i f  i t  has c e r t a in  p r o p e r t i e s ,  th en  
wo may on th e  b a s is  o f  p a c c e p t ,  b e l i e v e ,  q . Thus a r u le  
o f  r a t i o n a l  a c c e p ta n c e  i s  an a n a ly s is  o f  what i t  i s  f o r  p 
to  b a good argum ent f o r  q ,  s u f f i c i e n t l y  good f o r  us to
be a b le  to a c c e p t th e  c o n c lu s io n . So by  r e j e c t i n g  (N e u t)*
we a re  say in g s  i f  t h i s  i s  a  good argum ent f o r  i t s  c o n c lu s io n , 
th e n  i t  does n o t fo llo w  th a t  we mey so. c o n s id e r  a l l  s im i l a r  
argum ents to  be good argum ents f o r  t h e i r  r e s p e c t iv e  
c o n c lu s io n s .  So we a re  i m p l i c i t l y  r e j e c t i n g  ( % )  s in c e  
we a re  d en y in g  t h a t  i t  c o n s t i t u t e s  an a n a ly s is  o f  what i t
i s  f o r  p to  bn a good argum ent f o r  q .
So l e t  us tu rn  to  th e  s o lu t io n  ( o ) ,  ad v o ca ted  by Kyburg 
and o th e r s .  I n  h is  a r t i c l e  'C o n ju n c t iv i t i s *  Kyburg mak s 
th e  follO Tfing comments;
I t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  g iv e  argum ents a g a in s t  th e  
c o n ju n c tio n  p r in c ip l e  p a r t l y  b cause  i t  i s  so  
obvious to  me t h a t  i , i s  f a l s e ,  and p a r t l y  
b ecau se  i t  i s  obvious to  o th e r s  t h a t  i t  i s  t r u e .
The m ost p e rs u a s iv e  argum ents perhaps a rc  th o se  
which stem  from th e  l a s t  theorem  p re s e n te d ;  i t  
seems p re p o s te ro u s  to  suppos t h a t  a l l  o f  ou r
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in d u c t iv e  knowledge h as to  be  em bodiablc in  a s in g le  
f a t  s ta te m e n t .  I t  seems to o  l im i t in g  to  sa y  th a t  
I  havn to  b e l ie v e  th e  c o n ju n c tio n  o f  e v e ry th in g  I  
have a r i ^ t  to  b e l ie v e  ( th e r e  can n o t be  v e ry  much, 
th e n ,  t h a t  I  have a r i g h t  to  b e l i e v e ) ,  and i t  seems 
even more u n re a so n a b le  to  c la im  I  have a r i g h t  to  
b e l ie v e  jho c o n ju n c tio n  o f  e v e ry th in g  I  have a  r i g h t  
to  b e l i e v e .  A lthough I  c la im  to  have good rea so n s  
f o r  b e l ie v in g  -v e ry  s ta te m e n t I  b e l i e v e ,  I  c la im  a ls o  
to  h av r good re a so n s  f o r  b e l ie v in g  some o f  those  
s ta te m e n ts  a re  f a l s e .  I  th in k  t h a t  b o th  o f  th e se  
c la im s a re  p e r f e c t ly  sound; and i f  th ey  a r c ,  th e  
c o n ju n c tio n  p r in c ip le  i s  fa ls© .^ ^ ^
But how ever obv ious Kyburg p ro fe s s e s  to  f in d  th e  
p r in c ip l e  o f  c o n j im c t iv i ty , he r a t h e r  g r a tu i to u s ly  lo a d s  
u s to  b e l ie v e  th a t  i t s  r e j e c t i o n  does n o t come qjs second 
n a tu r e  to  h im , f o r  e a r l i e r  in  th e  a r t i c l e ,  he s a y s ;
But th e r e  i s  o b v io u s ly  som eth ing  in c o n s i s te n t  
abou t a c c e p tin g  th a t  an a r b i t r a r y  p i s  no t-H  (S in ce  
i t ' s  a  p and t h a t 's  a l l  we know ab o u t i t ) ,  and 
a c c e p t in g  the  s ta te m e n t t h a t  an a r b i t r a r y  p i s  R 
( s in c e  i t ' s  a p and t h a t ' s  a l l  we know ab o u t i t ) ^ ^ ^  
B ut i f  th e r e  i s  n o th in g  a t  a l l  i n c o n s i s t e n t  i n  
b e l i e v in g  p and in  b e l i e v in g  n o t-p  a t  th e  same t im e , what 
co u ld  th e r e  be in c o n s i s t e n t  abou t b e l ie v in g  p b ecau se  1 
and b e l ie v in g  n o t-p  b e ca u se  1 ,  a t  th e  same tim e?  The 
su p p o rt a  s e t  o f  b e l i e f s  h as does n o t c o n fe r  upon them , 
n o r  does i t  d e p r iv  : them o f ,  c o n s is te n c y .  Such a 
s i t u a t i o n  as Kyburg d e s c r ib e s  co u ld  on ly  seem odd to
( a )  p . 77 In d u c t io n ,  A ccep tan ce . and R a tio n a l B e l i e f •
Ed.M .Swain (D. R e id e l , D o rd re c h t, 1 9 7 0 ).
(b )  p . 60.
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someone who a lr e a d y  a c c e p te d  th e  o d d ity  o f  b e l i e v in g  p 
and b e l i e v in g  n o t-p  a t  th e  same tim e .
The s i t u a t i o n  i s  an Kyburg d e s c r ib e s ;  i t  i s  v e ry  
d i f f i c u l t  to  a rgue  f o r  som eth ing  t h a t  one f in d s  obvious# 
E s p e c ia l ly  when th o se  consenuences t h a t  make one f in d  i t  
so  obvious 5 a re  ju s  t  th o se  consoquences t h a t  th e  o th e r  i s  
p re p a re d  to  d en y . I t  i s  l i k e  h a v in g  to  conv ince  someone 
t h a t  th e  f i r n  i s  h o t d e s p i t e  th e  f a c t  t h a t  he h as  m t  h i s  
hand in  i t  and d e n ie s  h av in g  been  b u r n t ,  a lth o u g h  on© can 
se e  th e  b l i s t e r s .  But mere r h e t o r i c  w i l l  n o t prove (c )  
a f a l s e  o p t io n ,  n o r  x f il l  i t  conv ince  Kyburg th a t  i t  i s ;  
what WG have to  show i s  th a t  th e  two re a so n s  Kyburg g iv e s  
f o r  ta k in g  th i s  a l t e r n a t i v e  a re  n o t  re a so n s  t h a t  compel 
u s  to  fo llo w  h im , and t h a t  th e re  a re  re a so n s  t h a t  compel 
u s  n o t to  fo llo w  him*
There a r  two q u i te  obvious consequences t h a t  we must 
a c c e p t i f  we a c c e p t ( 6 ) .  One i s  th e  im m unity from ^  p r i o r i  
c r i t i c i s m  an in d iv id u a l  w i l l  have i f  he b e l ie v e s  p and 
b e l i e v s  n o t - p .  The o th e r  i s  t h a t  we must r e j e c t  any id e a
t h a t  c o n s is te n c y  and in c o n s is te n c y  arr^ c o n c ep ts  t h a t  can 
p la y  any p a r t  in  d e te rm in in g  th e  r a t i o n a l i t y  o f  s e t s  o f  
b e l i e f s .  I t  i s  w orth  lA i le  rem in d in g  o u rse lv e s  o f  th e  
c o u n t e r - i n t u i t i v i t y  o f  th e  f i r s t  con seq u en ce . C o n sid e r an 
argum ent betw een two p eo p le  A and B in  th e  c o u rse  o f  which 
A say s  t h a t  he b e l ie v e s  a l l  p a in t in g s  done in  a p a r t i c u l a r  
p e r io d  were f o r g e r i e s , and then  l a t e r  on say s  he b e l ie v e s  
o f  a  p a r t i c u l a r  p a in t in g  o f  th e  same p e r io d  th a t  i t  i s  n o t 
a  f o rg e r y .  B ch a rg es  A X’d t h  c o n t r a d ic t in g  h im s e l f ,  which 
A in d ig n a n t ly  d e n ie s ;  B th en  ch a rg e s  A w ith  ch an g in g  h is  
m ind, which a g a in  A in d ig n a n t ly  d e n ie s .  Wo a r e  to  im a g in e , 
a c c o rd in g  to  K yl;urg, t h a t  A can a l l e v i a t e  B 's ,  by now, a c u te
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i n t e l l e c t u a l  d is c o m fo r t ,  n o t to  sa y  d i s g u s t ,  by  p o in t in g  
o u t to  him t h a t  he does n o t b e l ie v e  th e  c o n ju n c tio n  o f
^ "A ll p a in t in g s  done in  a p a r t i c u l a r  p e r io d  were fo rg e r ie s *
A
/ a ^  and 'T h is  p a in t in g ,  o f  th-^ same p e r io d ,  i s  n o t a  f o r g e r y ' ,
b u t  o n ly  t h a t  he b e l ie v e s  each  o f them; a n d , o f  c o u r s e ,  
ho i s  n o t th e re b y  com m itted to  b e l i e v in g  t h e i r  c o n ju n c tio n . 
S u re ly  o u r sym path ies  in  th e  d is p u te  w i l l  rem ain  w ith  B.
I t  would seem th e r e fo r e  t h a t  to  a c c e p t th e  a l t e r n a t i v e  
p re se n te d  by  ( c )  i s  to  r e j e c t  th e  o r d in a r i l y  a c c ep te d  
canons o f r a t i o n a l  d is p u te  and amounts to  d e c la r in g  them 
in c o h e re n t .
T ha t th e  second p o in t  i s  a consequence i s  shovm by
th e  f a c t  t h a t  in  o rd e r  to  g e t  c o n s is t  ncy  to  perfo rm  any
' l im c tio n  when a p p lie d  to  s e t s  o f  b e l i e f s , need to  have
some means w hereby we can r e l a t e  one b e l i e f  to  a n o th e r .
By r e j e c t i n g  (C on j) Kyburg has e f f e c t i v e l y  in s u la te d  
each  b e l i e f  from a l l  o th e r s .  I n  o th e r  w o rd s, i n  o rd e r  
to  ex ten d  th e  n o tio n  o f  c o n s is te n c y  from c o n s is te n c y  
^  i  betw een p ro p o s i t io n s  to  c o n s is te n c y  betw een b e l i e f s ,  we 
need some way o f  h r  ;ald.ng doim t h e i r  i s o l a t i o n .  (C on j) 
does g u s t  th a t  and i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  see  what cou ld  
ta k e  i t s  p la c e  i f  i t  were r e j e c t e d .
The t ro u b le  w ith  th e s e  p o in ts  as o b je c t io n s ,  how ever, 
i s  th a t  th e y  a re  consequences Kyburg w ants to  a c c e p t , f o r  
he i s  h o p in g  to  m axim ise th e  number o f  oypes o f  p o s s ib ly  
r a t io n a l  b e l i e f  s e t s ;  he w ants to  be  as l i b e r a l  as  he 
ca n . We a re  n o t g o in g  to  convinoe Kyburg o f  th e  e r r o r  
o f  h i s  ways by  s im p ly  p o in t in g  o u t t h a t  th o se  consequences 
t h a t  he w ants o r  b e l ie v e s  to  be d e s i r a b le  do in d eed  fo llo w
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from h is  p o s i t io n ;  we have g o t to  show t h a t  th e  ex tre m e ly  
l i b e r a l  v iew  he h as  o f  th e  a u th o r i ty  o f  r a l ; i o n a l i t y  amounts 
to  i t s  a b d ic a t io n .
One p o in t  t h a t  may be made i s  th a t  in  d e s c r ib in g  a  
th e o ry  o f  r a t i o n a l i t y  i t  would seem re a so n a b le  t h a t  we 
s j i o u l d  s e e k  to  m axim ise th e  p o s s ib le  so u rc e s  o f  c r i t i c i s m  
o f  a  b e l i e f  5 r a t h e r  th a n  m in im isin g  them as Kyburg would 
seem to  be  d o in g . Such a demand i s  f o r  example im p l i c i t  
in  P o p p e r 's  c o n te n tio n  th a t  a good  s c i e n t i f i c  h y p o th e s is  
sh o u ld  be as  v u ln e ra b le  as p o s s ib le  (w h ile  y e t  c o n s is te n t  
w ith  th e  a v a i la b le  e v id e n c e , t h a t  i s ) .
A nother p erhaps more t e l l i n g  o b je c t io n  a r i s e s  when 
we a sk  o u rs e lv e s  w h eth er o r  n o t a  man who b e l ie v a s  p and 
who b e l ie v e s  n o t-p  co u ld  be s a id  to  know e i t h e r  o f  them; 
o r ,  s in e - ' t h i s  i s  a l i t t l e  am biguous, cou ld  i t  be  s a id  
o f  such  a man t h a t  e i t h e r  b e l i e f  c o n s t i tu te d  knowledge?
To sa y  o f  one o f them th a t  i t  d o e s , would be l i k e  sa y in g  
o f  a man who baclcs a l l  th e  h o rse s  in  a ra c e  t h a t  he knew 
t h a t  8uoh«^and-such a h o rse  was g o in g  to  be th e  w in n e r.
I f  such  a  c la im  was made we would be  in c l in e d  to  lask  
•why th e n  d id  he b ack  a l l  the o th e r s ? ' Of c o u r s e ,  re a so n s  
cou ld  b e  g iv en  s in c e  one can b ack  a  h o rse  f o r  re a so n s  
o th e r  th a n  th o se  r e l a t e d  to  b a c k in g  i t  to  w in , b u t  i f  
we ig n o re  such  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  th e  a n a lo g y  becomes e x a c t .  
G iven such  a s i t u a t i o n  wo would sa y  th a t  b e k in g  a l l  th e  
h o rse s  in  a ra c e  was a s u re  in d ic a t io n  o f  ig n o ra n c e  r a th e r  
th a n  know ledge. A ccep tin g  th a t  an in d iv id u a l  w ho.:believes 
p and who b e l ie v e s  n o t-p  cou ld  n o t be  s a id  to  b e l ie v e  
e i t h e r  o f  them , we m ight a sk  what co u ld  be th e  p o in t  o f  
h av in g  b o th  b e l i e f s .  W ell, i t  i s  n o t v e ry  d i f f i c u l t  to
th in k  o f  a d v a n ta g e s . C o n s id e r , f o r  ex am ple , th e  u se  
a p o l i t i c i a n  m igh t he a b le  to  make o f  such  a  s i t u a t i o n  
wer ‘ he to  f i n i  h im s~ If  in  i t .  What i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  
do i s  to  see  how su ch  ad v an tag es  r e l a t e  to  e p is te m ic  
r a t i o n a l i t y .  T h is  i s  n o t to  a rg u e  t h a t  K yburg ' s  t h e s i s  
i s  no d i f f e r  n t  from th e  t h e s i s  th a t  wo may b e l ie v e  what 
we l i k e ,  b u t  i t  i s  to  s u g g e s t  t h a t  i t  s u f f e r s  from 
s im i l a r  d e f e c t s .  To p u t the m a t te r  a s  s u c c in c t ly  as  
p o s s i b l e ,  we would n o t say  o f  an in d iv id u a l  who b e l ie v e d  
ev. y th in g  th eb  he knew e v e ry th in g .
I n  o rd e r  to  c v a lu a t- ' t h i s  p o in t  we have to  r e j o i n
th e  argum ent beaun  e a r l i e r  and th e n  l e f t  -  th e  argum ent
w hichishow s t h a t  Kyburg has to  r e j e c t  c o n s is te n c y  as  a
d e s i r a b l e  f e a t u r  o f  r a t i o n a l  s e t s  o f  b e l i e f s  -  and to
r: l a t e  i t  to  the o v e r a l l  i n v e s t i g a t io n  in  w hich we a re
engaged . I n  o rd e r  to  a n a ly s e  th e  n o tio n  o f  r a t i o n a l
in q u i r y  we must s p e c i f y  a g o a l and means by  w hich t h a t
g o -1 e f-r f?  i s  to  be a c h ie v e d . L e t us suppose  t h a t  G
i s  th e  g o a l o f  r a t i o n a l  in q u i ry  and F th e  means by w hich
we a re  to  a c h ie v e  i t .  Now, i f  Kyburg i s  r i g h t  we have
to  su p p o s- t h a t  th e  fo llo w in g  i s  a p o s s ib le  s i t u a t i o n .
An in d iv id u a l  can em ploy, o r  f o l lo w , means P and r - a c h
a p o s i t i o n ,  P , su ch  th a t  he can know th a t  in  h av in g
a r r iv e d  a t  P ho has employed P q u i t e  c o r r e c t l y  and con
q ls o  Imow t h a t  in  a r r i v i n g  a t  P he has n o t a ch iev ed  G.
F u r th e r ,  by  r e f u s in g  to  ta k e  the demands o f  c o n s is te n c y
s e r i o u s l y ,  Kyburg would have us b e l ie v e  t h a t  t h i s
s i t u a t i o n  n e .d b e  n e i t h e r  u n u su a l o r  odd . We can se e
t h a t  th i s  i s  a s i t u a t i o n  Kyburg w ants us to  a c c e p t as
p o s s ib le  by ta k in g  G to be k n o w led g e , F to  be (D[[) , o r
com e q u iv a le n t ,  and P to  b -  b e l i e v in g  th a t  p and
b e l i e v in g  th a t  n o t - p ^ ^ ^ *
( a )  I t  i s  w o rth w h ile  p o in t in g  o u t a g a in  t h a t  h e re  a s  e lse w h ere  in  
th e  t h e s i s ,  n o th in g  a t  a l l  hangs on th e  u se  o f  b e l i e v in g  p and 
and b e l i e v i n g  n o t-p  g a l l  u see  co u ld  b e  e l im in a te d  w ith o u t  l o s s
co g en cy , b u t  n o t  o f  b r e v i t y .
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I f  we a c c e p t Kyburg*g argum ent th e n  th e  o n ly  way o f  av o id in g  
th e  c o m p lic a tio n s  im p lie d  in  th e  above argum ent would be  to  deny 
t h a t  th e  g o a l o f  r a t i o n a l  b e l i e f  was know ledge, o r  a n y th in g  th a t  
demanded tru^? b e l i e f ,  and t h i s  move i s  , s u r e ly ,  a b su rd . But what 
a re  th e  c o m p lic a tio n s  t h a t  fo llo w  from th e  above argum ent? Kyburg 
a tte m p ts  to  show th a t  i f  w make c e r t a i n  demands on r a t i o n a l i t y  th e n  
we a re  le d  to  view  r a t i o n a l i t y  as f a t a l l y  flaw ed , b ecau se  such  
demands le a d  to  the l o t t e r y  and p re fa c e  p a ra d o x e s . However, th e  
p i c t u r -  o f r a t i o n a l i t y  t h a t  Kyburg p a i n t s ,  as  an a l t e r n a t i v e ,  i s  
one in  which we a re  su p io s^ d  to  view  i t h  eouinam iby th e  
p o s s i b i l i t y  o f s i t u a t i o n s  a r i s i n g  in  which \t  ^ can be aware o f 
th e  f a c t  t h a t  our re a so n in g  has n o t  a ch iev ed  i t s  aim and y o t a ls o  
be aware t h a t  W3 can do no b e t t e r .  # h a t can t h i s  be  b u t  a f a t a l  
flaw ? Ev n i f  we can p ro v id e  no s o lu t io n  to  the l o t t e r y  and 
p re fa c e  paradoxes a l l  Kyburg seems to  have succeeded  in  d o in g  i s , 
ah b e s t ,  to  s u b s t i t u t o  one in f i r m i ty  f o r  a n o th e r .  And in  o rd e r  
to  e f f e c t  th= s u b s t i t u t i o n  he has r e j e c te d  th e  c la im s o f 
c o n s is te n c y  and in  o d o in g  -  q u i te  a p a r t  from th e  c o u n t e r - i n t u i t i v i t y  
o f  th e  s u g g e s tio n  -  has made q u i te  p re c a r io u s  th e  hom ogeneity  o f  
b e l i e f  r e q u ire d  to  a s c r ib e  coherenc to  an in d iv id u a l .
At t h i s  p o in t  w - can se e  t h a t  we have advanced s u f f i c i e n t  re a so n s  
f o r  n o t fo llo w in g  Kyburg in  a c c e p tin g  ( ^ ) a s  t h -  s o lu t io n  to  the 
l o t t e r y  p a rad o x . I t  m ight bo f e l t  t h a t  W" have d e a l t  a  l i t t l e  
i n s e n s i t i v  l y  w ith  i t ,  t h a t  Kyburg o n ly  n e rd s  to  r e j e c t  u n r e s t r i c t e d  
u se  o f  (C onj) and i s  in  a  p o s i t io n  to  a c c e p t th e  r e s t r i c t e d  u se  o f  
( C o n j . ) .  T hat i s ,  u se  o f  (C on j) i s  r e s t r i c t e d  to  w ith in  s e t s  
r e s u l t i n g  from  some p a r t i t i o n  o f o n e 's  t o t a l  s e t  o f  b e l i e f s ;  b u t 
a p a r t  from th e  d i f f i c u l t y  abou t what such  a p a r t i t i o n  cou ld  be  and 
how i t  cou ld  b<: r  l a t - b  to  khe co n cep t o f  r a t i o n a l i t y ,  i t  i s  
d i f f i c u l t  to  s ee  how it% o p e ra t io n  i t h i n  such  p a r i t i o n s  would n o t 
g iv »  r i s *  to  s im i la r  p a ra d o x e s , f o r  example th e  p re fa c e  p a rad o x .
-  4
I t  seem s, t h e r e f o r e , t h a t  e i t h e r  we r e j e c t  
p r o b a b i l i t y  as  th e  method o f  r a t i o n a l  in q u iry  o r  we 
a c c e p t an e x tre m e ly  cancereci view  o f  human r a t i o n a l i t y .  
L e t u s  e x p lo re  th e  f i r s t  a l t e r n a t iv e  in  th e  n e x t c h a p te r ,
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C h ap te r F o u r.
S p is te m ic  Reaoonlng and a  Rule 
o f  D etachm ent.
We have so f a r  t r i e d  a  number o f  p o s s ib le  i-rays o f  
e x t r a c t in g  o u rse lv e s  from  th e  conseouences o f  th e  l o t t e r y  
paradox  and f a i lr id  to  f in d  them s a t i s f a c t o r y ,  t h i s  seems 
to  lo a v -  u s  id lth  o n ly  two p o s s ib le  a l t e r n a t i v e s .  We may 
e i t h e r  deny th a t  th e  lo tt=  ry  paradox  i s  a  p ro b lem , and 
argue  th a t  s i t u a t i o n s  o f  t h a t  s o r t  were bound to  a r i s e  f o r  
b e in g s  who had to  r e s o r t  t o  methods o f n o n -d ed u c tiv e  
in fe re n c e  t o  a c a u iro  know ledge | o r  we may examine th e  
c la im s t h a t  a r u le  o f  detachm ent f o r  p r o b a b i l i ty  s ta te m e n ts  
has to  b e in g  a r u le  o f  r a t io n a l  a c c r p t a ^ c o .  Q u ite  c l e a r l y  
th e  f i r s t  a l t e r n a t i v e  i s  a co u n se l o f  d e s p a i r , h a rd ly  an 
i n v i t i n g  s o lu t i o n ,  so  l e t  u s  tu rn  o u r a t t e n t io n  to  th e  
second a l t e r n a t i v e .  But b e fo re  wa do th a t  i t  i s  w orth  
r e c a p i t u l a t i n g  what w have done up to  now and d e l in e a t in g  
th e  s t r a t e g y  o f  th e  argum ent as i t  le a d s  on from h e r e .
Remembering t h a t  th e  o b je c t  o f  th e  d is c u s s io n  i s  to  
show th a t  th e  e x is te n c e  o f  th e  tivo paradoxes does n o t show 
th e  I m p o s s ib i l i ty  o f  r a t i o n a l  b e l i e f ;  we have to  show th a t  
e i t h e r  th e  d e r iv a t io n  o f  th e  two paradoxes i s  f a u l t y ,  o r  t h a t  
th e r e  i s  an asymmetry betw een th e  l o t t e r y  p aradox  end th e  
p re fa c e  p aradox  th a t  e n a b le s  us to  draw d i f f e r e n t  c o n c lu s io n s  
from th e  e x is te n c e  o f  th e  p re fa c e  paradox  th a n  from th e  
e - i s te n o e  o f  th e  l o t t e r y  p a rad o x . I n  th e  second c h a p te r  we 
showed th a t  b o th  p aradoxes le d  to  b e l i e f s  th a t  v io la te d  
th e  p r in c ip le  'Be c o n s is te n t*  and hence th e  p r in c ip le  'Do 
nob have f a l s e  b e l i e f s * .  I n  th e  t h i r d  c h a p te r  wn f r i l e d  
to  show t h a t  th e re  was some s to p  in  e i t h e r  o f  th e  d e r iv a t io n s  
o f  th e  p a ra d o x ic a l  b e l i e f s  t h a t  was f a u l ty  in  some way, and
/-  45 ~
ao could  n o t show t h a t ,  sine©  tho  s to p s  in  each  a re  l a r g e ly  
th o  Game, b o th  p aradoxes may ho ig n o re d .
T his s u g g e s ts  t h a t  we must lo o k  e lsew h ere  and examine 
s te p s  ( l )  and ( 3) in  th e  p re fa c e  p aradox  and s te p  ( l ) *  in
th e  l o t t e r y  p a r a d o x . B u t  i t  i s  to  he n o tic e d  th a t  m
can n o t f o r e -  an asymmetry hotw een s te p s  ( l )  and ( 3 ) and 
s te p  ( l ) *  b ased  on th e  f a c t  t h a t  s te p  ( l ) *  le a d s  to  a 
c o n t r a d i c t io n ,  s in c e  t h i s  i s  so  in  b o th  c a s e s .  I n  o th e r  
w o rd s, we can n o t ocuch an o b je c t io n  to  the l o t t e r y  paradox  
in  term s o f  i t s  le a d in g  to  c o n t r a d ic to ry  b l i e f s  s c m t im e s , 
s in c e  t h i s  w i l l  be th e  ca se  ^^ith any ac ce p ta n c e  p r in c ip l e  
a s  i s  shown by  tho p re fa c e  p a rad o x . W© sim p ly  can n o t 
a p p e a l to  th e  p r in c ip le  *Bo n o t have f a l s e  b e l i e f s *  to  
s e p a ra te  th e  two p a ra d o x e s . However, we must b e  c a r e f u l  
n o t to  i n t e r p r e t  t h i s  as im p ly in g  e i t h e r  th e  r e j e c t i o n  o f 
th e  p r in c ip l e  *Do n o t have f a l s e  b e l ie f s *  o r  t h a t  we sh o u ld  
ta k e  i t  l i g h t l y .  I f  t h i s  p r in c ip le  i s  to  b** v io la te d  then  
i t  can o n ly  be  u n d e r v e ry  s p e c ia l  c irc u m s ta n c e s ; what we
have g o t to  do i s  to  show th a t  th e s e  c irc u m sta n c e s  do
o b ta in  in  the p re fa c e  case  b u t  do n o t in  th e  l o t t e r y  c a s e .
What we m ust do th e n  i s  to  exam ine th e  c la im s made by 
bhos who h o ld  th a t  th e r e  i s  a  r u le  o f  detachm ent f o r  
s ta to m o n ts  o f  p r o b a b i l i t y ,  and we must show t h a t  th e  view  
o f  r a t i o n a l  in q u iry  t h a t  i s  h e ld  by  su ch  t h e o r i s t s  i s  
in a d e q u a te  in  some way. And we m ust do t h i s  on grounds 
in d ep en d en t from th e  l o t t e r y  p a rad o x , 
y- Up u n b il  t h i s  p o in t  we have been  f a :^ y  s lo p p y  in  t a lk in g
ab o u t th e  p r o b a b i l i ty  o f  a s ta te m e n t 's  b e in g  t r u e .  So b e fo re  
we d is c u s s  th e  m e r its  and d e m e r its  o f  ta k in g  some r u le  o f
a r e  r e t a i l i n g  th e  num bering  u sed  in  C h a p te r  One.
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detachm ent as  a  r u le  o f a c c o p t^ n c o , l o t  us a c q u ire  some 
background knowledge ab o u t p r o b a b i l i ty  and i t s  in t ro d u c t io n  
in to  th  d e b a te  on r a t i o n a l  b e l i e f .
P a r t ( i ) .  Nhy a r u le  o f  detachm ent?
Many p eo p le  hav  argued  th a t  somehow th e  o o n o rp t o f  
p r o b a b i l i t y  i s  th e  key to  th e  problr^m o f  in d u c t io n ,  and 
a lth o u g h  i t  would be r id ic u lo u s  to  th in k  th a t  a l l  have 
b een  le d  to  t h i s  b e l i e f  a lo n g  th e  same r o u te ,  i t  i s  n o t an 
o v c r - s im p l i f i c a t io n  to  say  th a t  th e r e  i s  s u f f i c i e n t  s i m i l a r i t y  
among th e  s o r t  o f  problem s th e se  p eo p le  have been  im pressed  
b y , f o r  u s  to  d e s c r ib e  a s in g le  l i n e  o f  th o u g h t t h a t  has 
le d  them to  h o ld in g  t h i s  p o ra itio n . So l e t  us do j u s t  t h a t .  
The problem s posed by  no?i-deductivc  in f c ro n o o s , th a t  
 ^ j  i s  ^ in fe re n c e s  from p rem isse s  to  c o n c lu s io n s  n o t  m ta i le d  by
them , stem  from a f e a tu r e  o f  them th a t  i s  supposed to  fo llo w  
from  t h i s  f a c t ;  nam ely , t h a t  i t  i s  n o t th e  ca se  t h a t  we can 
in v a r ia b ly  i n f e r  t r u e  c o n c lu s io n s  from t r u -  p re m is s e s .
P h ereas  in  d e d u c tiv e  in fe ren ce  s wr- c; n fo rm u la te  a  s e t  o f  
r u le s  w h ic h , i f  fo llow ed  c o r r e c t ly ,g iv e  us a c a s t - i r o n  
g u a ra n te e  t h a t  wa w i l l  n o t i n f e r  a  f a l s e  c o n c lu s io n  from a  
t r u e  p r .-m iss , th e  same can n o t bo s a id  o f  non—d e d u c tiv e  
in f e r e n c a s . Indeed  th e  problem  goes d e ep e r  th a n  th a t  f o r  
wo do n o t have any su ch  com parable s e t s  o f  in ile s  f o r  non - 
d e d u c tiv e  in fe ro n c a s  a s  we do f o r  d e d u c tiv e  in f e r e n c e s .
T h is  g iv e s  us two problem s o f  in d u c tio n s  th e  f i r s t  i s  to  
p ro v id e  th e  r u l e s ,  i f  th e re  be a n y , f o r  in d u c t iv e  in f e r e n c e ,  
adherence  to  w hich would j u s t i f y  a  p a r t i c u l a r  in d u c tiv e  
in fe re n c e I  th e  second i s  to  show th a t  th e  employment o f  
th e sa  r u l - s  i s  s u f f i c i e n t  to  g ra n t r a t i o n a l i t y  to  th o se  
b e l i e f j g  a c q u ire d  th ro u g h  them . T hat i s  to  say  we must 
combat b o th  a lo c a l  and a g e n e ra l s c e p t ic is m .
A
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C o n sid er th e  fo llo w in g  in fe re n c e s s
( a )  From *I seem to  rera:.<mher t h a t  I  g o t th e  sh o p p in g . •
A i n f e r s  *I remember t h a t  I  g o t th e  shopping.*
(b )  From *I seem to  nee a c h a i r .*
A i n f e r s  *I s e e  a c h a i r . •
(o )  From *Always in  th e  p a s t  w henever we have had l ig h te n in g ,
i t  has been  fo llo w ed  by  th u n d e r .*
A in f e f s  * Thunder alw ays fo llo v rs  l ig h te n in g .  *
(d )  From *John has b een  cau g h t th ie v in g  a g a in .*
and *In a l l  c a se s  in  th e  p a s t  when John has been
cau g h t th ie v in g  he h as prom ised  n o t to  s t e a l  a g a in .*
A in f e r s  *John x i i l l  p rom ise n o t to  s t e a l  a g a in .*
how ta lc in g  th e se  as exam ples o f  in fe re n c e s  made a t  a
p a r t i c u l a r  t im e , by a p a r t i c u l a r  p e rs o n , A, we c ln  see  o f
each  o f  th e  c a se s  ( a )  to  (d )  on th r  b a s is  o f  a  p rem iss  o r
p rem isse s  A moves to  a  c o n c lu s io n , th e  p rem isse s  b e in g
cla im ed  to  bo good re a so n s  f o r  a c c e p tin g  th e  c o n c lu s io n s .
So ch a ra c to -  i s i n g  in d u c t io n  as s im p ly  th e  p ro c e ss  by  which
we moVi from  a s o t  o f  p rem isse s  to  a concilia  io n  n o t e n ta i l e d
by  them , th e  problem  becomes* how do we d i s t i n g u i s h  betw een
A*s good a rg u m en ts , i f  a n y , and A*s bed a rg u m en ts , i f  any?
And a re  A*s good argum ents good enough?
The f a c t  o f  th e  m a t te r  i s ,  how ever, t h a t  h i s t o r i c a l l y
v e ry  l i t t l e  h as  b een  s a id  abou t th e  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  o f
p a r t i c u l a r  i n f  r e n c e s , o r  in  g iv in g  an ^answer to  o u r f i r s t
n u e s tio n j  m ost d is c u s s io n s  abou t in d u c tio n  have b een
d i r e c te d  a ^ t  p ro v id in g  an answ er to  the  second q u e s t io n ,
nam ely th e  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  o f in d u c tio n  in  g e n e r a l .  W ithout
g o in g  in to  a d e t a i l e d  d e s c r ip t io n  o f th e  t r a d i t i o n a l  d e b a te s
on in d u c tio n  we can d e s c r ib -  th e  s o r t  o f  problem s such
d e b a t s g o t in to ;  th e  s o r t  o f  problem s some f e  1 can be
avoided  by  th e  in tro d u c  fiion o f  th e  co n cep t o f  p r o b a b i l i t y .
-  "
On© move th a t  h as been  advocated  i s  the  re d u c tio n  
o f  fcho scope o f  lo c a l  s c o p tio ism  by show ing t h a t  la r g e  
c l a s s e s , and p o s s ib ly  a l l , a rc  n o t in d u c tiv e  -  o r  non— 
d e d u c tiv e  we th e  term s in te rc h a n g e a b ly  -  a t  a l l  b u t
d lsg u ia o d  d ed u o tio n e  o r  enthym em es. T h is  program m e, i f  
i t  were p o s s ib le  to  c a r ry  i  k th ro u g h , would h e lp  bconuse 
i t  would e x p la in  th e  p ro b le m a tic  n a tu r?  o f  in d u c t iv e  
In f '^ r  nce by show ing th a t  th e re  was no such  th in g ,  a l l
infereno** th en  b^^ing d e d u o tiv  - ; and i t  would c la r i f^ r  th e
n a tu re  o f  re a so n in g  boo u s e ^ r ig h t ly  o r w rong ly^the  r o le  
o f  d e d u c tiv e  i n f  a x encr in  re a so n in g  i s  f» I t  to  be u n d e rs to o d .
An example o f  t h i s  s o r t  o f  r« d u c t io n  can bo g iv m  as  
f o l l o i i s . C o n sid er th e  i n f  e r f  nc from a p r or c o i t io n  ab o u t 
a  p a r t i c u l a r  to a n o th e r  p ro p o s i t io n  about th e  same 
p a r t i c u l a r ,  th a t  i s ,  from Pa to  Go. T h is in fe re n c e  i t  
i s  s u g g e s t 'd  r e l i c s ,  i f  v a l i d ,  u ro n  some u n iv e r s a l  law  (x )
( Fx3Gx) ^^^ w h ich y co n ju n c tio n  w ith  the p r  m iss e n t a i l s  th e  
conoluB ion# Wow perhaps many o f  th e  p ro p o s i t io n s  th a t  
we come to  b e l ie v e  a rc  a r r iv e d  a t  by d e d u o tiv e  infortune© 
b u t  c l e a r l y  nob a l l  can b e .  I n  p a r t i c u l a r  th e re  must b e ,  
a t  l e a s t ,  some s in g u la r  s ta te m m ts  th a t  we do n o t e s t a b l i s h  
in  d e d u c tiv e  f a s h io n .  However, i t  i s  argued  th a t  wr- do have 
a s e t  o f  s ta te m e n ts  n o t © stab lic jhed  by in f^ jrenco  and b e l i e f  
in  which i s  i n o o r r ig e a b ie , such  s tn trm a n ts  a re  f i r o t - p o ro o n  
p r e s ^ n t - te n s e  r e p o r ts  o f  o b s e rv a t io n a l  s t a t e s .  B ut even 
sup  c s in g  th a t  nuch s ta te m e n ts  can y ro v id e  a s u + i i c i  n t l y  
r i c h  evidonfci-il b a s e ,  i t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  such  an
(a )  As i s  vreli-known th e re  a re  a whole s e t  o f  problem s re la .te d  
to  g iv in g  th i s  an th -  lo g ic a l  form o f a u n iv e r s a l  law . HoTf-ver, 
i f  i t  le  p o s s ib le  to  g iv ,' s u p r o r t  to  such an a n a ly s is  th en  the 
t h e s i s  we a r  co n s id e rin g ; g r in s  p l a u s i b i l i t y ;  b u t ,  e q u a l ly ,  i f  
i t  i s  n o t p o s s ib le  to  suji; c r t  such  anx a n a ly s is  th en  th e  t h e s i s  
d im in ish e s  in  p l^ -u s ib i l i  ty .  And th e re  a re  c r t n i n  fe?-tur<'?s t h a t  
c a s t  j u s t i f i e d  doub t on such  an a n a ly s i s .  There i s  th e  n o to r io u s  
problem  o f  coun t ^ r fa c i .u a l  c o n d i t io n a l s .  B ut a l a o ,  th e  de f e a s ib ­
i l i t y  o f  u n iv e r s - 1 law s which i s  n o t  r e f l e c t e d  in  ouch an 
a n a l y s i s ,  and th i s  f e a t u r :  o f  u n v o ra a l law s would su g g e s t th a t
continued over . , .
an assu m p tio n  i s  d u b io u s , wo s t i l l  have to  p x t-n d  th e  programme 
to  in c lu d e  in fe re n c e s  th a t  e s t a b l i s h  u n iv e r s a l  la w s .
Fow d is c u s s io n s  as  to  the n a tu re  o f  in fn re n c o s  to  u n iv - r s a l  
law s havn usu.- l l y  d ev o lv -d  around such  q u e s tio n s  as ’W ill th e  
f u tu r e  be l i k e  th e  p a s t? *  o r *Can we assume th a t  what has 
hap. ' ned in  th~' p a s t  w i l l  happen in  th e  f u tu r e ? * A lso such  
d is c u s s io n s  have tended  to  assume t h a t  th e  in fe re n c e s  to  be 
shown to  be enthymemic a r^  o f  the form :
Fa&Ga and Fb&Gb and . . .  Pi&Gl . . .  to  ( x )(F xdGx ) ,
I t  i s  c l e a r  how in  g e n e ra l  th e  argum ent w i l l  ru n . Assuming 
t h a t  th e  u n iv e rs ;  o f  d is c o u rs ^  i s  e v - n t s , some o f  which w i l l  have 
o c c u rre d  and some o f  a h ic h  a re  o c c u r r in g  and some o f  which w i l l  
o c c u r ,  we want to  s r y  t h a t  o f  any e v e n t a FaoGa. how ever, a l l  
w? have to  s u p - o r t  th i s  c la im  i s  a s e t  o f  c o n ju n c tio n s  Fb^Gb, FcSvG c,... 
e t c . ,  w hich can a t  b e s t  be a sm all s u b - s e t  o f  thm t o t a l  s a t .
Fow g iv en  th a t  what needs j u s t i f y i n g  in  th e  i n f e r e n c e , i s  th e  
commitment to  unexam ined mambers we can see  how th e  b la n k e t  
a s s e r t i o n  t h a t  th e  f u tu r e  w i l l  be l i k e  th e  p a s t  w i l l  h e lp ,  by 
o f f  r in g  some hope th e  t in fe re n c e s  o f  t h i s  s o r t  a re  enthymemes as 
w e l l .  %hat needs to be done i s  to  show th a t  w  ^ can say  o f  the
p rem issea  th a t  th e y  c o n s t i t u t e  a c h a r a c ta r i s a  io n  o f  what th  p a s t
was l i k e .  T h is  would go a t  l e a s t  p a r t  o f  th r  wry to  show ing th a t
such  in fe re n c e s  w ar- in d e  d enthymemes.
A lthough  i t  i s  c l e a r  how th e  argum ent w i l l  ra n  in  g a « n 'ro l, i t  
i s  im p e n tra b ly  o b scu re  as to  how i t  w i l l  work ou t in  d e t a i l , o r  
the l i s t  o f  d i f f i c u l t i e s  i s  a lm o st e n d le s s .  Th© most obvious 
d i f f i c u l  .y cornea when we c o n s id e r  how i t  i s  w  o ra  supposed to  say  
o f  the: sm a ll s u b -c la s s  o f  p a s t  o o o u rr-n c e s  th a t  hav  been  examined 
th a t  t h i s  i s  what th e  p a s t  was l i k e  w ith o u t making an in d u c t iv e  
in f e r e n c e .  And even su p /.o sin g  th a t  th e se  and o th a r  problem s a re  
accommodated such  th a t  th e  in fe re n c e s  can be shown to bo enthymemic 
th i s  can o n ly  show t h a t  thr y  a re  v a l id  i f  th e  e x t r a  p rem iss  ’The
( a )  co n tin u ed  from p re v io u s  p ag e .
even i f  c e r t a i n  in fe re n c e s  d id  r e q u i r e  u n iv e r s a l  laws th e r e  a d d i t io n  to
su ch  in f e r e n c e s  would n o t  h r  s u f f i c i e n t  to  tu r n  them in to  d e d u c tiv e
onoso
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f u tu r e  w i l l  be l i k e  th e  p as t*  i s  t r u e ;  and how a re  we 
su p :o se d  to  know th i s ?  I f  i t  i s  n o t  a n n c e ssn ry  t r u t h  
th en  i t  would seem th a t  wr could o n ly  come to know i t  by 
in d u c t iv e ly  i n f e r r i n g  i t ,  and t h i s  would le a d  us back  
where we s t a r t e d  from . So i t  would seem th a t  t h i s  s t r a t e g y  
demands t h a t  th e  s ta te m e n t ’The f u tu r e  w i l l  be l i k e  th e  p as t*  
m ust bo c o n s tru e d  as a n e c e s s a ry  t r u t h .  The t ro u b le  v d î l  
t h i s  i s  t h a t  such  s ta t - m e n ts  have an u n co m fo rtab le  h a b i t  o f  
a p p e a r in g  f a l s e  (when i n t e r p r e t e d  in  such  a way as  to  make 
i t  seem l i k e l y  th a t  th  y  could  be u sed  to  tra n s fo rm  u n iv e r s a l  
g e n e r a l i s a t io n s  in to  enthym em es), o r  so  em pty, i f  t r u e ,  t h a t  
i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  see  how such  s ta te m e n ts  co u ld  be used  to  
g iv e  any su p p o rt to  a n y th in g . Where th e  a tte m p t to  push 
such  a programme th ro u g h  has n o t b een  so com plete  as  the 
a b o v ^ ,d i s c u s s io n  ab o u t the  rump l e f t  o v er o f i r r e d u c ib ly  
in d u e  t i v  in fe re n c e s  h as  been  in  te rm s o f  com bating  g lo b a l  
r a t h e r  th a n  lo c a l  s c e p t ic is m .
A lthough to  a c e r t a i n  e x te n t  th e  p r -v io u s  few pages a re  
a  c a r i c a t u r e  o f th e  t r a d i t i o n a l  d e b a te  on th e  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  
o f  in d u c t io n ,  i t  i s  n o t  so  u n f a i r  as a l l  t h a t ;  and i t  shovm 
us n o t o n ly  why many f r i t  t h a t  th e  in t ro d u c t io n  o f  th e  n o tio n  
o f  r r o b a b i l i t y  in to  th e  d e b a te  would b r in g  some e n lig h te n m e n t, 
b u t  a l s o  th o se  p a r t i c u l a r  f e a tu r e s  o f  p r o b a b i l i t y  t h a t  were 
f e l t  to  be so a t t r a c t i v e .  In  o rd e r  to  a p p r e c ia te  t h i s  more 
f u l l y  l e t  us c o n s id e r  th e  fo llo v /in g  argum ent.
( a )  M enthol c i g a r e t t e s  were found u n d er J o h n ’s b e d .
(b )  John i s  thr-' o n ly  p e rso n  in  the  hous»  ^ ho smokes 
m enthol c i g a r e t t e s .
s o ,  ( c )  John put. them th e r e .
L e t us su p p o s- t h a t  th e  i n f e r  nee i s  a good one and th a t
( c )  i s  t r u e .  And l e t  us suppose th e  same argum ent i s  employed
-  S '! -
on a n o th e r  o cc a s io n  e x c e p t t h a t  ’Wednesday* r e p la c e s  
‘T uesday’ and on th i s  second  o c c a s io n  the  c o n c lu s io n  i s  
f a l s e ,  b ecau se  F red  p u t them th e re  t r y in g  to  in c r im in a te  
Jo h n . Ifow we do n o t w ant to  a rg u e  th a t  th e  f i r s t  u se  o f 
th e  argum ent i s  i n v a l id  b ecau se  th e  second u se  f a i l e d  to  
p roduce a t r u e  c o n c lu s io n . T h a t i s  , th e  t r u e  in  a l l  p o s s ib le  
w orlds c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n  o f  th e  v a l i d i t y  o f  d e d u c tiv e  argum^-nts 
w i l l  n o t do f o r  in d u c t iv e  a rg u m en ts . So, th e  argum ent r u n s ,  
we m ust lo o k  f o r  some r e l a t i o n  W t h a t  h o ld s  betw een  ( a ) ,  (b )  
and ( c ) ,  in  th r  two c a s e s  d e s c r ib e d  in d e ra n d e n t ly  o f  th e  
t r u t h —V alue o f  ( b ) .  The obvious c a n d id a te  i s  p r o b a b i l i t y  
i . e .  ‘ ( c )  i s  p ro b a b le  to  su c h -a n d -su c h  a d eg ree  on ( a )  and 
and ( b ) f .
T h is  s u g g e s ts  t h a t  th e  argum ent above sh o u ld  be r e c a s t  
as fo llo w s?
( a )  M enthol c i g a r e t t e s  were found u n d e r  J o h n ’s 
bed •
(b )  John i s  th e  o n ly  p erso n  in  th e  house who 
smokes m enthol c i g a r e t t e s .
So , ( c ) ’ P ro b ab ly  John  p u t them th e r e .
So, ( c )  John  r u t  them th e r e .
Fow i t  can p la u s ib ly  be argued  t h a t  th e  r e l a t i o n  
*- i s  p rob ' b l  ■ on - ’ i s  a  l o g i c a l  one; and ^ fu rther^  on a 
c o n s id e r a t io n  o f argum ents l i k e  th e  fo llo w in g :
( i )  F ido  i s  a dog .
( i i )  Most dogs d i s l i k e  c a t - f o o d .
3 o , ( i i i )  P ro b ab ly  F id o  d i s l i k e s  c a t - f o o d .
i t  c n be  argued  th a t  s in c e  we can q u a n t i fy  e x p re s s io n s
l i k e  ( i i )  we can a ls o  q u a n t i fy  e x p re s s io n s  l i k e  ( i i i ) .
— ^2 —
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(b ) John ia  t he only T>orson in  tho house who smoke# 
menthol c ig a re tte s#
S o, ( o ) ’ P robeb ly  John put. them th e r e .
S o , ( c )  Jofm p u t them th e re *  /
F o r t h i s  to  be o f  h e lp  we need to^b^  a b lo  to  show t h e t  
th e  s to p  from  (a) and (b )  to  ( c )* Jw sf'lloductive• S inor i t  
i s  a l r e a d y  c l e a r  th a t  th-r x p le tâ C ^ in h lp  ’ (c )*  i s  p ro b eb lo  on 
( a )  and ( b ) ’ i i  n o t a f f a c t^ d ro y  i;he t r u t h  o r  f a l s i t y  o f
if
( c ) ’ * dow on oonoideractlon  o f argum ents l i k e  th e  fo llow ing*
( 1 ) F id o  iG qXmg#
( i i )  Moot d ie  l i k e  c a t—food*
S o , ( i i i )  F ^ x ^ b ly  'U do d i s l l k e a  o a ta - fo o d . 
i t  o n b«f p la u s ib ly  argued  th a t  th e  r  l a t i o n  • -  i a  p ro b ab le  
o n - V is  a lo r  l e a l  o n e . S ince we oan n u o n tify  oxpresoos H im  
y i;is )  m  c m  a ls o  q im M fy e x p ro aa io n s  l i k e  ( i i i ) .  T h e re fo re ,  
we can q u a n t i fy  th -  dOj-ree o f  eupi o r t ,  d  ^g reo  o f  p r o b a b i l i t y ,  
th e  evidonoo co n fe rn  upon a p a r t i c u l a r  s ta te m e n t .  And t h i s  
i n  tu rn  su g g e a te  t h a t  we can e v a lu a te  ouch moves as  from ( c )  to
( c ) ’ in  tr  v m  o f  th e  d eg ree  o f  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  ( o ) .  T hat i s  
i f  th e  d eg re e  i s  h ig h ,  we may i n f e r  ( o ) ’ ,  o th e rw ise  n o t ;  in  
o th e r  words 5 Gmploy a  r u le  o f  d e tach m en t. T h is  proposed  
s o lu t io n  i s  a  s o lu t io n  to  th e  problem  o f  lo c a l  s c e p t ic is m , th e  
problem  o f  g e n e ra l s c e p t ic is m ,  t h a t  i s  J u s t i f i c a t i o n  o f  th e  u se  
o f  a  r u le  o f  d e ta c h m e n t, i s  n o t to u ch  by th i s  p ro p o s a l .
At t h i s  p o in t  i t  becomes r a t h e r  d i f f i c u l t  to  r iv e  a  s h o r t  
d e s c r ip t io n  o f  tbo  d cvelo im  m t o f  th e  i n t r o i u c t i o n  o f  p r o b a b i l i ty  
i n to  the debase, s in ce  c l e a r l y  any d e s c r ip t io n  o f  p r o b a b i l i ty  
m ust in c lu d e  d e t a i l s  o f  how we a r -  to  a s s ig n  p a r t i c u l a r  v a lu e s  
to  p a rk io u la r  s ta te m e n ts , and i t  i s  j u s t  t h a t  t h a t  i s  most 
Gont n ticu s in  probabiliby th e o ry . In the n e x t p e r t  we vtIII
go on to  in d ic e tr  th e  s o r t  o f  d i f f i c u l  bien t h a t  fa c e  p r o b a b i l i ty  
th e o rio rt o f  in d u c tio n -  in  t r y in g  to  p iv  an acco u n t o f  th e
-  53 -
ass ig n m en t o f  such  v a lu e s  t h a t  cou ld  p l a u s i b l y  bo co n s id e re d  
an a n a ly s i s  o f  ’ p q , s o -a n d -so  p r o b a b le ’ , an d ,  ab th e  
s t r o k e ,  a p l a u s i b l e  account o f  ’p i s  a good argument 
f o r  q ’ .
P a r t  ( i i )  Why nob a r u l e  o f  d e tach m en t.
One problem t h a t  c o n f ro n ts  th o se  who a d v o ta te  a c e n t r a l  
rol< f o r  p r o b a b i l i t y  in  i l l u m i n a t i n g  th e  problems o f  
in d u c t io n  may be i l l u s t r â t  >d bj th e  fo l lo w in g  oxampie*
(1 )  L ivo rpoo l have on ly  once i n  one hundred and 
f i f t y  m eetings  d e fe a te d  C helsea  when C helsea  
have worn g roen  s h o r t s .
( 2 ) For  th e  m atch , on 3 a tu rd e y , a g a in s t  L iv e r p o o l ,  
C helsea  w i l l  wear g re  n s h o r t s .
3 0 , (3 )  Most p ro b a b ly  C he lsea  w i l l  w in.
So, ( 4 ) C helsea  v . i l l  win.
Mow o r d i n a r i l y ,  I  would s u g g e s t ,  we would c o n s id e r  
t h a t  such  d e a t h l e s s  p ie c e s  o f  in fo rm a t io n  as th o se  in  ( l )  
and ( 2 ) were o f ,  a t  in o s t ,  s l i g h t  re le v a n c e  bo a r a t i o n a l  
e s t im a t io n  o f  th e  chances o f  e i t h e r  teem in  th e  e n c o u n te r ;  
and ev n l e s s  r e l e v a n t  to  a d e c i s io n  as to  th e  outcome.
Howevor, i t  seems d i f f i c u l t  to see  how ( l )  and ( 2 ) cou ld
be made i r r e l e v a n t  to  ( 3 ) ,  on accounts o f  p r o b a b i l i t y  t h a t  
ta k e  argument o fo th e  form o f  the  argument ( i ) ,  ( i i )  hence
( i i i )  g iv e n  in  th e  p re v io u s  s e c t io n  to  be p a ra d ig m a t ic .
T h is  s u g g e s ts  s t r o n p l y  t h a t  a  s t r a i g h t f o r w a / d  accoun t o f  
^  ^  ^ p r o b a b i l i t y  i s  n o t  d i r e c t l y  r e l a t e d  to the  w orth  o f  an
^  ^  ^ argum ent. We need to  in t ro d u c e  some n o t io n  o f  re le v a n c e
j l L  such  t h a t  th e  above argument f a i l s  to  b t a good a rgument
f o r  ( 3 ) .  But i t  i s  n o t  obvious how such a n o t io n  could
be b ro u g h t  i n .  I t  seems f a i r l y  obvious t h a t ,  a t  l e a s t  
som etim es, w hether o r  n o t  p i s  ev id  noo fo r  c i c  a
V L
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c o n t in g e n t  m a t t e r ,  a n d ,  t h e r e f o r e , i f  wc in c lu d e  a 
s t i p u l a t i o n  o f  r e l e v a n c e  in  th e  a sse s sm e n t  o f  th e  
p r o b - b i l i t y  o f  n and p th en  th e  p r o b a b i l i t y  r e l a t i o n  
c ea se s  to  bn a  l o g i c a l  one? and we a r e  landed  b a c k  w ith  
ou r  o r i g i n a l  in d u c t io n  problnm .
A f u r t h e r  probl^m t h a t  e x i s t s  may bn i l l u s t r a t e d  by 
th e  fo l lo w in g  two exam ples:
( a ) John  i s  a dog .
(B) Most dogs l i k e  F e l i x .
So, (C) P ro b ab ly  Jolm w i l l  l i k e  F e l i x .
And
( a )* Jolin i s  a B oxer dog.
(B)* Most Boxers do n o t  l i k e  F e l i x .
So, (C)* P ro b a b ly ,  John  w i l l  n o t  l i k e  F e l i x .
Mow l e t  us  su p ro se  t h a t  some i n d i v i d u a l ,  X, b e l i e v e s  
b o th  ( a )  and (B) and (a )*  and (B)* and wants to  know w hether  
o r  n o t  John w i l l  l i k e  F e l i x .  By assum ption  th e  r e l a t i o n  
betw een  (a ) ,  (B) and (c)  and betw een (A )* ,  ( B ) ’ and ( c ) ’ 
i s  a log ic* .!  one. 3o i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  see  why John 
shou ld  p r e f e r  the  second argum ent to  th e  f i r a t ,  o r  v ic e  
v e r s a ,  and d r a  h i s  c o n c lu s io n  a c c o r d in g ly ,  s i n e  a wo a re  
to  -\jupi 030 t h a t  h ig h  r.rob; b i l i t y  i s  s u f f i c i e n t  to j u s t i f y  
a c c e p ta n c ' ' ' , and h ig h  r  rob a b i l i t y  t h e r e  i s  i n  each  c a s e .  
C le a r ly  w- do n o t  want to  a l lo w  K to  a c c e p t  e i t h e r  eccor^iing  
t o  h i s  h im , n o r  do wo want him to  a c c e p t  b o th .
I t  m ight be supposed t h a t  q u a n d r ie s  such as  t h i s  
were e a s i l y  resOiVed b y  a d o p t in g  some such  p r i n c i p l e  as
Hempol giv.'S  as h i s  t h i r d  r e q u i re m e n t .
C.R.3* The i n f e r e n t i a l  a c c e p ta n c e  o f  any  s ta te m e n t  
h i n t o  K i s  d e c id e d  upon by  r e f o r e n c - to  th e  
t o t a l  system  K.
But th e  m a t t e r  i s  r a t h e r  more s  r i o u s  than  t h i s  f o r  i f  we
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adop t th e  proposed  s o l u t i o n  th en  i t  would seem t h a t  
a c c o rd in g  to  th e  p r o b a h i l i s t  we can n e v e r  r a t i o n a l l y  
s  " 1 ^  c h a n g e  ou r  minds* T h is  may be shown q u i t e  s im p ly .
We can  o n ly  change ou r  minds i f  h a v in g  a c c e p te d  a 
p r o p o s ib io n  p wo l a t e r  a c c e p t  evidenc'e q such  t h a t  q 
shows p to  bo doubt^ 'ul o r  f a l s e *  However, i f  we 
s t i p u l a t e  t h a t  we can on ly  a c c e p t  a p r o p o s i t i o n  q by 
e v a lu a t in g  i t s  p r o b a b i l i t y  on th e  b a s i s  o f  a l l  th e  
p r o p o s i t i o n s  we have a c c e p te d ,  thwn s in c e  we w i l l  
e v a lu a te  q i n  p a r t  on th  b a s i s  o f  p; we c a n ,  i t  
seem s, n e v e r  a c c e p t  a p r o p o s i t i o n  t h r t  woull show t h a t  
some o th e r  we had a c c e p te d  shou ld  be r e j e c t e d .  I n  o th e r  
vrords , i f  q i s  s u b s t a n t i a l  e v id e n c e  a g a i n s t  p ,  a  
p r o p o s i t i o n  we have a l r e a d y  acc e p te d  , th e n  s in c e  a c c o rd in g  
to  C,R. 3 we must a lw ays e v a lu a te  i t  p r o b a b i l i t y  upon p 
we must always r e j e c t  i t .  M e ith e r  can we a l t e r  C .R .3 .  
by  th e  n u a l i f y i n g  c l a u s e  ‘by r e f e r e n c e  to  the  r e l e v a n t  
p r o p o s i t i o n s  in  the t o t a l  system  K’ , s in c e  we must 
i n c lu d e  i n  the  s e t  o f  r e l e v a n t  p r o p o s i t i o n s  th e  p r o p o s i t i o n  
p and 0  i s  good ev id en ce  a g a i n s t .
I t  would seem t h a t  th e  o n ly  way o u t  o f  t h i s  problem 
i s  to  d iv id e  th e  b e l i e f s  we have i n t o  t o  k i n d s ,  s a y ,  
(L ) - ty p e  an1 (M )- ty p e ,  such  t h a t  we always a c c e p t  (M )-type 
s ta tera .^n ts  on the b a s i s  o f  ( L ) - t y p e ,  o r  on (? f)- type  
s t a t e m e n t s ,  and we a c c e p t  ( b ) - t y p e  s ta te m e n ts  on some 
o th e r  b a s i s *  Given such  a s t r u c t u r e  we can s e e  how 
i t  i s  p o s s ib l e  to  r e j e c t  ("'?)-type s t a t e m e n t s .  F o r  exam ple , 
a f t e r  we had accep ted  some (M )-type s ta te m e n t  we a re  
l a t e r  l e d  to  a c c e p t  ce t a i n  ( h ) - t y p e  s ta te m e n ts  such  
t h a t  ou ld  demand th e  r e j e c t i o n  o f  th e  p r e v io u s ly  a c c e p te d
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( m) -  type  s to te m e n t .  The t r o u b l e  w i th  t h i s  s o r t  o f
s o l u t i o n  i s  t h a t  u n le s s  (L )-typ©  s ta t e m e n t s  a re
i n c o r r i g a b l o  , i n  th e  senS '' t h a t  wo c an n o t  r a t i o n a l l y  change
o u r  minds about; them a t  any tim e a f t e r  we have a c c e p te d
them , we a r e  l e d  t o  a v a s t  h i e r a r c h y  o f  ty p e s  o f  s t a t e m e n t s ,
nam.'-ly e v i d e n t i a l  t y p o s ,  o f  a s o r t  t h a t  does n o t  seem a t
a l l  p l a u s i b l e .  And th e r e  c e r t a i n l y  does n o t  seem to
be  any type o f  s ta t e m e n t  t h a t  i s  i n c o r r i g a b l e  i n  t h i s
s e n s e .  I t  i s  to  be  p o in te d  o u t  t h a t  t h i s  a rg u m e n t,
a l th o u g h  s i m i l a r ,  i s  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  d i f f e r e n t  to  th e
argum ent em rloyed by A .J ,A y e r  i n  h i s  a r t i c l e  Two Motes------------------
on P r o b a b i l i t y ^  ^; t h i s  argum ent we w i l l  expound l a t e r  
y o r  i t  p o i n t s  to  t h a t  a s p e c t  o f  th e  t  o p a rad o x es  t l i a t  
B e p a r a t es thom.
The problem s we have o u t l i n e d  h e re  a r e  by  no means 
the o n ly  ones t h a t  can b e  p o in te d  t o ;  f o r  exam ple ,  t h e r e  
i s  th e  problem  o f  a s s i^ i i in g  p r o b a b i l i t y  v a lu e s  to  
u n i v e r s a l  s t a t e m e n t s .  B ut t h i s  and o th e r  p rob lem s 
a m  n o to r io u s  and so  we w i l l  n o t  r e p e a t  them.
A lthough  the  p rob lem s o u t l i n e d  so  f a r e  eirr by  no 
means i n c o n s i d e r a b l e  p roblem s f o r  th e  p r o b a h i l i s t ,  i t  
i s  n o t  a t  a l l  c l e a r  t h a t  th e y  c o n s t i t u t e  i n s u p e r a b le  
d i f f i c u l t i e s  , n o r  i s  i t  c l e a r  t h a t  we can  tu r n  them i n t o  
i n s u p e r a b l e  d i f f i c u l t i e s .  I f  we a r e  to  f in d  in s u p e r a b le  
problem s to  p u t  i n  the  p a th  o f  the  - r o b a b i l l s t  th e n  we 
must f in d  them in  th o s e v e ry  t h e s e s  t h a t  p r o b a b i l i s t s  a re  
th em se lv es  most s u re  o f ,  r a t h e r  th a n  i n  th o se  a r e a s  t h a t  
th e y  th e m se lv e s  f in d  p r o b le m a t i c .  So l e t  u s  t u r n  to  
a n o th e r  p o i n t  o f  a t t a c k .
(^ ^ The Concept o f  a  P o iso n  and o t h e r  e s s a y s ,  A . J .  A y e r ,  
(M acm illan  1^64)*
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The p r o b a b i l i s t s ’ main c o n te n t io n  may be  fo rm ulaâed  
a s  f o l lo w s :  p i s  a good a r g u m e n t f o r  q ,  o r  q may be 
r a t i o n a l l y  i n f e r r e d  from p i f ,  and o n ly  i f ,  t h e r e  e x i s t s  
a c e r t a i n  p r o b a b i l i t y  r e l a t i o n  be tw een  p and o . T ha t 
i s  t o  s a y ,  i t  i s  n e c e s s a r y  and s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t i o n  f o r  
th e  r a t i o n a l  a c c e p ta n c e  o f  q ,  on th e  b a s i s  o f  p ,  t h a t  
t h e r e  i s  some p r o b a b i l i t y  r e l a t i o n  betw een  them . We 
w i l l  rem ain  vague f o r  th e  moment a b o u t  what th e  r e l a t i o n  
i s  to  b e ,  b e c a u s e  t h e r e  i s  no ag reem en t amongst p r o b a b i l i s t s  
as  to  what th e  r e l a t i o n  sh o u ld  b e ;  t h a t . i s ,  w h e th e r  i t  i s  
h ig h  p r o b a b i l i t y ,  and i f  s o ,  how h i g h ,  o r  w h e th e r  ih  i s  
so m eth in g  e l s e  l i k e  h ig h  p r o b a b i l i t y  r e l a t i v e  to  o t h e r  
a l t  n a t i v e s .
Now, i t  m ight seem t h a t  th e  c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n  g iv e n  
abov: cou ld  o n ly  a p p ly  t o  a t  most a  v e ry  few p h i l o s o p h e r s ,  
e . g .  R e ich e n b ach ,  and to  a  most u n p o p u la r  t h e s i s ,  f o r
p r o b a b i l i t y  f u n c t io n s  h a v e ,  i n  th e  minds o f  many, b een
r e p la c e d  by c o n f i rm a t io n  f u n c t i o n s ,  p ( h , e )  h as  b e e n  
r e p la c e d  by c ( h , e ) .  However, t h i s  r e p la c e m e n t  r e p r e s e n t s  
l e s s  o f  a  s h i f t  th a n  m ight a t  f i r s t  seem. T here  has 
alw ays b e e n  a g r e a t  d e a l  o f  doub t as  to  what th e  
4 i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  thy  c l a s s i c a l  c a l c u l u s  a t  p r o b a b i l i t y
I'' sh o u ld  b e ;  th e  r a t i o  o f  th e  f a v o u ra b le  to  th e  e q u a l ly
p o s s i b l e  c a s e s ,  o r  th e  n u m e r ic a l  f r e q u e n c y  o f  th e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  
o f  some p r o p e r t y  am ongst th e  members o f  some c l a s s , end 
so  on. C a rn a p ,  Jlempel and o t h e r s  w ish  to  s e p a r a t e  t h i s  
S B a^ l 's is  o f  p r o b a b i l i t y , o r  r a t h e r  bo s e p a r a t e  th e  se n se  
o f  ’p r o b a b i l i t y ’ t h a t  th e s e  r i v a l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  s e e k  
 ^ t o  e x p l i c a t e ,  from an o b h e r  se n se  o f  p r o b a b i l i t y ’ which w i l l
^Throughout th e  r e s t  o f  th e  c h a p te r  we w i l l  uao ’a rg u m e n t’ 
which i s  p e rh ap s  n o t  th e  moso f e l i c i t o u s  c h o ic e  o f  words 
f o r  th e  r e l a t i o n  w© a r e  e x a m in in g ,  b u t ,  i n  f a c t ,  n o th in g  
v e ry  im p o r ta n t  hangs on o u r  choic- o f  words h e re *
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be  an a n a l y s i s  o f  th e  m eaning o f  ’d e g re e  o f  c o n f i r m a t i o n ’ #
F h a t  i s  a t  i s s u e  h e re  i s  how we a s s i g n  n u m e r ic a l  v a lu e s  
t o  c ( h , e ) .
What e n a b le s  me t o  lump b o th  th e  e a r l i e r  and th e  
l a t e r  ap p ro a c h e s  t o - g e t h e r  u n d e r  th e  h e a d in g  p r o b a h i l i s t  
i s  t h a t  d e s p i t e  th^: d isag reem en t a s  to  how w  a s s ig n  
v a lu e s  t o  c o n f i r m â t io n  f u n c t i o n s , th e  s t r u c t u r e  o f  th e  
c a l c u l u s  t h a t  shoim th e  l o g i c a l  c o m p a t i b i l i t ; ^  o r  o th e r^ d o e  
o f  v a r io u s  n u m e r ic a l  a s s ig n m e n ts  to  p a r t i c u l a r  c o n f i rm a t io n  
s t a t e m e n t s , i . e .  c ( h , e )  i s  w, i s  g iv e n  by th e  c l a s s i c a l  
c a l c u l u s  o f  p r o b a b i l i t y .  Thus w: have a  s i t u a t i o n  i n  
which th e  sens^: o r  s e n s e s ,  o f  ’p r o b a b i l i t y ’ a r c  d i s p u t e d ,  
nd th e  s e n s e  o f  ’p r o b a b i l i t y ’ r e l e v a n t  to  i n d u c t i v e  w orth  
i s  a l s o  d i s p u t e d , b u t  i t  i s  ar^reed t h a t  th e  fo rm a l 
s t r u c t u r e  o f  th e  r e l a t i o n s  be tw een  s ta t e m e n t s  o f  e i t h e r  
p r o b a b i l i t y ,  o r  c o n f i r m a t i o n ,  i s  giv<^n by th e  c l a s s i c a l  
c a l c u l u s  ^  p r o b a b i l i  by.
F o r  ex am p le ,  i n  c l a s s i c a l  p r o b a b i l i t y  wc g e t  th e  
fo l lo w in g  a s  theo rem , o r  as  an  axioms
p(n o b -K jF )  e q u a l s  1 -  p ( h ,E ) ,  th e  s o -  a i l e d  n e g a t io n
aatiom.
We a l s o  g e t  th e  same axiom in  c o n f i rm a t io n  th e o r y ;
c ( n o t - h ,b ‘) e q u a l s  1 -  c ( h ,E ) .
Which i s  to  s a y  t h a t  a  d e g re e  o f  c o n f i rm a t io n  o f  
n o t - h  e q u a ls  one minus th e  d e g re e  o f  c o n f i rm a t io n  o f  K*
Because  th e  s e m a n t ic s  o f  c o n f i rm a t io n  c a l c u l u s ,  a s
conO‘- i v : d  by C a rn a p , Fempel and o t h e r s ,  i s  n o t  so m e th in g
th e y  a r e  ag reed  u p o n ,  i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  a t t a c k  an a c c o u n t  such
a s  th e y  would g iv r  o f  ’p i s  a good argum ent f o r  q ’ ,  b y  
p o i n t i n g  t o  p ro b le m a t ic  exam ples and so  on . F o r  t h i s
g i v  s  ut? no g u a ra n te e  t h a t  such  r^roblems as  a r e  post'd 
b y  su ch  exam ples c a n n o t  ba w eroom e by some a l t e r a t i o n  i n
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th e  sem an tic  i n t '^ r p r e t a t i o n  o f  th e  supposed c o n f i rm a t io n  
c a l c u l u s .  Thu'^ i t  i s  p o s s ib le  t h a t  th e  p ro b le m s ,  o r  
d i f f i c u l t i e s ,  t h a t  wr suggostt:d  e a r l i e r  may v e ry  w ell  be 
e l im in a te d  by some such  move. I f  we a re  to  s e t  
s u b s t a n t i a l  problems f o r  th e  approach  su p p o rte d  by 
C arnap, e t c . ,  we must show th a t  th e  s y n ta x  o f  c o n f i rm a t io n  
s t a t e m e n t , upon which th ^ y  a r e  a g r e e d ,  cannot accommodate 
cert.: i n  f e a t u r e s  t h a t  a re  n e c essa r-  f o r  an ad eq u n te  
a n a ly s i s  o f  *p i s  a good argument f o r  q* .
^ h e re  a r - two f  a tu r o s  o f  the  s y n ta x  o f  *p i s  a good 
argument f o r  q* t h a t  we s h a l l  c la im  canno t b -  accomrnodatod 
by  1 rob ah i l l s  t s .  They a r e , f i r s t l y ,  t h a t  i f  £  i s  a good, 
argument f o r  £_, an(>, r  i s  a good argument f o r  £  th e n  p and r  
o g e th e r  c o n s t i t u t e  a  good argum n t  f o r  n and s ; and 
s e c o n d ly ,  t h a t  i  \ P  i s  a good argument f o r  £ ,  t h e n ,  a l s o ,
£  i s  a good arguraent a g a i n s t  n o t - q . The f i r s t  p o in t  i s  
quit'-- s im p le ;  i t  i s  j u s t  t h a t  i f  an i n d i v i d u a l .  A, has 
an argument £  f o r  £  and an argument £  f o r  £ ,  and b o th  e re  
goo i ones , th^n  he has  n o t  g o t  t o  do  a n y th in g  mor to  
e s t a b l i s h  o and s . th a n  s im ply  to  p r e s e n t  h i s  argument £
I i f and r . The s. cond p o in t  i s  oijually s im p le .  I t  i s
s u f f i c i e n t  grounds f o r  the  r a t i o n a l  r e j e c t i o n  o f  n o t-q
t h a t  an i n d iv id u a l  p r e s e n t  an argum en t,  £  f o r  £? we do
n o t  demand t h a t  i n  a c c e p t in g  £  an i n d iv id u a l  p r e s e n t  two
a rg u m en te , one f o r  £  th e  o th e r  a g a i n s t  n o t - g .
At t h i s  p o in t  w nend to  s y a l i t t l e  more abou t the  
s o r t  o f  p r o b a b i l i t y  r e l a t i o n  t h a t  can b seen  to  j u s t i f y  
r a t i o n a l  i a f e  enco from p to  q .  Herapel’s s u g g e s t io n  i s  
as  fo l lo w s :
( a ) We may a c c e p t  q g iv en  p i f  and on ly  i f  c ( q ,p )
/  0 J/' M
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i s  g r e a t e r  than  -J , and
We may r e j e c t  q g iv en  p i f  an d ,o n ly  i f  c ( q ,p )  
i s  l e s s  th an  -J.
However, i t  would seem th a t  we can g iv e  a number o f  
reaso n s  f o r  r e j e c t i n g  such  a r u le  as  i t  s ta n d s ;  f o r  
c o n s id e r  a s i t u a t i o n  in  which c ( q ,p )  eq u a ls  O .5I .  How 
i f  we a rc  to  supj-ose d eg ree  o f  confirm a io n  a measure o f
the  w orth  o f  an argument thon 0 .5 1  would appear  to o  l i t t l e
s u p e r io r  t o  0 .4 9  to  w a rra n t  ac op tan ce  o f  pand r e j e c t i o n  
of f»«^ p. So l o t  us  ta k e  a more p l a u s i b l e  r u le  o f  detachm ent 
as fo l lo w s :
(a ') '  Accept q g iv en  p i f  and on ly  i f  c ( q ,p )  i s  
g r e a t e r  th an  o r  equa l to  0 . 8 .
V and R e je c t  q g iven  p i f  and on ly  i f  c ( q ,p )  i s  l e s s  than
u d  . . u / 7  to 0 .2 .
'^1 One p o in t  t h a t  may be made q u i t e  by the way about
#' /. a l l  th e se  r u le s  i s  th e  a r b i t r a r y  n a tu re  o f  th e  f i x i n g  o f
/ ■' th e  ex a c t  p o in t  a t  which accep tan ce  i s  r a t i o n a l ;  a  |?oint
so  i in p o r tan t  we may c o n s id e r  th a t  i t  shoul.l be  marked by  
som eth ing  o th e r  th an  some a r b i t r a r y  f i a t ,  end th e  f a c t  
t h a t  i t  i^: n o t  som ething o f  a c r i t i c i s m  in  i t s e l f .
How l e t  us c o n s id e r  two p r o p o s i t i o n s ,  1 and m, of
which th e  fo l lo w in g  i s  t r u e :
( i )  c ( l , e )  e q u a ls  0 . 8 .
( i i )  c (m ,e)  e q u a ls  0 . 8 ,
( i i i )  c ( l , e  and m) e q u a ls  0 . 8 .
^ # e r e  3^i s  an i n d i v i d u a l ’s t o t a l  body o f  e v id e n c e .
C ond ition  ( i i i )  g u a ra n te e s  t h a t  1 and m a re  s t o c h a s t i c a l l y  
^  in d e p e n d e n t .  He may now ask  th e  q u e s t io n  who t h r  1 and m
^ * may be accep ted  by t h i s  person? To which W" c a l c u l a t e
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c ( l  and m ,e) and f in d  bhat c ( l  and m ,e)  e q u a ls  O .6 4 . 
b y  th e  m u l t i p l i c a t i o n  axiom . So a c c o r U n g  to  r u l e  
( a ‘) t h i s  p e rso n  may n e i t h e r  a c c e p t  n o r  r e j e c t  th e  
c o n j u n c t i o n ,  1 and m. I t  would seem , t h e r e f o r e ,  t h a t  the  
m u l t i p l i c a t i o n  axiom g u a ra n te e s  t h a t  i n  g e n e r a l  i f  p 
i s  a ,^od  argument f o r  q , and i f  r  i s  a good argum ent 
f o r  £  th e n  p and r  w i l l  n o t  b^  ^ a good argum ent f o r  r; and s
ÎÎOWOV r ,  i t  m ight be o b j e c t e d ,  i f  q i s  an e lem ent 
o f  .FB(a) and s i s  an e lem ent o f  PB (a.) th en  A may a c c e p t  
q and s . B ut t h i s  o n ly  makes m a t t e r s  worse r a t h e r  
th a n  b e t t e r ,  f o r  t h i s  i s  to  r a i s e  th e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  
c o n j u n c t i v i t y  to  th e  s t a t u s  o f  a  r u l e  o f  a c c e p ta n c e  
from bhat o f  b - i n g  a p r i n c i p l e  o f  commitment. q u i t e  
a p a r t  from th'-' problem s s t i r r c - ^  up by r a i s i n g  p r i n c i p l e s  
o f  commitment to  th e  s t a t u s  o f  r u l e s  o f  a c c e p ta n c e ,  what 
we now have i s  a  s i t u a t i o n  i n  which we have two r u l e s  
o f  a c c e p ta n c e ,  one s a y in g  one t h i n g  bhe o t h e r  s a y in g  
a n o th  r .  But i t  m ight b r  f e l t  t h a t  t h i s  cou ld  be 
e a s i l y  overcome by  bhe fo l lo w in g  ru l in g *  l o g i c a l  r u l e s  
o f  a c c e p ta n c e  i . e . ,  th e  laws o f  l o g i c  i n t e r p r e t e d  as  
r u l e s  o f  a c c e p ta n c e  5 ta k e  p reced en ce  o v er  r u l e s  l i k e  
( a * ) .  B ut t h i s  wou^d be  j u s t  h o p e l e s s ,  f o r  t h i s  
would make i t  l o g i c a l l y  im p o ss ib le  to  r a t i o n a l l y  change 
one * s m ind .
I t  would seem t h e r e f o r e  t h a t  th e  p r o b a b i l i s t s  must 
a c c e p t  th e  f i r s t  o f  ou r  two a sy m m e tr ie s .  Mow l e t  us 
c o n s id e r  a second example i n  which th e  f o l lo i f in g  i s  the  
c a s e ;
( i )  A knows t h a t  ( r  o r  s  o r  t ) b ecau se  ( r  o r  s o r  t )  
i s  a n e c e s s a r y  t r u t h .
— ^2- —
( i i )  r , 3 , t  a r e  l o g i c a l l y  m u tu a l ly  e x c l u s iv e ,
( i i i )  c ( r , e )  e q u a l s  0 . 7 0 .
( i v )  c ( s , e )  e q u a ls  0 . 1 5 *
IA T" V 7 ( v )  o ( t , e )  equals  0 . 15*
/ /
4" r  f-(^ Thus a ccord.ing to  (A*) A may r e j e c t  s  and may r e j e c t
^  t ,  h u t  may nob a c c e p t  r .  However, n o t - r  i s  e q u i v a l e n t  t o ,
ill t h i s  c a s e  ( s  o r  t ) ,  so  i t  would seem t h a t  a  good argum ent 
againsG  n o t - r  i s  n o t  a good argum ent f o r  r .
The p r o b a h i l i s t  m ight o b je c t  t h a t  t h i s  was bound to  be 
th e  cas: s in c e  c ( s  o r  t , e )  i s  g r e a t e r  th an  o ( s , e )  o r  c ( t , e ) .  
But t h i s  would seem t o  c o n s t i t u t e  a  f u r t h e r  d i f f i c u l t y  
r a t h e r  th a n  a r  b u t t a i , s in c e  i t  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  a good 
argum ent a g a i n s t  s  and a  good argum ent a g a i n s t  t  does n o t  
c o n s t i t u t e  s u f f i c i e n t  grounds f o r  r e j e c t i n g  ( s  o r  t ) .  I t  i s  
t o  be  p o in te d  o u t  t h a t  the  abovo example i s  n o t  to  bo seen  as 
a  d i s g u i s e d  v e r s i o n  o f  the l o t t e r y  p a ra d o x ,  f o r  no a c t u a l  
i n c o n s i s t e n c y  i s  involv-id  i n  th e  a c q u i re d  s e t  o f  b e l i e f s .
However, th e  p r o b a h i l i s t  m igh t a rgue  t h a t  r u l e s  as  
i n f l e x i b l e  as ( a )  and (A*) were bound to  le a d  to  d i f f i c u l t i e s  
and t h a t  w  sh o u ld  a d o p t  some more f l e x i b l e  r u l e  (A **).
( a ” ) We may a c c e p t  q g iv en  p i f  and o n ly  i f  c ( p ,q )  i s  
much g r e a t e r  th a n  th e  o t h e r  a l t e r n a t i v e s ,  and we may r e j e c t  p 
g iv e n  q i f  and o n ly  i f  c ( p ,q )  i s  much l e s s  th a n  th e  o t h e r  
a l t e r n a t i v e s .  But a g a in  t h i s  l e a d s  t o  s i m i l a r  d i f f i c u l t i e s .  
C o n s id e r .
c ( p , e )  e q u a ls  0 . 4 0 . 
c ( q , e )  e q u a ls  0 . 1 0 . 
c ( r , e )  e q u a ls  0 .1 0
c ( v , e )  e q u a ls  0 .1 0
c (p  o r  q o r  r  o r  . . .  o r  v )  e q u a ls  1 .0
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Mow i n  t h i s  example we can a c c o rd in g  to  (A**) a c c e p t  
p ,  h u t  what t o  do w i th  n o t - p  whose p r o b a b i l i t y  i s  h ig h e r  
' - th a n  p?
We may ta k e  i t  th e n  t h a t  w  a r e  g o in g  to  f in d  s y s te m a t ic  
jVc . asym m etries  betw een  th e  s y n ta x  o f  th e  p r o b a b i l i t y  c a lc u lu s
and bhe s y n ta x  o f  th:^ é v a lu a  bion o f  n o n -d e d u c t iv e  argum ents
/ I J- 6^  ' I- ' '
' i n  o r d in a r y  language*
However, what c o n c lu s io n s  cr>n be  drawn from t h i s ?  What
th e  asym m etries  show i s  bhat th e  p r o b a h i l i s t  acco u n t  o f  th e
j u s t i f i e r  bion o f  p a r t i c u l a r  i n f e r e n c e s  canno t b -  g iv e n  as  an
a n a l y s i s  o f  what we o r d i n a r i l y  ta k e  t o  ju s  b i fy  p a r t i c u l a r
i n f e r e n c e s .  F u r th e rm o re ,  u n le s s  wo have c o n s id e r a b le
g rounds f o r  r e j e c t i n g  what we o r d i n a r i l y  ta k e  to  j u s t i f y  n o n -
/Lf \ /pC . d e d u c t iv e  argum ents  as in c o h e r e n t  (and wo have n o t ) ,  vm
h a v n  no r e a s o n  f o r  sup  plumbing what wo hav- w ith  th e  e l a b o r a t e
s t r u c t u r e  proposed  by  Carnap o t  a l .  w i th  a l l  i t s  o b s c u r i t i e s  
and coraï-1 i  ca  t i  o n s .
T h is  does  n o t  mean t h a t  p r o b a b i l i t y ,  o r  h ig h  p r o b a b i l i t y  
does  n o t  p la y  an im p o r ta n t  p a r t  i n  i n f e r e n t i a l  r e a s o n in g ,  b u t  
o n ly  t h a t  i t  does n o t  have the  r o l e  t h a t  t h y  would have us  
b e l i e v e .  T h is  g iv e s  u s  s u f f i c i e n t  grounds f o r  r e j e c t i n g  th e  
f i r s t  s t e p  in  th e  l o t t e r y  p aradox  and hence a v o id in g  .Curbher 
c o m p l ic a t io n s .
B e fo re  we le a v e  p r o b a b i l i t y  l e t  u s  have a lo o k  a t  th e  
p o in t  Ayer makes i n  h i s  a r t i c l e  which we r e f e r r e d  t o  e a r l i e r .  
The p o in t  can  b e s t  be e x p la in e d  by  u s in g  tho  same example 
( a ) John  i s  a  dog .
(B) Most dogs l i k e  F e l i x .
S o , (C) P ro b a b ly ,  John  w i l l  l i k e  F e l i x .
So, (D) John Trill l i k e  F e l i x .
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Mew, suppose  en i n d i v i d u a l , A, who has  a d o g ,  J o h n ,  w ants  to
know w h e th e r  i t  w i l l  l i k e  F e l ix *  F u r t h e r ,  l e t  u s  suppose
t h a t  he knoTfS ( a ) and he knows (B)* So on th e  b a s i s  o f  ( a ) 
and ( B ) ,  a , msuy work o u t a d e te r m in a te  v a lu e  f o r  th e  p r o b a b i l i t y  
o f  ’John w i l l  l i k e  F e l i x * .  Mow th e  q u e s t io n  Ayer prompts us  to  
a s k  is*  ’Why on th e  b a s i s  o f  ( a ) and (B) a lo n e  s h o u ld ,  A d e c id e  
w h e th e r  o r  n o t  to  acc p t  (©)?* T h a t  i s ,  no m a t t e r  what th e  
v a lu e  John d i s c o v e r s  f o r  th e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  ( b ) on ( a ) and ( B ) ,  
why sh o u ld  he s to p  h i s  i n v e s t i g a t i o n ?  A has  no r e a s o n  to  
suppose  t h a t  ( a ) and (b ) e x h a u s ts  p o s s i b l e  r e l e v a n t  in f o r m a t io n .
He has  no r e a s o n  to  suppose  t h a t  i f  he went on lo o k in g ,  o r  i n  
t h i s  c a se  s t a r t e d  to  l o o k ,  he would n o t  f in d  e v id e n c e  t h a t  
would g iv e  a d i f f e r e n t  v a l u e .  F o r  exam ple , he m ight d i s c o v e r  
( a )* and (B )* ,  t h a t  i s  t h a t ;
( a ’ ) John  i s  a  Boxer dog .
(B*) Most Boxer dogs do n o t  l i k e  F e l i x .
And i f  he d id  d i s c o v e r  t h i s  th e n  tho  v a lu e  he would g e t  
f o r  th e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o^’ ( d ) would be t o t a l l y  d i f f e r e n t .  T here  
i s  no r e a s o n  to  supi ose th a t  th e  d i f f e r e n c e  m ight bo such  as  to  
make i t  r a t i o n a l  t o  a c c - p t  (p )  i n  th e  one i n s t a n c e  and r a t i o n a l  
to  r e j e c t  ( p )  i n  the  o t h e r  i n s t a n c e ;  a t  l e a s t ,  a c c o rd in g  to  ( % ) •  
T here  i s  no q u e s t io n  o f  one v a lu e  b e in g  th e  c o r r e c t  v a lu e  and 
a n o th e r  v a lu e  b e in g  i n c o r r e c t .  As Ayer p o i n t s  o u t  th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
betw een  th e  p re m isse s  and c o n c lu s io n  i s  i n  each  c a s e  a l o g i c a l  
on ' and i n  each  c a s e  th e  i n f e r e n c e  i s  p e r f e c t l y  c o r r e c t , b a r r i n g  
m i s c a l c u l a t i o n s ,  so  i t  can n o t  be  i n  thesT term s t h a t  th e  one i s  
to  be p r e f e r r e d  to  bhe o b h e r ,  i f  i t  i s  to  be p r e f e r r e d  a t  a l l .
I n  our e a r l i e r  d i s c u s s io n  we were concerned  to  d e m o n s tra te  t h a t  
i n  c e r t a i n  c a se s  th e  p r o b a h i l i s t  has  d i f f i c u l t y  i n  showing t h a t  a 
d e t e r m in a te  v a lu o  f o r  th e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  a s ta t e m e n t  c m  b e  a r r i v e d  
a t ,  w i th o u t  a t  th e  same tim e e n s u r in g  t h a t  we cou ld  n o t  r a t i o n a l l y  
vhange o u r  m inds. The p o in t  h e r e  i s ,  g ra n te d  we can re?*ch a
d e t r m i n a t ©  v a l u e ,  th o n  why sh o u ld  we a c t  on i t ?
T hc t i s ,  why employ ( % ) ,  o r  som eth ing  s i m i l a r ,  on 
ou r  f i r s t  v a lu e  f o r  th e  p r o p o s i t i o n ?  O r, o u r  se c o n d ,  
o r  any o th e r ?
To t h i s  i t  i s  t  m p ting  f o r  th e  p r o b a h i l i s t  to  make 
th e  f o l lo w in g  s o r t  o f  r e p l y .  I t  i s  q u i t e  t r u e  t h a t  tho 
mor ev id e n c e  w- c o l l e c t  bhe b e t t e r  a  g u id e  prob b i l i t y  
i s  to  th  t r u t h  o f  a  p r o p o s i t i o n  b u t  can n o t  go on 
c o l l e c t i n g  e v id e n c e ,  we must s to p  somewh- r o .  But i f  
t h i s  i s  a  te m p tin g  r e p l y  i t  i s  a l s o  q u i t e  m isg u id e d .
F o r  th e  whole p o in t  i s  t h a t  th e  p r o b a h i l i s t  h a s ,  and 
can make, no room f o r  rem arks l i k e  ’ th e  more ev id e n c e  
we c o l l e c t  th e  b e t t e r  a pu ide  p r o b a b i l i t y  i s  t o  tho 
t r u t h  o f  a p r o p o s i t i o n ’ (even  s u p p o s in g  th a t  i t  i s  tK u e , 
which i t  i s  n o t ) .  F o r  t h i s  would g iv e  uo a t o - t i e r  
s t r u c t u r e  o f  é v a l u a t i o n ,  th e  low er which would be  a 
w  s ta te m e n t  o f  th e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  a  s t a t e m e n t ,  and th e
( h ig h e r  which would be fin e v a lu a t io n  o f  th e  o r t h  o f
th e  p r o b a b i l i t y  as  a g u id e  to  th e  t r u t h  o f  th^  s t a t e m e n t .  
How, i f  t h i s  h ig h e r  t i e r  i s  p r o b a b i l i s t i c ,  th e n  we a re  
l e d  t o  a v i s c i o a s  i n t i m a t e  r  g r e s s , a n d ,  i f  n o t ,  th e n  the 
p T o b r b i l i s t  t h e s i s  l i e s  i n  r u i n s .
Mow i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to s e e  e x a c t l y  what t h i s  
argum ent p ro v es  and Ayer h im s e l f  does  n o t  develoy i t ,  
b u t  i t  i s  obvious t h a t  i f  we cou ld  d i s c o v e r  what i t  was t h a t
r u l e s  l i k e  ( % )  were l a c k in g  th a t  th e y  sh o u ld  be  l e d  t h i s
s o r t  o f  d a n c e ,  a  c o n s id e r  gib l e  d i s t a n c e  would have been  made 
tow ards  d i s c o v e r in g  what soundness  i n  non-d .educ tive  argument 
c o n s i s t s  o f .  What i t  i a  n o t  d i f f i c u l t  bo soe  i s  t h a t  
p r o b a h i l i s t  answ ers t o  t h i s  q u e s t io n  l e a v e  a g r e a t  d e a l  to  
be d e s i r e d .
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Chai t e r  F iv e .
The P re fa c e  P a ra d o x .
So f a r  we have c o n c e n t r a t e d  o u r  a t t e n t i o n s  e n t i r e l y  on 
th e  l o t t e r y  p a ra d o x ,  and i t  i s  n o t  o b v io u s  how su ch  c o n c lu s io n s  
as  we hav'"* r e a c h e d  ab o u t  t h a t  h e lp  us  to  r e a c h  a  c o n c lu s io n  
a b o u té th e  p r e f a c e  p a ra d o x .  T here  i s  no d o u b t  t h a t  one ’s o lu t io n *  
i s  Sim l y  to  deny th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  r a t i o n a l  b e l i e f .  However, 
a l th o u g h  t h i s  i s  one c o u r s e  we can  take t h i s  does  n o t  mean 
t h a t  we must ta k e  i t ;  o b v io u s ly  we do n o t  have  t o  ta k e  any 
o p t io n  a v a i l a b l e  to  u s .  B u t ,  a t  th e  moment, w-^  have y e t  t o  
show t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  any a l t^ a  n a t iv :  o p t i o n s ,  and b e f o r e  we can 
do t h i s  we must f i l l  i n ,  to  some e x t e n t ,  th e  r- t h e r  spars©  
p i c t u r e  we have so  f a r  o b ta in e d  o f  th e  e v a l u a t i o n  o f  e p i s t e m ic  
r e a s o n i n g .
Up u n t i l  t h i s  p o i n t  a l l  we have  a c c e p te d  i s  t h a t  an 
im p o r ta n t  f e a t u r é  o f  r a t i o n a l  e p i s t e m ic  r e a s o n in g  i s  a d h e re n c e  
t o  t h  p r i n c i p l e  ’bo n o t  have f a l s e  b e l i e f s ’ ; r e c o g n i s in g  
t h a t  t h i s  e n t a i l s  a d h e re n c e  to  th e  p r i n c i p l e  ’Be c o n s i s t e n t ’ .
But i t  i s  q u i t e  c l e a r  t h a t  t h i s  ca n n o t  be th e  o n ly  p r i n c i p l e  we 
demand a d h e re n c e  t o .  F o r ,  i f  i t  w e re ,  i t  would be  as  r a t i o n a l  
f o r  God to have no b e l i e f s  a s  f o r  him to  have b o l i  f s , and t h i s  
d e s p i t e  th e  f a c t  t h a t  i f  God has a  b e l i e f  th e n  i t  c rn n o t  be 
f a l s e .  I n  o t h e r  w o rd s , i f  the above were o u r  o n ly  p r i n c i p l e  
t h e n ,  th e  p r e f a c e  p a ra d o x  and o t h e r  c o m p l ic a t io n s  n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g ,  
i t  would s t i l l  be th e  c a s e  t h a t  i t  would be r a t i o n a l  t o  have  no 
b e l i e f s ,  w h a te v e r  o n e 's  c a p a c i t y  f o r  r e a s o n in g  o r  o n e ’s a c c e s s  
t o  e v id e n c e .  And t h i s  we may ta k e  to  be  s t r o n g l y  c o u n te r ­
i n t u i t i v e .
I t  seems 5 t h e r e f o r e ,  h a t  b e f o r e  we c m  even b e g in  to  show 
t h a t  i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  t o  have a r a t i o n a l  s e t  o f  b e l i e f s ,  o t h e r
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th an  th e  n u l l  s e t ,  we must lo o k  ’o r  some a d d i t i o n a l  
p r i n c i p l e  o f  e p is te m ic  r e a s o n in g .  A second p r i n c i p l e  
has been proposed by I s a - c  Levi i n  h i s  book Gambling w ith  
/L '^L /  T r u t h , and t h a t  i s  ‘R e l ie v e  d o u b t* .  Guch a p r i n c i p l e  i s
-  ^ . imr l i c i t ,  o r  n o t  v e ry  f a r  from th e  s u r f a c e ,  i n  Kuhn’s
c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n  o f  s c i e n t i f i c  i n q u i r y  an a p u z z le - s o lv in g  
a c t i v i t y ,  and in  Topper’s c o n te n t io n  t h a t  s c i e n t i s t s  ought 
to  make b o l d ,  r a t h e r  than t im id ,  c o n j e c t u r e s .  I t  would 
a l s o  a p p ea r  to  be th e  h i s t o r i c a l  d escen d en t  o f  th e  ’w i l l  
jj^ . t o  b e l ie v e *  t h a t  W illiam  James w e n t 'd  to  a s c r ib e  t o  human
ivJ. b e in g s .
L e v i ’s p r i n c i p l e  may be e x p l i c a te d  as f o l lo w s . An 
in d iv id u a l  doub ts  p i f  he n e i t h e r  b ' l i e v a s  t h a t  p n o r  
lATT'-'/t/X 7 ^ C'f . b e l i e v e s  t h a t  n o t - p .  F u r th e rm o re ,  we p la c e  a v a lu e  on
n o t  b e in g  i n  such s i t u a t i o n s ^ n u i t e  in dependen t o f  th e  t r u t h -  
v a lu e  o f  th e  p ro  o s i t i o n  t h a t  we come to  b e l i e v e  i n  o rd e r  to
a l l e v i a t e  th e  d o u b t .  That i s  to  s a y ,  coming to  b e l i e v e  p 
has  a v a lu e  in d ep en d en t o f  th e  t r u t h - v a l u e  o f  p .  However, 
r a t h e r  th an  deve lop  a second p r i n c i p l e  out o f  a  c r i t i c i s m  o f  
L e v i ’s p r i n c i p l e ,  l e t  us  s t a t e  a n o th e r  p r i n c i p l e , i n  e s s e n t i a l s  
no d i f f e r  n t  from L e v i ’s ,  b u t  r a t h e r  more g e n e r a l l y  a p p l i c a b le  
than h i s ,  more g e n e ra l  i n  so f a r  as  i t  cov r s  s i t u a t i o n s  
n o t  o b v io u s ly  covered by L e v i ’s p r i n c i p l e .  F o r  exam ple, 
i n  some s i t u a t i o n s ,  as when w> ask  th e  q u e s t io n  ’Are so u a re s  
f o u r - s id e d ? * ,  we have t - o  a n sw ers ,  ’They a r e ’ and ’They a re  
n o t ’ , where each  o f  the p o s s ib le  ans we s i s  th e  n e g a t io n  
o f  th é  o t h e r .  Such s i t u a t i o n s  a r e  covered  by L e v i ’s 
p r i n c i p l e  5 b u t  i n v e s t i g a t i o n s  a t te m p t in g  to answer such  
q u e s t io n s  as ’ lihat caused  th e  f i r e ? ’ a re  l e s s  e a s i l y  
^  c h a r a c t e r i s e d  as a t te m p ts  to  d e c id e  w hether  p o r  n o t - p .  So
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i t  i s  n o t  e a sy  bo s e e  how L e v i ’s p r i n c i p l e  i s  g o in g  to
f u n c t io n  as  a b a s i s  f o r  c r i t i c i s i n g  any p ie c e  o f  r e a s o n in g .
I t  i s  n o t  even th e  c a se  t h a t  i f  p i s  a p o s s i b l e  answ er to
a q u e s t i o n  th e n  n o t - p  i s  a l s o  a p o s s i b l e  answ er to  the
q u e s t io n -  He can make L e v i ’s p r i n c i p l e  more g e n e r a l  by
g iv in g  a d i f f e r e n t  c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n  o f  d o u b t .  Thus we
r e t a i n  th e  s lo g a n  ’A l l e v i a t e  d o u b t ’ ©r ’R e l ie v e  doubt* b u t
( a )g iv e  i t  a s l i g h t l y  d i f f e r e n t  e x p l i c a t i o n . '   ^ An i n d i v i d u a l ,  
A, has  a d oub t s ,  i f  he has  n o t  g o t  an answer t o  a  q u e s t io n  
Qg. I n  o r d e r  to  av o id  c o n f u s io n ,  o r  th e  f e e l i n g  th a t  
so m eth in g  j h i l o s o p h i c a l l y  c o n te n t io u s  has  been  s- i d ,  l e t  u s  
s a y  a  l i t t l e  more a b o u t  t h i s .  The f i r s t  p o i n t  i s  t h a t  i t  
i s  q u i t e  obv ious  t h a t  a q u e s t io n  may have more than  one 
ans^'^er; i f  t h i s  were n o t  th r  c a s e , t h e n  w would have no 
b a s i s  f o r  th e  d i s t i n c t i o n  betw een c o r r e c t  and i n c o r r e c t  
a n sw e rs .  The second p o in t  t o  be  made i s  t h a t  t h i s  p r i n c i p l e  
makes no demands t h a t  the  answ er sh o u ld  be  th e  c o r r e c t  o n e ,  
th e  o t h e r  p r i n c i p l e  ’Do n o t  have f a l s e  b e l i e f s *  does t h a t .
The f i r s t  p o in t  shows t h a t  th e r e  i s  n o th in g  l o g i c a l l y  wrong 
w ith  th e  fo rm u la t io n  o f  th e  p r i n c i p l e ,  and th e  second  showS 
t h a t  th e  p r i n c i p l e  i s  n o t  o b v io u s ly  wrong. A f u r t h e r  
p o in t  to  be  made i s  t h a t  th e  p r i n c i p l e  does n o t  demand t h a t  
a c h o ic e  be  made betw eeh t o  c o r r e c t  a n sw e rs .  Thus suppose  
a q u e s t io n  has  more th a n  one c o r r e c t  answ er th e n  th e  
p r i n c i p l e  does n o t  demand t h a t  a c h o ic e  be  made be tw een  them;
i f  p i s  an answer and q i s  an answ er bhen *p and q* i s  an 
an sw er.  L a s t l y ,  to  have come t o  th e  c o n c lu s io n  (p  o r  q )  -  
where p i s  an answ er and q i s  an answ er -  i s  n o t  t o  have come 
to  an a n sw er ,  i t  i s ,  a t  b e s t ,  t o  have narrow ed th e  s e l e c t i o n
( ^ ^ I t  i s  to  be n o te d  t h a t  b o th  L e v i ’s p r i n c i p l e  and o u r  otm 
employ a s l i g h t l y  e r s a t z  n o t io n  o f  d o u b t ,  b u t  t h i s  need be  no 
s o u rc e  o f  a n x ie ty .
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from which th e  answ er i s  to  be  c h o s e n .  I t  may be  a  b e t t e r  
c o n c lu s io n  t o  come t o  th a n  *p o r  q o r  r * , i t  may even be  a 
b e t  e r  c o n c lu s io n  t o  come to  th an  c i t h e r  p o r  q ,  b u t  t h i s  
s t i l l  does n o t  make i t  an answ er t o  th e  q u e s t i o n .  A lthough  
th e  f o rm u la t io n  o f  c r i t e r i a  by  which we judge some s ta t e m e n t  
t o  bo an a n sw e r ,  and o f  c r i t e r i a  by  which we judge  *p o r  q* 
t o  be c l o s e r  an answ er th a n  *p o r  q o r  r ’ -  t h a t  i s  c l o s e r  
t o  an answ er b u t  n o t  an answ er -  i^ay be  a d i f f i c u l t  p h i lo s o ­
p h ic a l  problem  ; we may ta k e  i t  t h a t  what we have s a id  i s  n o t  
p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y  c o n t e n t i o u s ,  t h a t  i s ,  th e r e  a r e  such  c r i t e r i a .
So th e  p r i n c i p l e  sa y s  r e p l a c e  doubb w ith  an  ansy^wer.
L a te r  on we w i l l  e x p l i c a t e  th e  p r i n c i p l e  i n  g r e a t e r  d e t a i l , 
b u t  a t  th e  moment we need  to  answ er some more p r e s s i n g  q u e s t i o n s .  
We need to  do more th a n  p o in t  to  a  number o f  d i s t i n g u i s h e d  
a d v o c a te s  o f  such  a  p r i n c i p l e  t o  s u b s t a n t i a t e  th e  c la im  t h a t  
we a c t u a l l y  employ su c h  a  p r i n c i p l e .  We have to  show bhat th e  
p r i n c i p l e  does n o t  c o n f l i c t  w i th  o u r  most g e n e r a l  i n t u i t i o n s  
ab o u t r a t i o n a l i t y .  We a l s o  have to  show t h a t  su ch  a  
p r i n c i p l e  d o e s ,  i n  f a c t ,  have some work to  d o .  And l a s t l y ,  we 
have to  show t h a t  a d o p t in g  th e  p r i n c i p l e  i s  n o t  s im p ly  an ad hoc 
m easure d e s ig n e d  to  g e t  u s  o u t  o f  d i f f i c u l t i e s  -  i n  ways we 
have n o t  y e t  r e v e a l e d .
We conceded e a r l i e r  t h a t  r a t i o n a l i t y  makes no co m p le ten ess  
demand. T h a t  i s  to  s a y ,  we do n o t  demand o f  an i n d i v i d u a l  
t h a t  he b e l i e v e  a l l  t r u e  s t a t e m e n t s ,  o r  a g a in  an i n d i v i d u a l  i s  
n o t  open to  c r i t i c i s m  s o l e l y  on t h e  g rounds t h a t  he f a i l s  to  
b e l i e v  some t r u e  s ta t e m e n t s ;  t h e r e f o r "  we do n o t  want t o  couch 
o u r  p r i n c i p l e s  i n  su ch  a f a s h io n  as  makes such  c r i t i c i s m  p o s s i b l e .  
I t  was i n  r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  t h i s  f a c t  t h a t  we ad o p ted  th e  p r i n c i p l e  
•Do n o t  have f a i s  b e l i e f s *  r a t h e r  th a n  th e  p r i n c i p l e  *Have t r u e
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b e l i e f s ’ . However, i f  we a re  t o  av o id  making su ch  c r i t ic ism , 
p o s s i b l e  we must r e j e c t  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  th e  s o r t  we have j u s t  
s u g g e s te d ;  s i n c e  we musk a llo v r ,  and th e  p r i n c i p l e  does n o t ,  
t h a t  t h e r e  by  some q u e s t i o n s ,  an immense number o f  q u e s t i o n s ,  
t h a t  an i n d iv i . l u a l  need  n o t  v e n  a t t e m p t  to  p ro v id e  an answ er 
t o .  T h u s ,  on tho  f a c r  o f  i t ,  i t  does  seem t h a t  th e  second 
p r i n c i p l e  t h a t  we hav su g g e s te d  does  make a co m p le ten ess  
demand and i s  th e r e b y  op n  to  obvious  and c ru s h in g  c r i t i c i s m .
So b f o r  = w< s o t  o u r s e lv e s  th; t a k s  o f  show ing t h a t  such  a 
p r i n c i  l e  has  some work to d o ,  e t c . ,  we need f in d  some r e p l y  
t o  t h i s  s o r t  o f  c r i t i c i s m .
Tho f i r s t  e sc a p e  r o u te  we have to  e x p lo re  i s  t o  be  found 
in  some t h e s i s  abou t th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  betw een  ought and can 
and i n  su ch  g e n e r a l  f a c t s  as  th e  f a c t  t h a t  i t  i s  q u i t e  im p o ss ib le  
f o r  a human b e in g  to  r e s o l v e  a l l  p o s s i b l e  q u e s t i o n s .  As Suppes 
p o i n t s  out*
A th e o r y  o f  r a t i o n a l i t y  that does n o t  ta k e  i n t o  ac c o u n t  
s p e c i f i c  human powers and l i m i t a t i o n s  o f  a t t e n t i o n ,  
memory and c o n c e p t u a l i s a t i o n  may have in te r e s t in g  t h in g s  
to  s a y ,  b u t  n o t  a b o u t  human r a t i o n a l i t y . ' ^ ' ^
T here  i s  no d o u b t t h a t  c o n s id e r a t i o n s  o f  t h i s  s o r t  t r i l l  
demand a , p e r h a p s , complex th e o r y  o r  ac c o u n t  o f  th e  u se  o f  
e p i s t e m ic  p r i n c i p l e s  i n  c r i t i c i s m  and a s s e s s m e n t .  However, 
i t  i s  n o t  a t  a l l  c l e a r  t h a t  c o n s id e r a t i o n s  o f  t h i s  s o r t ,  g i v in g  
r i s e  t o  m o d i f i c a t i o n s ,  su ch  a s ,  ’Do y o u rb e s t  t o  a l l e v i a t e  d o u b t ’ , 
a.ré g o in g  to  p ro v id e  an adequabe s o l u t i o n  t o  o u r  p rob le ra .
T here  a r e  t o  r e a s o n s  f o r  t h i n k i n g  t h i s .  The f i r s t  r e a s o n  i s  
t h a t  q u a l i f y i n g  c l a u s e s  o f  t h i s  s o r t  p ro v id e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  
e l s e w h e re .  T here  i s  o b v io u s ly  some p o i n t  a t  which we would 
want to  s a y  o f  someone t h a t  th ey  were i r r a t i o n a l , t h a t  i s
( a )  S u p p es ,  ’R a t io n a l  changes o f  B e l i e f ’ , i n  The problem  o f  
I n d u c t io n  L o g ic (e d .  by I . L a h a t o s ) ,  Amsterdam I9 6 8 , p . l ^  6 ,
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e p i s t e r a i c a l l y  i r r a t i o n a l ;  th e  p a t b e m  o f  t h e i r  ’ re a so n in g *  
was such  t h a t  sh o u ld  n o t  w -n t t o  a s c r i b e  them r a t i o n a l  
b e l i e f s  a t  a l l .  The o b v ious  way o f  d e te r m in in g  a t  what p o i n t  
t h i s  s t a g "  i s  r e a c h e d  i s  t h a t  p o i n t  a t  which we co u ld  n o t  s a y  
t h e i r  ’r e a s o n i n g ’ e x h i b i t e d  a d h e re n c e  t o  t h -  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  
e p isb e m ic  r e a s o n in g .  I n  o t h e r  w o rd s ,  we m ight s im p ly  want 
to  sa y  t h a t  some p e o p l e ’s  b e s t  was n o t  good enough* B ut 
how can we do t h i s  when we add q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  o f  th e  above 
s o r t  t o  th e  p r i n c i p l e s  by  which w" e v a l u a t e  h i s  r e a s o n in g ?
The second  r e a s o n  i s  t h a t  even  as  i t  s t a n d s  th e  r r i n c i p l e  
i s  s t i l l  open t o  c r i t i c i s m  o f  a  s i m i l a r  s o r t .  Thus a l th o u g h  
i t  b lo c k s  an avenue to  c r i t i c i s m  o f  th e  s o r t  ’A i s  a q u e s t i o n  
to  w hich you have nob p ro v id e d  an a n sw e r ,  you have  t h e r e f o r e  
f a i l e d  t o  a l l e v i a t e  d o u b t ’ ; i n  o t h e r  w o rd s ,  c r i t i c i s m  b a s e d  
on a s t r a i g h t  c o m p le te n e s s  r e q u i r e m e n t .  I t  f a i l s  to  b l o c k  
a n o th e r  e q u a l l y  a b su rd  r o u t e  t o  c r i t i c i s m .  T h is  ru n s  a s  
f o i l o i f s : ’A i s  a  q u e s t i o n  you can p ro v id e  an answ er to  and
you have n o t .  You have th e r e b y  f a i l e d  t o  do th e  b e s t  you
can  to  a l l e v i a t e  d o u b t . ’ Mow i t  c l e a r l y  i s  n o t  th e  c a se  
t h a t  wo c r i t i c i S '  p e o p le  f o r  f a i l i n g  t o  u s e  t h a i r  f u l l  
i n t e l l e c t u a l  powers a l l  th e  t im e .  T h a t  i s  to  s a y  i t  i s  n o t  
t r u -  t h a t  p eop l ought to  answ er a l l  th e  q u e s t i o n s  th e y  c a n .
I f  w“ do c r i t i c i s e  p eo p le  f o r  n o t  h a v in g  answ ers  t o  q u e s t io n s  
i t  i s  f o r  more complex r e a s o n s  th a n  s im p ly  th e  f a c t  t h a t  th e y  
c o u l 1 hav  an answ er t o  th e  q u e s t i o n  i f  th e y  i n v e s t i g a t e d .  ’You 
ought to  have  found o u t ’ s im p ly  d oes  n o t  e x te n d  to  a l l  t h e  t h in g s  
an i n d i v i d u a l  cou ld  have found o u t .
He n e e d ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  some means w hereby we can  show t h a t  
an  i n d i v i d u a l ’s b e l i e f - a c q u i r i n g  a c t i v i t i e s  can  h r  b o th  l i m i t e d  
and r a t i o n a l .  He have a l r e a d y  shoxm t h a t  t h i s  c a n n o t  bn done
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in  te rm s o f  th e  t r u t h - v a l u e  o f  th e  answ ers  to  be  d i s c o v e r e d ,  s in c e  
t h i s  s t i l l  l e a v e s  u s  w ith  to o  many answ ers  t o  bo fo u n d .  F u r t h e r ,  
we have  no r e a s o n  t o  su p p o se  su ch  a d e l i m i t a t i o n  co u ld  p o s s i b l y  be  
c a r r i e d  o u t  i n  te rm s o f  s u b j e c t - m a t t e r ;  f o r  on th e  one hand t h i s  
would be  i n s u f f i c i e n t ,  and on th e  o t h e r  n o t  s e v e r e  enough . I t  would 
^  seem t h a t  a l l  we hg^ t o  c a r r y  o u t  t h i s  l i m i t a t i o n  a r e  th e  p e r s o n a l  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  th e  i n v e s t i g a t o r .  We co u ld  u se  t h e s e  b y  
i n v e s t i n g  o u r  co n c e p t  o f  d o u b t  v i t h  some more s p e c i f i c  f e a t u r e  l i k e  
" . . .  i s  w orred  by Thus o u r  e x p l i c a t i o n  o f  th e  c o n c e p t  o f
d o u b t  would have become so m e th in g  l i k e  th e  f o l l o w in g :
A d o u b ts  i f  and o n ly  i f  ( i )  He does  n o t  have an answ er to  a
q u e s t i o n .
and ( i i )  He i s  w orred  by  t h a t  q u e s t i o n .
T h is  a d d i t i o n  would have th e  a d d i t i o n a l , b u t  n o t  c r u c i a l , 
a d v a n ta g e  o f  b r i n g i n g  o u r  co n c e p t  o f  d o u b t  c l o s e r  to  th e  o r d in a r y  
n o t i o n .  B u t .  howevei h e l p f u l  su ch  an a d d i t i o n  m igh t b e ,* #  i t  has  
co n seq u en ces  t h a t  v i t i a t e  th e  s u g g e s t i o n .  F o r  th e  above demands 
as  an a n a l y t i c  consequence  o f  an i n d i v i d u a l  h a v in g  a  r a t i o n a l  
b e l i e f  i n  p t h a t  he was a t  some t im e  p r i o r  w o r r ie d  b y  some c u e s t i o n  
to  which p was th e  a n sw e r .  And t h i s  seems an im p ro b a b le  consequence  
to  have t o  ^ ..w allow . F o r  ex am p le ,  i f  we a r e  t o  ad m it  e p i s tm m ic a l ly  
r a t i o n a l  b e l i e f s  a t  a l l  th e n  s u r l y  a  paradigm  example would be 
th e  b e l i e f  t h a t  most men have  t h a t  th e y  a r e  men; b u t  a r e  we to  
suppose  t h a t  t h i s  i s  so m e th in g  t h a t  h a s  a t  some t im e  w o r r ie d  most 
men!
We seem to  have  re a c h e d  a p o i n t  h e r e  we h ave  n o th in g  l e f t  to  
h e l p  us  s a lv a g e  o u r  second  p r i n c i p l e , u n l e s s  we can  show t h a t  o u r  
i n i t i a l  c r i t i c i s m  was somehow m isp la c e d *  I n  orc ler  to  f i n d  o u t  
w h e th e r  o r  n o t  t h i s  i s  in d e e d  th e  c a se  wo need  to  examine th e  r o l e  
t h a t  su ch  p r i n c i p l e s  p la y ;  w h e th e r  th e y  a r e  t h  b a s i s  f o r  é v o lu a t i n g  
r e a s o n in g  i n  g n n o r s l , o r  w h e th e r  th ^ y  a r c  th e  b a s i s  f o r  e v a l u a t i n g  
p q ^ r t i c u l a r  p i e c e s ,  o r  e p i s o d e s ,  o f  r e a s o n i n g ,  o r  w h e th e r  th e y  a r e
-  73 -
a b a s i s  f o r  e v a l u a t i n g  th e  t o t a l  s e t s  o f  b e l i e f s  i n d i v i d u a l  
has  a c q u i r e d ,  o r  w h a t.  Now we may n o t  be  c l e a r  t h a t  a l l  th e s e  
a r e  t o t a l l y  i n d e p e n d e n t , in d e e d  we may ta k e  i t  t h a t  th e y  a r e  n o t ,  
b u t  i t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  th e y  a r e  a l l  d i f f e r e n t .  D epending which 
r o l e  we ta k e  t o  be  th e  p r im a ry  one f o r  o u r  p r i n c i p l e s , we w i l l  
g e t  d i f f e r e n t  answ ers  t o  th e  q u e s t i o n  *Do th e  p r i n c i p l e s  we 
have p ro p o sed  make a  c o m p le te n e s s  demand?*
Thus i f  we ta k e  e p i s t e m ic  p r i n c i p l e  t o  be  p r im a r i l y  
co n ce rn ed  i n  th e  e v a l u a t i o n  o f  r e a s o n in g  i n  g e n e r a l ,  th e n  i t  
i s  q u i t e  c l e a r  t h a t  th e  second  p r i n c i p l e  does make a co m p le te n e ss  
demand. A g a in ,  i f  we ta k e  them t o  be  p r i m a r i l y  c o n ce rn ed  i n  th e  
é v a lu a  io n  o f  th e  s o t  o f  b e l i e f s  an  i n d i v i d u a l  has  a c q u i r e d  th en  
we g e t  a  co m p le te n e ss  demand. H ow ever, t h i s  i s  n o t  th e  c a s e  i f  
we con show t h a t  th e  p r im a ry  r o l e  o f  e p i s t e m ic  p r i n c i p l e s  i s  t o  
e v a l u a t e  e p i s o d e s  o f  r e a s o n i n g ,  the  p ie c e s  o f  r e a s o n in g  t h a t  l e a d  
up  t o  th e  a c q u i s i t i o n  o f  a p a r t i c u l a r  b e l i e f ,  o r  p a r t i c u l a r  
i n q u i r i e s .  ' T h a t  t h i s  i s  so  i s  e a s i l y  s e e n .  L e t  us  c o n s id e r  
th e  sum t o t a l  o f  an i n d i v i d u a l ' s  r e a s o n i n g s , what we r e f e r r e d  to  
e a r l i e r  a s  ’ r e a s o n in g  i n  g e n e r a l * .  I f  we moke th e  demand t h a t  
i t  sh o u ld  have a l l e v i a t e d  d o u b t ,  o r  have gone v e r y  f a r  i n  t h a t  
d i r ' C t i o n ,  th e  demands o f  th e  p r i n c i p l e  h iS  n o t  b een  m e t .  S i m i l a r l y  
i f  we c o n s id e r  th e  t o t a l  s e t  o f  an i n d i v i d u a l ' s  b e l i e f s .  However, 
a s  wt' s h a l l  show l a t e r  on n e i t h e r  o f  t h e s e  can  c o n s t i t u t e  th e  
p r im a ry  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  th e  p r i n c i p l e s  we a r e  c o n s id e r i n g .
L e t  us  c o n s id e r  a p i e c e  o f  r e a s o n i n g ,  an  a rg u m e n t ,  o r ,  as  
seems much mor-' ap r o p r i a t e ,  fin i n v e s t i g a t i o n .  T here  a r e  a t  
l e a s t  b o a s p e c t s  o f  an i n v e s t i g a t i o n  t h a t  a r e  open to  e v a l u a t i o n .
The f i r s t  i s  the i n s t i g a t i o n  o f  th e  in v  s t i g a t i o n ,  o r  th e  d e c i s i o n  
to  make th e  i n o u i r y ,  and th e  second  i s  th e  c o u r s e  o f  the  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  
o r  th e  o r t h  o f  th e  r e a s o n in g  c a r r i e d  o u t .  C o n s id e r a t io n s  r e l e v a n t  
t o  th e  f i r s t  e v a l u a t i o n  a r e  n o t  r e l e v a n t  t o  th e  s e c o n d .  F o r
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e x a m p le ,  i f  we want to  d e te rm in e  th e  v a lu e  o f  i n s t i g a t i n g  
some i n q u i r y  wa may have  to  b r i n g  i n  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  o f  
e c o n o m ic s ,  a e s t h e t i c s ,  i n t e r e s t  on t h e  part o f  th e  i n v e s t i g a t o r -  
t o - b e ,  h i s  i n t e l l i g e n c e ,  d u r a t i o n  o f  th e  i n v e s t i g a t i o n ,  e f f e c t s  
on o t h e r  p e o ' l e  and so  on* A ll  t h i s ,  and m o re , may be  r e l e v a n t  
to  th e  f i r s t  q u e s t i o n ,  b u t  th ey  a r e  c e r t a i n l y  n o t  to  th e  s e c o n d ,  
a s  we pointed o u t  i n  th e  f i r s t  c h a p te r*  The r  s u i t s  o f  th e  
two e v a l u a t i o n s  a r e  a l s o  e n t i r e l y  i n d e p e n d e n t .  An i n v e s t i g a t i o n  
th e  i n s t i g a t i o n  o f  w hich  was c o m p le te ly  f o o l i s h ,  o r  a b s u r d ,  may 
p e r f e c t l y  W'll r e s u l t  i n  a r a t i o n a l  b e l i e f .  E q u a l ly  an 
i n v e s t i g a  t i o n  t h a t  i t  was eminently r a t i o n a l  t,o b e g in  may r e s u l t  
in  the  a c q u i s i t i o n  o f  an i r r a t i o n a l  b e l i e f .  C o n s id e r  a  man 
who i s  c o u n t in g  th e  number o f  l e a v e s  on a  t r e e .  A lth o u g h  we 
can  im ag in e  c i r c u m s ta n c e s  which would redeem su ch  an a c t i v i t y ,  
th e  r e s u l t  o f  a  £ 1 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0  b e t  m ig h t depend  on i t ,  l e t  u s  
su p p o se  t h a t  no su c h  red eem in g  f e a t u r e s  a r e  pres n t .  Now
m igh t w e l l  t h i n k  t h a t  su ch  an i n v e s t i g a t i o n  was p o i n t l e s s  
o r  a b s u r d ,  i n  so  f a r  as  i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  s e e  why anyone s h o u ld  
w ant t o  i n s t i g a t e  su ch  an i n v e s t i g a t i o n ,  b u t  t h i s  does  n o t  mean 
t h a t  th e  i n d i v i d u a l  would n o t  come up w i t h ,  o r  r a t h e r ,  a r r i v e  
a t  a  p e r f e c t l y  r a t i o n a l  b e l i e f .  E q u a l ly  w e l l  i t  may b e  most 
im p o r ta n t  f o r  someone t o  come to a c o n c lu s io n  a b o u t  some q u e s t i o n ,  
and y e t  r e a s o n  s t u p i d l y  and so  come to  an i r r a t i o n a l  b e l i  f .
G iv -n  t h i s  d i s t i n c t i o n  w- can  s e e  t h a t  a c o m p le te n e s s  
demand am ounts to  the  demand t h a t  a l l  p o s s i b l e  i n v e s t i g a t i o n s  
be  i n s t i g a t e d  and t h a t  bh y  s h o u ld  b-=> co m p le ted  by  an  i n d i v i d u a l .  
And i n  o r d e r  to  show t h a t  su ch  a  demand was a r a t i o n a l  o n e , \fe 
would have to  show t^ o  t h i n g s .  F i r s t  t h a t  i t  was r a t i o n a l  t o  
demand t h a t  a l l  p o s s i b l e  i n v e s t i g a t i o n s  be  i n s t i g a t e d  , and 
s e c o n d ly  t h a t  i t  was r a t i o n a l  t o  demand t h a t  i f  an i n v e s t i g a t i o n  
b e  i n s t i g a t e d  th e n  i t  o u g h t t o  be  c o m p le te d .  Now th e  two
Il-
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p r in c ip l e s  we have proposed  could  on ly  e n t a i l  a com pleteness 
re q u irem en t  i f  we accep ted  t h a t  tfhat was a p p r o p r i a t e  to  
e s t a b l i s h i n g  the f i r s t  was a l s o  a p p r o p r ia te  to  e s t a b l i s h i n g  
th e  second . I n  o th e r  w ords, i f  we were p rep a red  to  c o n f l a t e  
th e  two modes of e v a lu a t io n .  But we have j u s t  shown th a t  
t h i s  would be a g ro ss  c o n fu s io n .
I t  f o l lo i f s  from what we have j u s t  s a id  t h a t  th e  two 
ep is to m ic  p r in c ip l e s  we arm o f f e r i n g  'Do n o t  have f a l s e  b e l i e f s '
J  and 'A l l e v i a t e  doubt ' do n o t  make com pleteness  d e m a n d s k(rCCu<Sé*
 ^ -f . / / t'hfflmmwiprrr  ^ th ey  must f in d  t h e i r  iprim ary  a p p l i c a t i o n  in  th e
/ e v a lu a t io n  o f  p a r t i c u l a r  p ie c e s  o f  r e a s o n in g ,  and «only
j  Î I s e c o n d a r i ly  in  th e  e v a lu a t io n  o f  r e a so n in g  in  g e n e r a l , o r  to
4.' f l  th e  t o t a l  s e t  o f  an in d iv id u a l^  b e l i e f s .
B efo re  we move on w- need to  show th a t  we have no t 
proved more than we w anted . I t  m ight be su g g e s te d  t h a t  we 
have a tom ised  th e  e v a lu a t io n  o f  b e l i e f  and in  so  do ing  have 
je o p a rd is e d  the  ; r i n c i p l e  'Be c o n s i s t e n t ’ , which on ly  has any 
fo rc e  i f  we can é v a lu é t- s e t s  o f  b e l i e f s  as w e ll  as  in d iv id u a l  
b e l i e f s .
I n  f a c t  i t  can be sho rn  q u i t e  e a s i l y  t h a t  t h i s  i s  n o t  a. 
consequence. The problem a r i s e s  as fo l lo w s ,  s in c e  the 
e p is te ra ic  r a t i o n a l i t y  o f  a s e t  o f  b e l i e f s  i s  dependent upon 
the  © pistem ic r a t i o n a l i t y  o f  each b e l i e f ,  r a t h  r  than  th e  
o th e r  way ro u n d ,  we seem to  hove je o p a rd is e d  supposed f e a tu r e s  
o f  r a t i o n a l i t y  u n le s s  we can show t h a t  th ey  con be  e x h ib i te d  in  
p a r t i c u l a r  b e l i e f s ;  and p a r t i c u l a r  b e l i e f s  need n o t  be 
i n c o n s i s t e n t ,  y e t  the  b e l i e f  s e t  in  which i t  occurs  may be 
i n c o n s i s t e n t .  Howdver, even when on ly  a p p l ie d  to  p a r t i c u l a r  
inVGSt i g e t io n s  th e  p r i n c i p l e  'Do noc have f a l s "  b l i e f s *  i s  
q u i t e  s u f f i c i e n t  to g e n e ra te  the  p r i n c i p l e  t h o t  we 'Be c o n s i s t e n t * .  
For the s im p le  rea so n  t h a t  i t  s t i l l  f o l l o r s  from the  f a c t  t h a t  
b e l i e f  i n  p and b e l i e f  in  n o t -p  demands t h a t  one b e l i e f  be
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f a l s e .  The coh es iv e  f o rc e  i s  s u p p l ie d  hy m a t te r s  o f  l o g i c  
and the  demand ’Do n o t  have f a l s e  b e l i e f s ' .
We may now tu rn  from d e fen d in g  the p r i n c i p l e  'A l l e v i a t e  
d o u b t '  to  the  more im p o r ta n t  t a s k  of showing th a t  such  a 
p r i n c i p l e  has work to d o ,  and to  showing th a t  such a p r i n c i p l e  
f ig u r e s  i n  th e  s o lu t i o n  to  the  p r e fa c e  pa rad o x . But j u s t  
b e f o re  we do t h a t  w sh o u ld  complet^ the  e x e g e t i c a l  t a s k  we 
s topped  h a l f  way through e a r l i e r  on. At t h a t  p o in t  we 
c le a r e d  up a number o f  p o in t s  r e l a t i n g  to  th e  n o t io n s  o f  a 
doubt and o f  an answer t h a t  w  employed, b u t  we s a id  n o th in g  
about the  n o t io n  o f  an i n v e s t i g a t i o n  th a t  w- haye employed. 
M a n if e s t ly ,  i f  we a rc  to  g iv e  an accoun t o f  r a t i o n a l  b e l i e f  
then  i t  canno t be such as t o  exclude s e t s  o f  p e r f e c t l y  o rd in a ry  
b e l i e f s ,  such  as b e l i e f s  ac q u ire d  by s e e in g ,  h e a r in g ,  and so 
on. B e l i e f s  such as th e s  , a c q u ire d  p a s s i v e l y ,  could  h a rd ly  
be s a id  to  have been a c q u ire d  by in q u i r y  o r  i n v e s t i g a t i o n ,  
t h i s  im p lie s  som ething  more a c t i v e .  Although t h i s  i s  
c e r t a i n l y  t r u e  i t  i s  som ething  wo w i l l  have to l i v e  w ith  and 
we w i l l  have to  acknowledge t h a t ,  j u s t  as b e f o r e ,  we have g iven  
th e  n o t io n  o f  an i n v e s t i g a t i o n  an e x te n s io n .  Thus i t  i s  a 
s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t io n  f o r  an in d iv id u a l  hav ing  c a r r i e d  o u t an 
' i n v e s t i g a t i o n  thau he shou ld  have a cq u ired  a b e l i e f ,  
f <tyt J . But l e t  us g e t  on w ith  showing t h a t  th e re  i s  such a
p r i n c i p l e .  I t  would h e lp  i f  we cou ld  show t h a t  th e  p r i n c i p l e  
'A lle v ic  to  d o u b t ' had work to  do . I n  o rd e r  to  do t h i s  w'- have 
to  fo l lo w  a p e r f e c t l y  s im p le  p ro ced u re ;  we have to  c o n s t r u c t  an 
example in  which the  p r i n c i p l e  'Do n o t  have f a l s e  b e l i e f s '  i s  
n o t  v i o l a t e d ,  b u t  th e  p r i n c i p l e  'A l l e v i a t e  d o u b t ' i s ,  and i t  
i s  only  be r e fe r e n c e  to  th e  l a t t e r  t h a t  w- can g e t  o u r se lv e s  
o u t  o f  d i f f i c u l t i e s .  The obvious c a s e i n  which our  second
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p r in c ip l e  i s  v io l a t e d  ru n s  as fo l lo w s :
(1 )  A man, A, b e l i e v e s  *p o r  q* on ev idence  E.
( 2 ) A ll  th e  ev idence  B i s  f o r  p .
( 3 ) P i s  t r u e .
(4 ) A n e i t h e r  b e l i e v e s  no r  d i s b e l i e v e s  p .
( 5 ) I t  i s  p e r f e c t l y  obvious t h a t  E i s  s u f f i c i e n t  to  
j u s t i f y  b e l i e f ,  by A, in  p .
Here we have a case  in  which A has a t r u e  b e l i e f  in  *p o r  q* 
and would have a t r u e  b e l i e f  I n  p i f  he *decided* to  b e l i e v e  i t ,
and so  in  e i t h e r  case  would n o t  hav v i o l a t e d  th e  f i r s t  p r in c ip le *
However, th e  second p r i n c i p l e  has been  flogfted s in c e  he hes n o t  
a l l e v i a t e d  h i s  d o u b t .  3o i t  would ap pear  t h a t  the  answer to  
th e  q u e s t io n  ' I s  A 's  b e l i e f  i n  "p  o r  q" a  r a t i o n a l  one?’ must 
be 'N o ' .
However, i t  cou ld  be  argued t h a t  by b u i l d i n g  c o n d i t io n
( 5 ) i n t o  th^ case  we have p re judged  th e  i s s u e  and t h a t  th e r e
i s  o p e r f e c t l y  good j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  A’s a p p a re n t  p e r v e r s i t y .
T h is  argument depends upon r e j e c t i n g  th e  p r i n c i p l e  'A l l e v i a t e  
d o u b t ’ and runs  as f o l lo w s .  The a d d i t io n  of an e x t r a  d i s j u n c t ,  
q ,  makes A 's  b e l i e f  l e s s  v u ln e ra b le  and so l e s s  l i k e l y  to  f a i l  
to  s a t i s f y  the  p r i n c i p l e  'Do n o t  have f a l s e  b e l i e f s ' .  T h is  
argument i s  q u i t e  independen t ,from th e  s o r t  o f  ev idence  A has 
o r  has  n o t  g o t  f o r  q .  There i s  no doubt t h a t  t h i s  argument 
i s  q u i t e  c o r r e c t ,  i f  s a t i s f a c t i o n  o f  th e  p r i n c i p l e  ’Do n o t  have 
f a l s e  b e l i e f s '  i s  our only  conc'^rn th en  i t  i s  more r a t i o n a l  f o r  
A to  b l i e v e  ’p o r  q* than i t  i s  f o r  him to  b e l i e v e  p .
I t  i s  tem pting  bo s u g g e s t  t h a t  we can r e j e c t  t h i s  argum ent, 
t h i s  l i n e  o f  d e fe n c e ,  by showing t h a t  i t  in e x o ra b ly  le a d s  to  
s c e p t ic i s m .  Thus i f  a good argument f o r  p ,  i s  a b e t t e r  
argument f o r  'p r  o r  q '  then  the  same argument w i l l  sho i t  to
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to  b© a b e t t e r  argument f o r  *p o r  q o r  r * , and so  on ad i n f i n i t u m . 
But t h i s  means t h a t  th e  o n ly  c o n c lu s io n  we can a c c e p t  i s  an
\ /
‘ i n f i n i t e  d i s j u n c t i o n ,  i f  we a c c e p t^ a s  we s u r e l y  must ^ t h a t  we
shou ld  o n ly  a c c e p t  th e  c o n c lu s io n s  o f  th e  b e s t  arguments t h a t  
we have a v a i l a b l  • So u n l e s s ,  as  seems v e ry  d o u b t f u l ,  we can 
make se n se  o f  b e l i e v i n g  an i n f i n i t e  d i s j u n c t i o n  th en  we a r e  le d  
t o  s c e p t ic i s m .  This  argument a l th o u g h  q u i t e  sound i s  n o t  good 
enough to  show t h a t  someone who h o ld s  t h a t  th e r e  i s  on ly  one 
e p is te m ic  p r i n c i p l e ,  namely 'Do n o t  have f a l s e  b e l i e f s *  i s  
TfTong. I t  f a i l s  b e c a u se  someone who h o ld s  t h a t  p o s i t i o n  i s  
a l r e a d y ,  v i a  the  p r e fa c e  p a rad o x ,  em bracing s c e p t ic i s m .
What th e  d e f e n c o f f e r e d  aboV'^ does e n t a i l ,  t o  i t s  c o s t ,  i s  
c o n c lu s io n  t h a t  a good argument f o r  p y i s  a b e t t e r  argument 
f o r  *p o r  q * , i s  an even b e t t e r  argument f o r  *p o r  q o r  r* • • •
We may ta k e  i t  t h a t  t h i s  i s  n o t  s im p ly  c o u n t e r - i n t u i t i v e  b u t  
m a n ife s t  r u b b is h .
L e t us  le a v e  f u r t h e r  defenc^^ o f  th e  p r in c ip l e ,  we have shotm 
t h a t  th e r e  must be more than  one p r i n c i p l e , and we have shown t h a t  
a d d i t i o n a l  p r in c ip l e s  must .be such  as to  r u l e  ou t s i t u a t i o n s  such 
as W'^  have j u s t  d e s c r ib e d  in  th e  example; iiirfcher wa have shown 
t h a t  our proposed p r i n c i p l e  'A l l e v i a t e  d o u b t '  does j u s t  t h a t .
We can do no more u n t i l  we a re  p re s e n te d  w ith  a n o th e r  p r i n c i p l e  
t h a t  does as much.
Ifhat w - need to  show, more im m e d ia te ly ,  i s  how a l l  t h i s  
h e lp s  u s .  I t  would t h a t  d e s p i t e  our now r a t h e r  c l e a r e r
p i c t u r e  o f  th e  n a tu re  o f  e p is te m ic  r e a s o n in g  we a r e  s t i l l  open 
to  p r e c i s e l y  th e  same argum ent, a l b e i t  couched in  r a t h e r  d i f f e r e n t  
te rm s .  That i s  th e  argument b ased  on th e  p r e fa c e  p a rad o x .  I f  
an  in d iv id u a l  a l l e v i a t e s  h i s  doubt i n  a manner demanded b y  the  
p r i n c i p l e  then  can he n o t  a l s o  h o ld ,  as a  f u r t h e r  r a t i o n a l  
b e l i e f ,  th e  b e l i e f  t h a t  one o f  h i s  b e l i e f s  i s  f a l s e ?  T h e re fo re
f l y .4  - jj-
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he must f a i l  t o  s a t i s f y  th e  f i r s t  p r i n c i p l e ,  and g iv e n  t h a t  
t h i s  i s  th e  c a se  does t h i s  n o t  demand t h a t  he n o t  a c q u i r e  
b e l i e f s ,  u n l e s s  he i s  p re p a re d  to  be i r r a t i o n a l ?  So, i n  what 
way do th e  two p r i n c i p l e s  we have a rgued  f o r  h e lp  us to  
overcome th e  scep tica l  c o n c lu s io n s  a p p a r e n t ly  fo rc e d  upon us  
by  th e  p r e f a c e  paradox?
We must lo o k  a t  th e  argument j u s t  sk e tc h e d  o u t  a l i t t l e  
c l o s o r .  What i t  s a y s  i s ,  ag reed  w have th e  two e p is te m ic  
p r i n c i p l e s  'Do n o t  have f a l s e  b e l i e f s '  and ’A l l e v i a t e  d o u b t ’ , 
bub W" ca n n o t  s a t i s f y  chom b o th ;  we must s a t i s f y  one o f  them , 
and t h a t  one i s  ’Do n o t  have f a l s e  b e l i e f s ' .  But do wr have 
to  a c c e p t  t h i s ?  I n  o rd e r  to see  w hether  o r  n o t  we d o ,  we 
have to  unde s ta n d  what happens when t  o n o rm a tiv e  p r i n c i p l e s  
c l a s h .  We can see  t h a t  t h i s  i s  a c a se  where t  o p r i n c i p l e s  
c l a s h .  I f  we s a t i s  Ty 'A l l e v i a t e  doubt* th  n by v i r t u e  o f  
th e  p r e f a c e  p a rad o x  we w i l l  f a i l  to  s a t i s f y  ’Do n o t  have f a l s e  
b e l i e f s ’ , and th e  o n ly  way o f  s a t i s f y i n g  'Do n o t  have f a l s e  
b e l i e f s '  would be  to  have no b e l i e f s  &md hence f r u s t r a t e  th e  
demands o f  'A l l e v i a t e  d o u b t ' .  There  a re  a number o f  p o in t s  
h e ra  t h a t  a r e  w orth  e l a b o r a t i o n .  Suppose A h as  a s e t  o f  
b e l i e f s  B ( a ) ,  and i t  comes to  h i s  n o t i c e  t h a t  a c e r t a i n  s u b - s e t  
o f  B (a) i s  f  I s e ,  t h a t  i s ,  bhe c o n ju n c t io n  o f  p r o p o s i t i o n s  
b e l i e v e d  i s  f a l s e ;  th en  t h i s  w i l l  o n ly  be a c a se  where th e  
two p r i n c i p l e s  c la s h  i f  e x a c t l y  th'> same re a so n s  can be 
a p p l ie d  to  each  s u b - s e t  o f  B(a ) ,  th e r e b y  e x h a u s t in g  i t .
Thus i f  A canno t r e j e c t  some s u b - s e t  o f  h i s  t o t a l  b e l i e f s  
B (a  ) ,  I'd.thout th e r e b y  demanding th a t  he have no b e l i e f s  a t  
a l l , i f  he a p p l ie d  th e  same c o n s id e r a t io n s  to  each  o f  th e  
s u b - s e t s  o f  B ( a ) ,  then and on ly  th en  do we have a genu ine  
c l a s h  o f  th e  t  o n o rm a tiv e  p r i n c i p l e s .  ( i t  i s  to  be n o te d
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t h a t  the  f o r c e  o f  h av in g  to  r e j e c t  a  s e t  o f  b e l i e f s ,  when th e  
t  o p r i n c i p l e s  c l a s h ,  i s  n o t  h av in g  t o  r - . j e c t  and s t a r t  a g a in  
b u t  h av in g  to  r e j e c t  and n o t  be a b le  to  s t a r t  a g a in * )
I n  h i s  a r t i c l e s  • E t h i c a l  C o n s i s t e n c y ' and "Consistency 
and Healism*^^^ B.A.O. W illiam s has  c o n v in c in g ly  gho%m t h a t  
when moral p r i n c i p l e s  c l a s h  we do n o t  r : j e o t  one as  i n v a l i d ,  
as  we d o , s a y ,  i n  th e  c a se  o f  i n d i c a t i v e  s e n te n c e s  when we 
r e j e c t  one as f a l s e .  Nor do wr n e c e s s a r i l y  c u r t a i l  th e  scope 
o f  one p r i n c i p l e .  But j u s t  as when we d i s c o v e r  t h a t  we have 
c o n f l i c t i n g  d e s i r  s we a r b i t r a t e  i n  fa v o u r  o f  o n e ,  i . e . , we 
s a t i s f y  one d e s i r  r a t h e r  th a n  th e  o t h e r ,  w i th o u t  t h i s  
n e c e s s a r i l y  c a s t i n g  a s p e r s io n s  on th e  d e s i r e  l e f t  u n s a t i s f i e d ,  
so  we do w ith  n o rm a tiv e  j r i n c i p l e s  when th ey  c l a s h .  There  
can be  no 'ough t*  abou t th e  a r b i t r a t i o n ,  s in c e  p r i n c i p l e s ,  l i k e  
d e s i r e s , a r e  n o t  v a l i d a t e d  in  th e  same way as  i n d i c a t i v e  
s e n te n c e s .  Thus t h e r e  can be noe argument o f  th e  form we have 
been  c o n s id e r in g ;  a l l  t h a t  can be  s a id  i s  t h a t  i n  s i t u a t i o n s  
where th e  t  o^ e p is te m ic  p r i n c i p l e s  c l a s h  we do a r b i t r a t e  i n  
fa v o u r  o f  'A l l e v i a t e  doubt* and n o t  th e  o t h e r  way ro u n d .  I t  
i s  t h i s  t h e r e f o r e  t h a t  g iv e s  us o u r  s o l u t i o n  t o  th e  p r e fa c e  
p a rad o x .
î^hat th e  p r e f a c e  paradox  and th e  l o t t e r y  paradox  have sho^m 
i s  t h a t  th e  modo o f  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  o f  b e l i e f s  t h a t  we employ and 
t h a t  p roposed  by th e  p r o b a b i l i s t s  s u f f e r s  a s i m i l a r  f la w .
Howev r ,  p r o b a b i l i s t i c  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  s u f f ^ ^ s  many o th e r  flai-m -  
f law s  we have good re a so n  to  su p p o s-  do n o t  i n f e c t  ou r  a c t u a l  
mode o f  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  as  we showed i n  C h ap te r  F o u r .  T h is  was 
s u f f i c i  ent to  show f i r s t l y  t h a t  p r o b a b i l i s t i c  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  
i s  n o t  the one we em ploy, and s e c o n d ly  t h a t  ther^  i s  n o t  re a so n  
why W-. sh o u ld  employ i t .  I n  t h i s  c h a p te r  w have shoim how, 
b y  a c c e p t in g  a perh ap s  unex p ec ted  com l e x i t y  i n  th e  n o t io n  o f
(a)  P.A.S.S. 1965. p p . 103- 2 4 . ( t )  p . A.S.3 . ,  I 9 6 6 . p p .1 -2 2 .
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r a t i o n a l i t y ,  th e  f la w  i n d i c a t e d  h, th e  p r e fa c e  p aradox  need 
n o t  he s e e n  to  he  f a t a l .  T h is  co m p lex ity  demands a move 
away from a r a t h e r  pwr%sgtio n o t io n  o f  r a t i o n a l i t y ,  to  a 
n o t io n  i n  which we have to  a c c e p t  t h a t  th e r e  a r e ,  p o s s i b l y ,  
many com peting  demands betw een which we s im p ly  have to  
e f f e c t  a compromise. Such a-com plex  n o t i o n ,  a l th o u g h  
perh ap s  l a c k in g  in  a e s t h e t i c  a p p e a l ,  i s  more a p p r o p r i a t e  to  
th e  c o m n le x i t ! es o f  th e  b e in g  i t  i s  d e s ig n e d  t o  a p p ly  t o .
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